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The dissertation examines two separate yet significant Information Technology 
(IT) issues: one dealing with IT risk and the other involving the adoption of IT. The IT 
risks that the dissertation focuses are information security breaches and the 
adoption/outsourcing of big data analytics. Using competitive dynamics theory and the 
theory of information transfer, the dissertation examines whether there is a spillover 
effect from information security breaches of breached firms to those firms’ rivals. Market 
reaction from spillover effects is captured from market activity and information 
asymmetry. The results suggest that the market of rival firms react to the focal firm’s 
experience of a data breach. However, the overall effects of data breaches on rival firms 
are the opposite to those to focal firms, although in many cases rival firms also 
experience negative reactions in the financial markets. Specifically, the results suggest 
that the characteristics of data breach types and previous data breach histories of focal 
firms have implications for rivals. However, strong information technology governance 
capabilities of rivals play a shielding role in mitigating those negative effects. 
The dissertation also examines the adoption of big data analytics by Internal Audit 
Function (IAF). Particularly, the dissertation examines the implications of data analytics 
challenges to the adoption of big data analytics by IAF. The results suggest that data-
specific IT knowledge rather than general IT knowledge is a significant predictor of 




knowledge also contributes to the adoption of big data analytics. Furthermore, if IAFs 
face management challenges, such as fraud risk detection, they are also more likely to 
adopt big data analytics. Results from interaction effects analysis suggest that Chief 
Audit Executives (CAEs) with CPA certifications are more likely to adopt big data 
analytics than the CAEs without CPA certification, when the size of the organization is 
small, when the size of the IAF is small, or when there is a lack of data-specific IT 
knowledge or business skills. Another important finding is that when two groups of IAFs 
have similar size and data-specific IT knowledge, IAFs with fraud detection 
responsibilities are more likely to adopt big data analytics. Finally, IAFs in Anglo culture 
countries are more likely to adopt big data analytics than IAFs in non-Anglo culture 
countries, even when both IAFs have the same size and data-specific IT knowledge. 
Finally, the dissertation examines the motivation of outsourcing of data analytics 
by IAF. The results suggest, contrary to conventional wisdom, that economic factors are 
not a significant predictor. Rather, strategic and sociological factors are significant in 
predicting the outsourcing of big data analytics. Specifically, IAFs outsource big data 
analytics when they lack data skills and are tasked with fraud risk management. 
Additionally, the role Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) is also significant. There is also a 
cultural variation of the outsourcing decision: IAFs from developing nations are more 
likely to outsource than are the IAFs from the developed countries. Further analysis of 
the interaction effects of these significant variables suggests that as the data skills of IAFs 
increase, the conditional difference of the likelihood of outsourcing decreases, suggesting 
that IAFs recognize both the value of data analytics and their lack of competencies. The 




implications about the formation of effective internal controls designed to mitigate the 
risks in the outsourcing decision. Moreover, external auditors will find the results useful 
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Organizations are increasingly utilizing Information Technology (IT) resources 
for competitive advantages. Effective utilization of IT resources affects the bottom line of 
organizations. However, utilization of IT is not without risk; the landscape of IT risks is 
evolving. In this dissertation, I will focus on two significant IT issues: one is IT risk and 
the other is the challenge of adoption/outsourcing of an emerging IT. One risk which the 
dissertation focuses upon is the possibility of information security breaches; the other risk 
studied here is related to big data analytics particularly, the challenges inherent in 
adoption and outsourcing of big data analytics by auditors. 
 
Information Security Breaches 
 
Cyberattacks have become a common IT risk. However, until recently, such 
attacks and breaches were hardly discussed. For organizations, the implications for 
cyberattacks are no longer confined to server rooms; they have now become a very 
significant issue for board rooms. The Ponemon Institute (2017) reports that, on average, 
cyber-crime costs $11.7 million per company and that the number of security breaches 
firms experienced increased annually by 27.4%. Juniper Research (2015) estimates that 




the expenses estimated in 2015.  Consumer market technology users are also concerned 
about data breaches. The Securities and Exchange Commission (2011) notes that 
“Registrants should address cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents in their 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 
(MD&A), Risk Factors, Description of Business, Legal Proceedings and Financial 
Statement Disclosures.” These backdrops underlie the significance of research related to 
information security breaches. 
 
Big Data Analytics 
 
Big data analytics has recently become a buzzword in the literature. The Economist 
(2017) reports that the world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data. Today’s 
vast amount of data provides companies with great opportunities to create competitive 
advantage, and research suggests that data-driven decision-making leads to significant 
differences in Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and firm productivity 
(Provost and Fawcett 2013).  Investments in big data analytics signal greater potential for 
organizations. International Data Corporation (2015) forecasts that by 2019, organizations 
around the world will spend about $48.6 billion on big data analytics and related services. 
Big data analytics is important for the accounting profession because data 
gathering and analysis technologies have the potential to fundamentally change 
accounting and auditing task processes (Schneider et al. 2015). It is noted that the 
emergence of big data analytics will significantly change the “infer (insight), predict 
(foresight), and assure (oversight) tasks” performed by accountants and auditors. 
Although statistics suggests that organizations (which is to say, the clients of 




lagging behind their clients in adopting the technology. Therefore, research related to the 
use of big data analytics by accountants/auditors is very important. 
 
Research Questions and Motivations for the Research 
Information Transfer of Information  
Security Breach 
 
Cybersecurity research has focused on many aspects of IT uses, including 
behavioral issues of organizational insiders, security culture, and the economic 
significance of breaches in capital markets. Most studies dealing with the economic 
significance of data breaches focus on the market reactions of the investors in breached 
firms. For example,  Campbell et al. (2003) examined the economic effect of information 
security breaches reported in press on the publicly listed companies in the US. Overall, 
they find limited evidence of negative market reactions to the announcement of 
information security breaches. However, cross-sectional analysis suggests that breach 
types, particularly the compromise of confidential information, can cause significant 
market reactions. Similarly, Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang (2006) documented 
significant market reaction following the announcement of security breaches. Overall, 
these studies suggest that data breaches have capital market consequences for the 
breached firms.  
One noteworthy point of the studies that lead to this conclusion is that they 
studied only breached firms. However, theories suggest that market reactions to the 
announcement of data breaches are not confined to breached firms, alone, and can impact 
rival firms in the same marketplaces. Hence, there are potentially far-reaching effects. 




likely to be affected by the other firms’ data breaches. There are two mechanisms through 
which this information transfer might spread – the contagion effect (rivals experience 
same effect of the breached firms) or competitive effect (rivals experience the opposite 
effect of the breached firms). The literature suggests that these kinds of information 
transfer occur for many other events as well, such as bankruptcy (Lang and Stulz 1992), 
accounting restatements (Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson 2008), financial misconduct 
(Paruchuri and Misangyi 2015), or even environmental problems (Barnett and King 
2008). Nevertheless, research related to the information transfer of security breach is 
sparse. Therefore, the first study of the dissertation seeks the answer to the question, “Is 
there any information transfer from security breaches from breached firm to related 
firms?” 
Adoption of Big Data Analytics by  
Accountants/Auditors 
 
Though big data analytics has significant implications for auditors and 
accountants, Earley (2015) suggests that significant hurdles need to be overcome in order 
to realize the benefits of data analytics. Existing literature has identified a number of 
challenges to the adoption of big data analytics (Sivarajah et al. 2017; Schneider et al. 
2015). Some of these challenges include data challenges (skills), process challenges 
(cognition), and management challenges (organization). Skill challenges (i.e., data) imply 
that since data analytics is an emerging technology, existing IT skills might not suffice 
for the use of data analytics. Process challenges (i.e., cognition) challenges imply that big 
data poses challenges to the information process and thus requires high tolerance for 
ambiguity. Additionally, it is considered that extracting meaningful knowledge from big 




thinking about the data. Finally, management challenges (i.e., organizational issues) 
implies that organizations will not mobilize themselves to adopt data analytics unless 
there are circumstances in which big data analytics can contribute significantly to 
operation.  The second study of the dissertation seeks the answers to the question, “Do 
the challenges to the adoption of big data analytics have implications for auditors?” 
Outsourcing of Big Data Analytics  
by Accountants/Auditors  
 
Though data analytics has implications for accountants/auditors, a number of 
challenges to the adoption of data analytics might prevent accountants/auditors from 
using data analytics. In such circumstances, outsourcing might be a better option than 
internal adoption. Moreover, the scarcity of skilled personnel for data analytics and the 
severe competition between organizations for these same personnel might also lead 
accountants/auditors to outsource big data analytics.        
The study of outsourcing of big data analytics by auditors is important because 
the auditors who provide input data for decisions on outsourcing data analytics will also 
be directly affected by the outcome of those decisions and must subsequently rely on the 
work performed by the chosen service organization; thus, the motivations of accounting 
personnel who provide the financial inputs to outsourcing decisions are highly relevant 
and must be carefully considered before outsourcing decisions are undertaken (Christ, 
Mintchik, et al. 2015). Further, Blaskovich and Mintchik (2011, 13) suggest that although 
research on the drivers of outsourcing has been conducted for several decades, the 
dynamic nature of technology continues to raise many interesting questions and offer 
fruitful avenues for research. Moreover, Christ et al. (2015) noted that outsourcing of 




function are not identical business practices. Therefore, accounting scholars should 
exercise caution and evaluate the similarity of contextual factors when considering 
whether to extrapolate results in the literature concerning outsourcing of the IT function 
to research findings on big data analytics outsourcing. To sum up, given the above 
backdrops, the study of the outsourcing of data analytics by auditors warrants further 
investigation. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation consists of three separate studies related to IT risks and 
adoption/outsourcing of an emerging IT. The first study, “Reaction of the Investors of 
Rival Firms to the Information Security Breach of Focal Firms: Evidence from Market 
Activity and Information Asymmetry,” deals with whether the markets of rivals firms of 
data breached firms react when the firms announce their data breaches. The second study, 
“Big Data Analytics Challenges and Internal Audit Function (IAF)’s Reliance on Big 
Data Analytics,” identifies challenges to the adoption of data analytics and their 
implications for accountants and auditors for such adoption decisions. The third study, 
“Outsourcing of Big Data Analytics by Internal Audit Function (IAF),” focuses on the 
factors that lead IAF to outsource big data analytics. The last section of the dissertation 









REACTION OF THE INVESTORS OF RIVAL FIRMS TO THE 
INFORMATION SECURITY BREACH OF FOCAL FIRMS: 






Data breaches have become commonplace; every day companies fall victim to 
new and sophisticated types of exploits. In 2014, the number of average successful cyber-
attacks per week was 160; a figure that is three times 2010 levels (Walters 2015). 
Ponemon Institute (2017) reports that, on average, cyber-crime costs $11.7 million per 
year per company and that the number of security breaches increased by 27.4%, annually. 
Juniper Research (2015) estimates that in 2019 cybercrime will cost companies more than 
a combined $2 trillion per year; a figure that is four times 2015 levels.  
Regulators are also concerned about data breaches. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (2011) noted that “Registrants should address cybersecurity risks and cyber 
incidents in their Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Results of Operations (MD&A), Risk Factors, Description of Business, Legal 
Proceedings and Financial Statement Disclosures,” and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (2017) introduced a cyber-security risk management 




that 70% of investors are interested in the cybersecurity policies of organizations and that 
about 80% of investors are not likely to invest in firms with a data breach history. These 
findings emphasize the importance of studying organizational data breaches.  
Much data breach research tests the economic significance of breaches. 
Specifically, these studies examine the reactions of the market (i.e., investors) when news 
of data breaches is made public either by the breached companies or by the press. 
Campbell et al. (2003) examined the economic effect of information security breaches 
reported in the press on the listed companies in the US. Overall, they found limited 
evidence of negative market reactions to the announcement of information security 
breaches. However, the cross-sectional analysis suggested that breach types, particularly 
breaches involving the compromise of confidential information, produce a significant 
market reaction. Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) studied the impact of Denial-of-Service 
(DOS) attack announcements on the market for a period of four and a half years. As was 
the case with Campbell et al. (2003), they did not identify any general market reaction; 
however, Internet-specific companies experienced more negative market reactions than 
other sorts of companies.  
Hovav and D’Arcy (2004) studied the impact of virus attack announcements on 
the market value of affected firms and found that there is no overall significant impact of 
virus attack announcements on the share price of the affected companies. On the other 
hand, many studies do document negative market reactions to the announcement of data 
breaches. For example, Kannan, Rees, and Sridhar (2007) studied the cross sectional 
characteristics of different factors related to data breaches; these factors include the 




did not find any significant market reactions in response to breaches; however, market 
reactions were significant for the breaches that followed September 11, 2001. Moreover, 
market reactions for dot-com era data breaches were significantly different from those of 
the post dot-com era. Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang (2006) documented significant 
market reaction following the announcement of security breaches, and they further 
indicate that retail firms suffer more from the effects of breach announcements than other 
sorts of firms.  Similarly, many other studies have attempted to document the economic 
effects of security breaches, but they have provided mixed results.   
Theories suggest that market reactions to the announcement of data breaches are 
not confined to the breached firms, alone. Rather, there are far-reaching effects. The 
theory of competitive dynamics suggests that rival firms are also likely to be affected by 
announcements of data breaches of focal firms1. This information transfer between firms 
occurs through two different yet significant mechanisms: the contagion effect (influence 
similar to that experienced by the rival firm) or competitive effect (an effect opposite that 
of the rival’s). The extant behavioral information security literature is silent on that nature 
and causes of such information transfer effects. Though very few studies focus on 
unaffected firms, it is likely that results from the few studies that have been conducted 
suffer from either generalization of the results or the reliability issues related to the 
measures of market reactions. Hinz et al. (2015) focused on the consumer electronics 
industry, but their sample size was only six companies. The results of the study suggest 
that the share price of both directly affected companies and related companies decreased. 
Zafar, Ko, and Osei-Bryson (2012) also studied both breached firms and non-breached 
                                                 




firms, but they tried to document the financial impact by using corporate financial ratios, 
which are very unreliable measures of market reactions. 
The study by Kannan, Rees, and Sridhar (2007) examined market reactions of 
breached firms and matched control firms; therefore, their results are not directly 
applicable for understanding rival firm market reactions. Furthermore, Cavusoglu, 
Mishra, and Raghunathan (2004) studied market reaction of breached firms and their 
Internet security suppliers, the results of which are also not generalizable to rivals of the 
breached firms. Ettredge and Richardson (2003) studied information transfer in the late 
dot-com era in which they classified their firms on the basis of the reliance on the 
Internet, which is not generalizable today because of the growing extent of data breaches 
and their increasingly significant impacts. More recently, Kashmiri, Nicol, and Hsu 
(2017) studied the information transfer of the Target Corporation data breach to other 
U.S. retailers in the same industry and found that there was a contagion effect from the 
Target data breach; in short, numerous U.S. retailers in Target’s market segment suffered 
negative abnormal returns. The extent of the contagion effect in the Target case was 
conditioned on moderating factors such as company size and product market similarity, 
governance-related strength, information-technology related ability, marketing ability, 
and corporate social responsibility. The limitation of the study is that it examined only a 
single data breach, and thus lacks appreciable external validity. Similarly, Martin, Borah, 
and Palmatier (2017) found that data breaches of focal firms have a negative spillover 
effect for rival firms, also suggesting a contagion effect. However, Jeong, Lee, and Lim 
(2018) have found that data breaches of focal firms have  a competitive effect on their 




Martin, Borah, and Palmatier (2017).  All of these researchers studied abnormal returns. 
However, this dissertation study examines abnormal turnover and the bid-ask spread to 
measure the market reaction of rival firms; these metrics capture changes in the 
expectations of individual investors, and they are more powerful than simple price tests. 
Taken together, this backdrop suggests that there is a research gap for the effect of data 
breaches on non-breached firms, particularly for rival firms using more reliable market 
metrics that will better capture the reactions of the markets.  
Using data from privacyrights.org, COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and BOARDEX, I find 
evidence that markets of rival firms react when competing firms experience data 
breaches. While the overall effects of data breaches for focal firms are opposite those of 
rival firms, in many cases rival firms’ markets also react negatively. Specifically, the 
characteristics of data breach type and previous data breach history of focal firms have 
implications for the impact on their rivals. However, strong information technology 
governance on the part of rivals plays a shielding role in mitigating those negative 
effects. Further, though it is hypothesized that strategic similarities of breached firms to 
their rivals also has implications, results do not document this effect. Even so, the results 
of the study are robust to alternative specification of both the models and the sample.  
The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the study contributes 
to the literature on information transfer analysis between firms; the previous literature 
established that information does transfer between the investors of different firms. In the 
context of data breaches, however, very few studies focus on the influence of information 
transfer about data breaches between firms. The few extant studies suffer from limitations 




used in this study covers a wide range of industries and employs different market metrics, 
it fills the void left by prior research. 
In a second major contribution, this study is the first to focus on stock trading 
volume and the bid-ask spread as a measure of the market reactions of rival firms to data 
breaches of focal firms. On the one hand, equities pricing signals the average belief of 
investors about a given company and its current status. On the other hand, equities 
trading volume represents the total of individual investors’ trades (Bamber and Cheon 
1995) and can, in that sense, serve as an indicator of overall market sentiment about the 
focal company. Therefore, trading volume might identify information content that is 
cancelled out in the average pricing process and vice versa (Bamber and Cheon 1995). 
For that reason, trading volume analysis complements rather than substitutes for pricing 
analysis. Additionally, the focus on trading volume may enable us to capture the 
differences between individual and institutional investors which are averaged out in the 
pricing process, and, thus, provide a better test of the effects of information about a 
breach on the market of firms and their competitors (Chen and Sami 2008).  
Third, there is a stream of research on the effects of information asymmetry in the 
markets of rival firms following data breaches of focal firms. Very few studies have 
focused on the information asymmetry effect of such data breaches, and it is generally 
considered that news of a data breach announcement should be completely unexpected 
(Rosati et al. 2017). For that reason, an abnormal bid-ask spread might be expected due to 
the information shock; this information shock creates higher uncertainty, and this will 
result in increasing the risk of exposure in informed market trading for stocks of focal 




rivals, this same information asymmetry might be present in the markets of rival firms, as 
well.  
Lastly, this study identifies factors that might have implications for rivals such as 
characteristics of data breaches and the previous history of data breaches for focal firms. 
The study suggests that the strong information technology governance of rival firms 
might help to mitigate negative consequences of focal firm data breaches. These results 
provide guidance for practitioners on ways to strengthen cybersecurity risk management 
programs in their organizations, which is considered an important step even for firms 
which are not yet affected by the data breaches in their markets.  
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
 
The research is based on theories drawn from the disciplines of finance, 
management and accounting. The first theoretical foundation of the research is based on 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) of Fama (1970). According to the EMH, share 
prices reflect all possible available information about a firm. A firm’s value at time t, 
expressed by Vt, can be written as the discounted present value of expected future cash 
flows given that all information is available:  
Vt = E [∑
𝑥𝑖 | ∅𝑡






In equation (2.1), E is the expectation, T represents the terminal period, 𝑥𝑖  | ∅𝑡 is 
the expected net cash inflows in period i given that information ∅𝑡 is available at time t, 
and 𝑟𝑗
𝑡 is the cost (that is, the interest rate) faced by the firm in period j at time t. 
However, the market is often characterized by information asymmetry and such 




breaches (∅𝑡) from different sources, but most often from news media. This information 
leads investors to reassess their expectation about future cash flows.  
The second theoretical perspective on which the research draws is the theory of 
competitive dynamics. Under competitive dynamics, when information such as a firm’s 
experience of a data breach is revealed to market, this revelation not only affects the 
breached companies but can also affect negatively the competitors in the industry, as 
well. This outcome is described as a contagion effect. Contagion effects are not limited to 
data breaches; they are known to occur in varying situations such as bankruptcy 
announcements (Lang and Stulz 1992), accounting restatements (Gleason, Jenkins, and 
Johnson 2008), news of financial misconduct (Paruchuri and Misangyi 2015), or an the 
occurrence of an environmental problem such as a chemical spill (Barnett and King 
2008). In these instances, financial markets appear to adjust expectations downward for 
firms in the industry other than the focal firm (which is, of course, also impact), even 
when investment analysts do not alter their earnings forecasts. As in the case of 
communicable diseases, the contagion effect spreads from the affected firm to other firms 
in the industry, leading to industry-wide stock price declines (Arthurs et al. 2015).     
Another school of thought related to competitive dynamics suggests that there is a 
theoretical possibility that competitor firms may actually benefit from a focal firm data 
breach. This school of thought is called the competitive effect. Prior literature related to 
different types of  negative news about the organizations demonstrated support for this 
effect (Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija 1997; Haensly, Theis, and Swanson 2001). The 
competitive effect holds that when a focal firm is in distress, rivals in the industry 




perceived by investors in a positive light. The market’s perception of the effect of 
negative news is revealed in the process of bidding for the rights to the residual cash 
flows among the firms in the industry. So, when one firm experiences a data breach, it is 
natural to assume that investors will bid up competitors’ stocks, thus resulting in stock 
gains.   
Actually, these competitive dynamics theories suggest that rival firms will always 
respond because they view the focal firm’s data breach as a challenge and want to protect 
their own market positions, profitability, and financial market valuations. Additionally, 
they don’t want to be considered a less valuable investment alternative to stakeholders 
(Farah 2017). However, the reactions of rivals are not uniform; their responses depend on 
many organizational and competitive factors. Some rivals might decide to respond 
aggressively to data breaches by taking a broad array of competitive actions. Others 
might decide not to respond, at all.  
Signaling Theory holds that the announcement of an event about one party will 
provide other parties with information, thus permitting them to infer from the 
announcement. Signaling theory is widely used in economics, finance, and the accounting 
literature. In this school of thought, announcements of data breaches by focal firms serves 
to relay information to rivals. Rivals might perceive that they need take initiative to avoid 
such events in the future. Alternatively, they (the rivals) might also know that the 
susceptibility of focal firms might be perceived as a benefit by the rivals. In the literature 
related to finance, economics, and accounting, there are numerous studies that support 
signaling theory perspectives. Connelly et al.  (2011) described the signaling theory effect 





Figure 2.1 Signaling Theory Effect 
 
As discussed, rival firms are likely to respond to the focal firm’s data breaches. 
However, defining the nature of what constitutes “rival firms” is critical. Here, I will 
define rivals using the Text-Based Network Industry Classification (TNIC) approach 
developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016), who use topic modeling to identify 
rivals. Other studies have also used the same method to identify rivals for investigation 
(Sheikh 2018; Collins, Kim, and Ohn 2018).  
I first measure the reaction of the market by using trading volume data. The 
literature suggests that the trading volume metric captures changes in the expectations of 
individual investors and that it is a more powerful test than price tests (Bamber, Barron, 
and Stevens 2011). Moreover, where stock price reactions are determined by the average 
investor’s beliefs about a specific event, trading volume reaction arises from 
heterogeneous beliefs about the future price trends  among individual investors (Beaver 
1968); trading volume reactions can exist without price reactions, and vice versa (Bamber 
and Cheon 1995). However, trading volume better captures the differences between 
individual investors and institutional investors that may be cancelled out in price analysis 




reactions in small sample settings, as well (Cready and Hurtt 2002; Cready and Mynatt 
1991). Experimental studies of trading volume also suggest that trading activity around 
announcements should increase/decrease in reaction to the magnitude of the news 
characterized by such announcements (Gillette et al. 1999), a finding that is consistent 
with Kim and Verrecchia (1991).  
Second, I measure the reaction of investors to the data breach of focal firms using 
a bid-ask spread. Bid-ask spread serves to capture information asymmetry. If a new 
announcement or disclosure by a breached company increases uncertainty, then the bid-
ask spread will increase. Alternatively, if a new announcement/disclosure decreases 
uncertainty, the bid-ask spread will decrease. Much research in the accounting and 
finance literature confirms these findings; for example, Coller and Yohn (1997) 
documented that the bid-ask spread after management earnings forecasts is significantly 
smaller than that before the announcements. Other studies include bid-ask spread changes 
in response to auditor changes (Hagigi, Kluger, and Shields 1993), stock repurchases 
(Franz, Rao, and Tripathy 1995), bankruptcies (Frino, Jones, and Wong 2007), and 
mergers and acquisitions (Chan, Ge, and Lin 2015). Since a data breach announcement 
should be completely unexpected (Rosati et al. 2017), it is reasonable to expect that an 
abnormal level of spread might ensue due to information shock, which creates higher 
uncertainty and thus increases the risk of exposure from  informed trading for focal firms.  
Finally, I also use abnormal returns measures. This is a method used by many 
studies capturing the reaction of the market to the effect of data breaches. One exception 
is Rosati et al. (2017), who used abnormal turnover and abnormal bid-ask spreads to 




As discussed above, the effects on the markets of rivals of data breaches on the 
part of focal firms are not clear; thus, the following hypotheses are suggested:  
H1a: The abnormal trading volume of rival firms is significantly related to the 
announcement of security breaches of focal firms. 
H1b: The abnormal bid-ask spread of rival firms is significantly related to the 
announcement of security breaches of focal firms. 
H1c: The abnormal returns of rival firms are significantly related to the 
announcement of security breaches of focal firms. 
For trading volume, I utilize daily stock turnover. The methodology I follow for 
daily stock turnover is the same as that of Rosati et al. (2017) . Turnover is defined as 
trading volume divided by outstanding shares. I calculate the abnormal turnover as 
follows: 
ATURNi,t = (TURNi,t - NTURNi,t) / std (NTURNi,t) 
Eq. (2.2) 
 





Here, TURNi,t is the turnover on day t associated with event i; ATURNi,t  is the 
abnormal turnover on day t associated with event i; and NTURNi,t is the average normal 
turnover associated with event i as calculated over the estimation period. The model for 
formal testing of the cross-sectional average abnormal turnover is:  
𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡  = 1/n   (∑ 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 ), t = - 5 to + 5 
Eq. (2.4) 
 
I also estimate the abnormal bid-ask spread as suggested by Rosati et al. (2017). 




ABASi,t = (BASi,t - NBAS i,t) 
Eq. (2.5) 
 





Here, BASi,t is the bid-ask spread on day t with event i; ABASi,t is the abnormal bid-
ask spread on day t associated with event i; and NBASi is the average normal bid-ask spread 
associated with event i as calculated over the estimation period. The model for formal 
testing of the cross-sectional average abnormal bid-ask spread is: 
 𝐴𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡  = 1/n  (∑ 𝐴𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 ), t = -5 to +5 
Eq. (2.7) 
 
Finally, I measure the reaction of market by using Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). This measure is in line with previous studies that measured the reactions of the 
market to the announcement of data breaches of focal firms. To determine whether an 
announcement affects the stock price, the study first estimate what the return of the stock 
would have been had the event not occurred, that is, the normal return. There are several 
ways to calculate the normal return, such as Capital Assets Pricing Model (which is also 
called the market model), and the Fama-French Three Factor Model. Consistent with prior 
studies, I use the market model. The model is:  
 Ri,t  = αi  + βi Rm,t + εi,t 
Eq. (2.8) 
 
Here Ri,t  is the return of the stock i on day t; Rm,t  is the return on the market 
portfolio on day t; αi and βi are the intercepts and slope coefficients respectively for firm 
i; and εi,t is the disturbance term for stock i on day t, with Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
properties. The event window is – five to + five days and the estimation window is – 132 




to 200 days (Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2004). My estimation period and 
event period are in line with Rosati et al (2017).  I obtain stock price data from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices database (CRSP) and financial data from the 
COMPUSTAT database. The equations to measure Abnormal Return (AR) and 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) are given below: 
 ARi,t = Ri,t  - (αi  + βi Rm,t ) 
Eq. (2.9) 
 
 CARi = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑡= −𝑇 i,t 
Eq. (2.10) 
 
Here, Ri,t  = return of stock i at time t; Rm,t  = market return at time t. αi and βi = 
OLS parameter estimates obtained from estimation period. 
Information Technology Governance (ITG), a subset of corporate governance, 
focuses on information and technology and its performance and risks. In other words, 
ITG is a combination of tools, processes, methodologies that help organizations align 
strategy and goals with IT services, infrastructure, or environments by reducing the risks 
arising from the use of IT. A high level of board ITG involvement has implications for 
strategic alignment and organizational performance (Turel and Bart 2014; Turel, Liu, and 
Bart 2017). Zafar, Ko, and Osei-Bryson (2016) documented that when organizations 
experience data breaches, organizations which have Chief Information Officers (CIO) in 
their top management team can recover damages or losses quicker than organizations that 
do not. Further, they find that having a CIO in top management has a significant positive 
impact on firm performance in the aftermath of data breaches. Feng and Wang (2018) 
study the relationship between a CIO’s risk appetite and subsequent data breaches, and 




security incidents. Further, they confirm that this association is stronger if the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) is risk averse, as well. Higgs et al. (2016) studied the signaling 
effect of the existence  of board-level technology committees to the firms’ ability to 
detect and respond to security breaches. Their results indicated that firms with technology 
committees are more likely to have reported the occurrence of breaches in a given year 
than are firms without such committees; it is likely that such results arise from “young” 
technology committees and external sources of breaches, however. As a technology 
committee becomes more mature and established, a firm is not as likely to be breached. 
Further, Higgs et al. (2016) documents that the presence of technology committee 
mitigates negative market reactions arising from the data breaches. Taken together, these 
results suggest that strong Information Technology Governance (ITG) has implications 
for market reactions to data breaches.  
Kwon, Ulmer, and Wang (2012) examined how an IT executive’s position in a 
top management team and how his/her compensation are associated with the probability 
of data breaches. Their results indicate that an IT executive’s involvement in the top 
management team is negatively associated with the possibility of information security 
breaches. They also found that the compensation differences between IT and non-IT 
executives are negatively associated with the likelihood of information security breaches. 
Haislip, Lim, and Pinsker (2017) investigated the independent relationship of CEO IT 
expertise, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) IT expertise, and the existence of board level 
technology committees with the subsequent likelihood of data breaches. Their results 
indicate that firms that either employ a CEO with IT expertise or implement a technology 




CFO with IT expertise are less likely to report a breach, thus suggesting that these firms 
are better at preventing breaches. Moreover, Haislip et al. (2016, 2015) document that 
firms experiencing Information Technology Material Weakness (ITMW) also experience 
higher CEO, CFO, and director turnover than non-ITMW firms; moreover, these ITMW 
firms hire CEOs, CFOs, and directors with higher levels of IT expertise, and upgrade 
their IT significantly following ITMW events as an attempt to legitimize their existence. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that ITG has implications for the occurrence of 
security breaches. Extrapolating these findings relating characteristics of focal firms to 
rival firms, I hypothesize the following:   
H2a: The Information Technology Governance (ITG) in rival firms is 
significantly associated with abnormal trading volume in response to the announcement 
of data breaches of focal firms. 
H2b: Information Technology Governance (ITG) in rival firms is significantly 
associated with abnormal bid-ask spreads in response to the announcement of data 
breaches of focal firms. 
H2c: The Information Technology Governance (ITG) in rival firms is significantly 
associated with abnormal returns in response to the announcement of data breaches of 
focal firms. 
In order to measure ITG, I adopt a holistic view. I do not confine ITG to only the 
technology committee; rather, I include the role of CIO, Chief Security Officer (CSO), 
the Risk Committee, and the Compliance Committee. Since the literature supports the 
role each of these high offices in cybersecurity risk management, the measurement will 




executive position, they will be represented by a variable called ITG, where one presents 
the existence of either tech committee, risk committee, compliance committee, CIO, or 
CSO; 0, otherwise.  
However, as suggested by Higgs et al. (2016), having a strong ITG is not a 
random occurrence, which suggests the potential for endogeneity issues; that is, firms 
having strong ITG might be more (less) likely to be breached. To address the endogeneity 
issue, I will use propensity score matching as was done by Higgs et al. (2016). Like 
Higgs et al. (2016), I will use the ITG prediction model from Premuroso and 
Bhattacharya (2007). The model is: 
ITG = ℽ0 + ℽ1 (R&D Exp) + ℽ2 (NPM) + ℽ3 (ROE) + ℽ4 (LEVERAGE) + ℽ5 
(ROA) + ℽ6 (WC) + ℽ7 (Tobin’s q) + ℽ8 (LOGTA) + ℽ9 (LOSS) + ℽ10 
(IC_WEAKNESS) + ℽ11 (PAST_BREACH) + ε 
Eq.  (2.11) 
 
Here, R&D Exp is research and development and in-process R&D expense 
reported in company income statements; NPM, net profit margin, is net income divided 
by total revenue; ROE, return on equity, is net income divided by average shareholders’ 
equity; LEVERAGE is calculated as long-term debt divided by average shareholders’ 
equity; ROA, return on assets, is net income divided by average assets; WC, working 
capital, is current assets divided by current liabilities; Tobin’s q is the market value of 
equity divided by assets; LOGTA is the natural log of total assets; LOSS is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm reports a negative net income, zero otherwise; and 
IC_WEAKNESS is an indicator variable equal to one if the company has a material 
weakness in internal control over financial reporting, zero otherwise; PAST_BREACH is 




zero otherwise. By using propensity score matching, I will calculate a matched sample 
and run the analysis for the matched sample. 
Firms compete for resources and capabilities in the strategic factor markets. If two 
firms are strategically similar, then that similarity impacts firm behavior and shapes the 
competitive dynamics for the two firms. There are two schools of thought about the 
relationship between strategic similarity and rivalry; one school of thought, which lacks 
generalizability, suggests that strategic similarity between two firms reduces rivalry. The 
latter school of thought suggests the opposite and has a degree of empirical support 
(Gimeno and Woo 1996). So, if focal firms and rivals are strategically similar, then it is 
expected that the announcement of data breaches by focal firms will affect rivals. Feng 
and Wang (2018) documented that the strategic position of a company acts as a 
moderator in the relationship between CIO risk aversion and the occurrence of data 
breaches. Strategic similarity intensifies the rivalry among firms and financial markets 
will react per the choices made by these firms. Whenever a firm announces a data breach, 
it aims to procure a bundle of useful resources to create capabilities to avoid future 
incidents. The increased capabilities may result in higher financial performance and 
markets will react positively to the focal firm’s improved performance and profitability. 
In that manner, the market is more concerned about the future cash flows associated with 
a firm’s decision. 
After the announcements of a data breach, if the focal firm becomes more 
competitive in the product market by deploying newly acquired resources or products, 
then financial markets will presume that the future cash flows of the firm will be higher 




they do not have such surety and stability in their cash flows. Moreover, if the industry in 
which these firms operate is a low-growth industry, then higher cash flows to the focal 
firms may come at the expense of existing rivals. Hence, the effect of data breach 
announcements on the rival firm’s profitability and future cash flows can be negative and 
particularly larger in magnitude if the firms are strategically similar than if they are not 
strategically similar. The similarity of how these firms respond to different market 
situations and rivals’ actions intensifies the rivalry among the existing firms in an 
industry. Strategically similar firms benefit at the expense of the remaining firms in the 
industry, so financial markets respond by penalizing strategically similar rivals more than 
strategically dissimilar rivals. Hence, strategic similarity can moderate the relationship 
between rivals’ market valuations and a focal firm’s data breach announcement. So, the 
following hypotheses are offered: 
H3a: The trading volume of strategically similar rival firms is significantly 
related to the announcement of security breaches of focal firms. 
H3b: The bid-ask spread of strategically similar rival firms is significantly 
related to the announcement of security breaches of focal firms. 
H3c: The abnormal returns of strategically similar rival firms are significantly 
related to the announcement of security breaches of focal firms. 
A firm’s strategic emphasis can be captured using proxies from four dimensions 
—strategic capabilities, technological intensity, marketing intensity, and market-specific 
experience (Uhlenbruck et al. 2017). Hence, I will use these four dimensions to capture 
the strategic similarity/overlap between rivals and the focal firm. I use firm size, 




product-market strategies, and network strength (Josefy et al. 2015). Following Lepak, 
Takeuchi, and Snell (2003), technological intensity was operationalized using capital 
intensity and Research and Development (R&D) intensity. I will divide  the summation 
of capital expenditure (CAPEX) and R&D expenses by sales to measure technological 
intensity (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989; Osborn and Baughn 1990). Marketing intensity 
was operationalized by dividing total marketing and advertising expenses of a firm by its 
sales.  The final dimension, market-specific experience, is proxied as the number of years 
a firm has been in operation since its Initial Public Offering (IPO). The names database 
from WRDS was used to get the year in which the companies began public trading. All of 
the variables above were averaged for both focals and rivals. Then, strategic similarity, 
following the model suggested by Gimeno and Woo (1996),  is measured by one minus 
the Euclidean distances between the points in four-dimensional space (normalized to a 
zero to one range). Gimeno and Woo (1996, 330) suggested the following model for 
strategic similarity:  









The measure will take the value of zero (minimum similarity) when the Euclidean 
distance in the strategic space between two firms is the largest for all pairs in the sample, 
and it equals one (maximum) when the Euclidean distance is zero (indicating that firms 
are equal in competitive orientation).  
Research suggests that different kinds of cross sectional variations (also called 
contingency factors) such as business type, industry, type of breach, event year, and firm 




Andoh-Baidoo and Osei-Bryson 2007; Gatzlaff and McCullough 2010). Therefore, 
although the moderating effects of the above contingency factors are not hypothesized, I 
also study the extent of market reactions conditioned on some of these moderating 
variables. The following models are suggested for the study: 
ATURN =β0 + β1 (ln_PRC ) + β2 (Spread) + β3 (Vari) + β4 (ln_mktCap) + 
β5 (BMRatioi) +β6 (Leverage) + β7 (ln_BrScale) + β8 (Prior_Breach_Yes) + 
β9 (BreachType) +β10 (FirmType) + β11 (ITG) + β12 (Similarity) + εi 
Eq. (2.13) 
 
ABAS = β0 + β1 (ln_PRC) + β2 (Turnover) + β3 (Var) + β4 (ln_mktCap) + 
β5 (BMRatio) +β6 (Leverage) + β7 (ln_BrScale) + β8 (Prior_Breach_Yes) + 
β9 (BreachType) + 
β10 (FirmType) + β11 (ITG) + β12 (Similarity) + εi 
Eq. (2.14) 
 
CAR =  β0 + β1 (FirmType) + β2 (ln_mktCap) + β3 (ln_BrScale) + β4 
(Prior_Breach_Yes) + β5 (BreachType ) + β6 (ITG) + β7(Similarity)  + εi 
Eq. (2.15) 
 
Here, ATURN = the abnormal turnover; ABAS = abnormal bid-ask spread; CAR = 
Cumulative Abnormal Return; ln_PRC = natural logarithm of the closing price and it 
represents dealer’s ordering cost; Turnover = stock daily turnover and it proxies for 
inventory-holding cost; Spread = the bid-ask spread calculated using the Corwin and 
Schultz (2012) model2. Var = the difference between the low bid and high ask price, and 
it proxies for dealer’s inventory-holding risks; ln_mktCap = natural log of market 
capitalization; BMRatio = book-to-market ratio;  Leverage = debt-to-asset ratio; 
ln_BrScale = natural log of the number of records breached; Prior_Breach_Yes = dummy 
variable 1 = if a focal firm experienced a data breach before and zero otherwise; 
BreachType = {Active, Stolen, Lost; and Unknown}3; FirmType = 1 if financial 
                                                 
2 Much research in the accounting and finance literature follows the Corwin and Schultz (2012) 
procedure to calculate the bid-ask spread (Cho, Lee, and Pfeiffer Jr 2013; Egginton and McCumber 2018; 
Rosati et al. 2017).  




companies, zero otherwise; Similarity = Strategic Similarity between focals and rivals 





The event of interest for the study is the announcement of an information data 
breach. I collected the data breach event from privacyrights.org as compiled by Privacy 
Rights Clearing House, a California based non-profit organization. Many studies have 
used the same data set to identify announcement dates of data breaches (Higgs et al. 
2016; Feng and Wang 2018; Rosati et al. 2017; Edwards, Hofmeyr, and Forrest 2016). 
For rivals (competitors) selection, I used the Text-based Network Industry Classification 
(TNIC) database developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). The focal-rival pair in the 
database is based on firms’ product market descriptions in their annual reports (10-Ks). 
The literature suggests that a pair in the database is exposed to different kinds of 
correlated shocks (Foucault and Fresard 2014), and indicates three important features of 
the database: first, unlike industry-based classification such as Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) or North American Industry Classification System (NACIS), the 
focal-rival pairs change over time, in accordance with changes in firms’ innovation, 
product ranges and so on; second, the pairings are based on the products that firms 
usually sell rather than its production processes; and third, unlike SIC  and NAICS 
industries, TNIC industries do not require relations between firms to be transitive. 
Foucault and Fresard (2014, 564) suggest that these specific characteristics of the data 
provides “ a richer definition of similarity and product market relatedness.” Though I 




the TNIC database available data period covers 2005-2015 during the preparation of this 
dissertation; therefore, I excluded data breach events for the years 2016-2017.  
From the privacyrights.org database I obtained 6166 data breach event dates, but 
many of the dates are related to non-publicly-listed companies; therefore, I have excluded 
the data for companies not publicly traded, as well as information about breaches in 
which there is no mention of the number of records lost. After merging the remaining 
data with CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and BOARDEX database, I identified 121 data breach 
events (Table 2.1) for publicly listed companies. Table 2.2 represents the distribution of 
the breaches by year, from which it is apparent that more than 25% data breaches 
occurred in the years 2013-2015. One hundred twenty-one data breach events represent 
76 focal companies. Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 represent the distribution of those companies 
by industry and year, respectively. More than 30% of focal companies belong to the 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate industries. 
When I identify all rivals for focal firms (data breached firms), I obtain about 
11,500 rivals; however, following the extant literature and as suggested by Hoberg and 
Phillips (2016), I selected the nearest five rivals for each focal firm using the similarity 
score provided in the TNIC database. This process identified 589 event dates for 363 
rivals4. As is the case for focal firms, more than 30% of rivals belong to the Finance, 




                                                 
4 In some cases, the nearest five rivals were not available for a focal firm; therefore, the total rival 






Total Number of Data Breaches (2005-2015) 
 
Total Number of data breaches (2005-2017) 6166 
Less: Number of data breaches related to not-listed companies  5550 
Less: Number of data breaches with zero number of records lost 281 
Less: Number of data breaches related to the years 2016-2017 and missing 
records in COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and BOARDEX 
214 
Total number of data breaches  121 
 
 
Table 2.2  
 
Distribution of Data Breaches by Year 
 
Year n percent cumulative 
2005 6 4.95 4.95 
2006 13 10.74 15.70 
2007 16 13.22 28.92 
2008 10 8.26 37.19 
2009 6 4.95 42.14 
2010 11 9.09 51.24 
2011 10 8.26 59.50 
2012 9 7.43 66.94 
2013 14 11.57 78.51 
2014 15 12.39 90.90 
2015 11 9.09 100.00 





Distribution of Companies by Industry 
 
Industry Focals Rivals 
Construction 1 5 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 26 116 
Manufacturing 12 57 
Mining 0 2 
Public Administration 0 1 
Retail Trade 12 52 
Services 17 78 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, GAS, and 
Sanitary Services 7 42 
Wholesale Trade 1 10 






Table 2.4  
 
Distribution of Companies by Year 
 
Year Focals Rivals 
2005 5 25 
2006 10 47 
2007 16 64 
2008 7 40 
2009 5 23 
2010 6 29 
2011 4 21 
2012 7 35 
2013 7 32 
2014 5 30 
2015 4 17 







Table 2.5 presents the summary statistics between focal firms (data breached) and 
rival firms. The continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels.  The variable 
ln_mktCap indicates that focal firms are larger in size than rival firms (9.8 vs 8.09) and 
this difference is statistically significant. The BMRatio of rivals is greater than that of 
focal firms, indicating that focal firms have higher growth potential than rival firms. 
Additionally, there is also significant difference between focal firms and rivals in terms 
of closing prices of stocks. Furthermore, both focal firms and rivals are highly leveraged.  
No statistical tests are done on the variables BREACH_TYPE_Active, 
BREACH_TYPE_Lost, BREACH_TYPE_Stolen, FirmType, ln_BrScale, and 
Prior_Breach_Yes because they are only related to focal firms, but the sample of rival 







Summary Statistics and Tests of Differences of Focals and Rivals 
 





Dev Q1 Median Q3 N Mean 
Std. 
Dev Q1 Median Q3 t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Z 
Var 113 1.06 1.21 0.46 0.83 1.20 545 1.02 1.53 0.38 0.68 1.17 0.68 1.71 
BMRatio 101 0.23 1.79 0.22 0.40 0.59 497 0.51 0.56 0.27 0.48 0.73 -2.46 ** -2.24 ** 
BREACH_TYPE_Activ
e 121 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 589 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 NA NA 
BREACH_TYPE_Lost 121 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 589 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA NA 
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen 121 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 589 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA NA 
FirmType 121 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 589 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 NA NA 
Leverage 121 0.70 0.24 0.54 0.68 0.89 584 0.67 0.26 0.49 0.69 0.88 1.47 1.16 
ln_BrScale 121 8.55 3.70 6.21 8.39 11.00 589 8.54 3.73 5.99 8.39 11.00 NA NA 
ln_mktCap 101 9.80 1.75 8.50 9.86 11.13 497 8.09 2.11 6.47 8.08 9.64 8.63 *** 7.24 *** 
ln_PRC 113 3.61 0.87 3.28 3.67 4.13 542 3.31 1.05 2.83 3.42 3.98 3.18 *** 3.09 *** 
Prior_Breach_Yes 121 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 589 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 NA NA 
Spread 113 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.005 0.01 543 0.01 0.01 00.00 0.005 0.01 -0.36 0.15 
Turnover 113 8.49 5.56 4.47 6.80 10.95 545 8.64 10.22 3.93 6.5 10.33 -0.22 -1.00 
*, **, *** significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
 







Table 2.6 presents summary statistics for the group of rivals (Unmatched Sample) 
by ITG = 1 and ITG = 0. The mean of CAR (-1, 0) of rivals with ITG = 1 is -0.001 and 
the mean of CAR (-1, 0) of rivals with ITG = 0 is 0.003; the difference is statistically 
significant. This suggests that the markets of rivals with ITG = 1 react negatively to 
breach announcements, while the markets of rivals with ITG = 0 react positively. 
However, the median of CAR (-1, 0) for both groups is negative, yet the market reaction 
of rivals with ITG = 1 is more negative (-0.003 vs -0.001). Together, these findings from 
CAR suggest that abnormal return of rivals with ITG = 1 reacts more negatively. 
However, the mean of ATURN (-1, 0) of rivals with ITG = 1 is greater than that of rivals 
with ITG =0 (0.27 vs .08). The same is true for the median ATURN (-1, 0). For ABAS (-1, 
0), where the mean of rivals with ITG = 1 is greater than that of rivals with ITG = 0. 
There is a difference in Var between the two groups of rivals, but it is not statistically 
significant. The difference of BMRatio is statistically significant, noting that rivals with 
ITG = 0 having higher growth potential. Though there is no statistically significant 
difference between two groups for BREACH_TYPE_Active and BREACH_TYPE_Lost, 
there is a statistically significant difference in BREACH_TYPE_Stolen; 18% of rivals 
with ITG = 1 experienced BREACH_TYPE_Stolen whereas 25% of rivals with ITG = 0 
experienced BREACH_TYPE_Stolen. It was also noted that 57% of rivals with ITG = 1 
belong to the finance and insurance industries, and this group of rivals is also more 
heavily leveraged. 
It was found that 36% of rivals with ITG = 0 belong to the same industry. 
Additionally, the breach scale (ln_BrScale) of the rivals with ITG = 1 is less than that of 




well. Further, there are statistically significant differences between the two groups (0.49 
vs 0.31) in terms of Prior_Breach_Yes. Overall, these figures suggest that there are 
significant differences between the rivals with ITG = 1 and rivals with ITG = 0.  
Table 2.7 presents summary statistics of rivals (Propensity Score Matched 
Sample) by ITG = 1 and ITG = 0. As expected, it is evident that the variables used in Eq. 
2.11 are not statistically significant between the two groups of rivals. Only ATURN (-1, 
0) is statistically significant, rivals with ITG = 1 having higher abnormal turnover than 
the rivals with ITG = 0. Moreover, ABAS (-1, 0) of rivals with ITG = 1 is smaller than 
that of rivals with ITG = 0. Similarly, CAR (-1, 0) of rivals with ITG = 1 is positive, with 
the CAR (-1, 0) of rivals with ITG = 0 being negative. Also, ln_BrScale of rivals with 
ITG = 1 is greater than that of rivals with ITG = 0. The same is true for 
Prior_Breach_Yes. Taken together, the findings suggest that though rivals with ITG = 1 
are more susceptible to frequent and large data breaches, markets have positive reactions 




Table 2.6  
 
Summary Statistics and Tests of Differences of Rivals (Unmatched Sample) 
 
 ITG   
  1   0   
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Q1 Median Q3  N Mean 
St.  
Dev. 




ATURN (-1,0) 185 0.27 1.91 -0.87 0.03 0.90  363 0.08 2.00 -0.98 -0.36 0.59 -1.05  
ABAS (-1,0) 184 0.002 0.01 -0.01 -0.001 0.01  361 0.001 0.02 -0.01 -0.002 0.01 -0.34  
CAR (-1,0) 184 -0.001 0.03 -0.01 -0.003 0.01  360 0.003 0.04 -0.01 -0.001 0.02 1.64 * 
Var 185 0.96 0.95 0.39 0.68 1.14  363 1.05 1.75 0.37 0.68 1.18 0.80  
BMRatio 166 0.62 0.41 0.35 0.58 0.83  334 0.45 0.61 0.26 0.43 0.66 -3.77 *** 
BREACH_TYPE_Active 191 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00  398 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.014  
BREACH_TYPE_Lost 191 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00  398 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93  
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen 191 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00  398 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.78 * 
FirmType 191 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00  398 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 22.16 *** 
Leverage 191 0.74 0.22 0.60 0.84 0.90  396 0.63 0.27 0.44 0.62 0.83 -5.21 *** 
ln_BrScale 191 8.17 3.52 6.29 7.76 10.52  398 8.72 3.81 5.92 8.76 11.08 1.73 * 
ln_mktCap 166 8.75 2.04 7.59 8.96 10.40  334 7.74 2.07 6.25 7.62 9.41 -5.19 *** 
ln_PRC 184 3.39 0.89 2.90 3.46 3.95  361 3.27 1.12 2.73 3.38 4.01 -1.30  
Prior_Breach_Yes 191 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00  398 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 16.77 *** 
Spread 185 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.004 0.01  361 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.65 * 
Turnover 185 8.20 6.07 4.29 6.75 10.79  360 8.86 11.80 3.44 6.31 10.12 0.86  







Table 2.7  
 
Summary Statistics and Tests of Differences of Rivals (Matched Sample) 
 
 ITG  
 1  0  
Statistic N Mean 
St. 
 Dev. Q1 Median Q3   N Mean 
St. 
 Dev. Q1 Median Q3 t-test/χ2 
R&D Exp 29 5.35 2.29 3.28 5.63 7.04  29 4.82 1.90 3.28 5.53 6.12 -0.96 
NPM 29 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.11  29 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.08 -0.76 
ROE 29 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.20 0.29  29 0.17 0.41 0.08 0.13 0.20 -0.20 
ROA 29 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.09  29 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.51 
WC 29 1.90 1.08 1.11 1.69 2.27  29 1.88 1.30 1.12 1.55 2.18 -0.05 
Tobin's q 29 1.65 1.08 1.09 1.37 2.00  29 1.31 0.97 0.77 1.00 1.62 -1.28 
LOGTA 29 8.62 2.11 6.76 8.56 10.25  29 8.24 1.98 6.55 8.28 9.52 -0.70 
LOSS 29 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00  29 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IC_WEAKNESS 29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PAST_BREACH 29 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00  29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ATURN (-1,0) 29 0.88 2.35 -0.55 0.61 1.67  29 -0.20 1.55 -1.11 -0.56 0.59 -2.07** 
ABAS (-1,0) 29 -0.001 0.01 -0.01 -0.001 0.01  29 0.0001 0.01 -0.01 -0.0002 0.005 0.17 
CAR (-1,0) 29 0.0004 0.03 -0.01 0.003 0.01  29 -0.002 0.02 -0.01 -0.004 0.01 -0.41 
Var  29 1.22 1.36 0.36 0.63 1.41  29 1.12 0.84 0.42 0.96 1.60 -0.33 
BMRatio 29 0.31 0.18 0.18 0.29 0.44  29 0.37 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.50 1.04 
BREACH_TYPE_Active 29 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00  29 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BREACH_TYPE_Lost 29 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00  29 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen 29 0.52 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00  29 0.55 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
FirmType 29 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00  29 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Leverage 29 0.56 0.22 0.41 0.58 0.76  29 0.59 0.20 0.46 0.62 0.76 0.45 
ln_BrScale 29 9.40 3.38 6.64 9.74 12.24  29 8.29 3.14 5.69 7.08 11.00 -1.30 
ln_mktCap 29 8.91 2.13 7.27 9.58 10.85  29 8.31 1.77 6.89 8.28 9.17 -1.17 
ln_PRC 29 3.48 1.22 2.96 3.42 4.40  29 3.66 0.88 3.20 3.78 4.33 0.63 
Prior_Breach_Yes 29 0.31 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00  29 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 
Spread 29 0.01 0.01 0.0002 0.004 0.01  29 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.01 -0.04 
Turnover 29 7.84 5.02 4.29 6.81 8.80   29 7.86 3.71 5.80 7.35 8.84 0.02 








Table 2.8 is the correlation matrix of the variables used for the study. ATURN (-1, 
0) has statistically significant correlations with some of the control variables, such as Var, 
ln_mktCap, and Leverage. As expected, both ATURN (-1, 0) and ATURN (-1, +1) have a 
statistically significant negative correlation with BREACH_TYPE_Active. This suggests 
that when focal firms’ data breach types are “active,” then their rivals’ abnormal turnover 
goes down. ABAS (-1, 0) has also significant negative correlations with the control 
variables. Further, ABAS (-1, 0) has a significant negative correlation with 
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen, which is unexpected; however, ABAS (-1,+1) has a significant 
positive relationship with Prior_Breach_Yes, suggesting that when focal firms have a 
history of data breaches, their rival firms also experience uncertainty in their information 
environment.  
CAR (-1, 0) is significantly negatively correlated with the data breaches scale 
(ln_BrScale) and data breach type (BREACH_TYPE_Lost). CAR (-1, +1) is also 
significantly negatively correlated with both ln_BrScale and BREACH_TYPE_Active. 
ITG is significantly and positively correlated with ln_mktCap, BMRatio, Leverage, 
FirmType, Prior_Breach_Yes, but negatively correlated with BREACH_TYPE_Stolen. 
These suggest that large organizations, high growth potential companies, highly 
leveraged firms, or firms belonging to the finance or insurance industries are more likely 
to have ITG, which consists of a technology committee, a CIO, Chief Security Officer, a 
risk committee or a compliance committee. As shown above, the data breach history of 








 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. ln_PRC                     
2.Var 0.78***                    
3.Spread -0.09* -0.05                   
4.ln_mktCap 0.63*** 0.47*** -0.07                  
5.BMRatio -0.21*** -0.19*** 0.07 -0.17***                 
6.Leverage 0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.11* -0.02                
7.FirmType 0.09* 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.46*** 0.40***               
8.ln_BrScale 0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.18*** -0.09*              
9.Prior_Breach_Yes 0.17*** 0.12** 0.03 0.19*** 0.10* 0.14*** 0.14*** -0.06             
10.BREACH_TYPE_Active -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.16*** 0.01            
11.BREACH_TYPE_Stolen -0.09* -0.03 -0.06 -0.13** -0.09 -0.06 -0.16*** 0.00 -0.21*** -0.33***           
12.BREACH_TYPE_Lost -0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.10* 0.11* 0.04 0.08 0.17*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.16***          
13.Turnover 0.05 0.26*** 0.00 0.21*** -0.22*** -0.03 -0.19*** 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.04         
14.ATURN (-1, 0) 0.05 0.17*** 0.02 0.10* -0.06 0.10* 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.08* -0.01 0.04 0.32***        
15.ATURN (-1, +1) 0.03 0.15*** 0.01 0.09* -0.05 0.09* 0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.10* 0.04 0.02 0.27*** 0.93***       
16.ABAS (-1, 0) 0.09* 0.15*** 0.59*** 0.12** -0.02 0.09* 0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.14** 0.08 0.07 0.11** 0.08      
17.ABAS (-1, +1) 0.10* 0.15*** 0.56*** 0.09* -0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.09* 0.06 -0.08 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.85***     
18.CAR (-1, 0) 0.03 0.09* 0.12** 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.12** -0.01 -0.08 0.10* -0.11** 0.07 0.12** 0.10* 0.06 0.07    
19.CAR (-1, +1) 0.06 0.09* 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.13** 0.00 -0.13** 0.10* -0.12** 0.04 0.13** 0.13** 0.03 0.04 0.81***   
20.ITG 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.20*** -0.05 0.17*** 0.01 -0.08* 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.02  






Abnormal Turnover (ATURN)  
 
Table 2.9 presents the results of abnormal turnover (ATURN) during the event 
windows (-5, 5). It is evident that though the markets for focal firms react at -two day, the 
markets of rival firms react at -three day.  However, the markets for both and focal firms 
react at -1 day. It is also evident that at both -two and -one days, the abnormal turnover 
for focal firms is negative, whereas for rival’s firms it is positive. This indicates that the 
reaction of the rivals’ market is opposite to that of focal firms’ markets, which lends 
support to the competitive theory hypothesis. These findings are in line with Jeong, Lee, 
and Lim (2018), but contradict Martin, Borah, and Palmatier (2017) and Kashmiri, Nicol, 
and Hsu (2017). Nevertheless, no significant market reaction is documented at zero day 
for both focal firms and rivals. This finding is not unexpected, since prior research (Higgs 
et al. 2016) also did not document any market reaction for focals at zero day.  
Table 2.10 presents cumulative abnormal turnover for both focals and rivals. 
Focal firms’ turnover of stock goes down 20% and 22% during the event window (-1, 0) 
and (-1, 1) respectively. In contrast, rival firms’ turnover of stock goes up by 12% and 
16% during the same event window. These findings further confirm the competitive 
effect hypothesis. Though the overall market reacts positively for rival firms, Table 2.11 
shows that when focal firms experience active types of data breaches 
(BREACH_TYPE_Active), the markets of rival firms react negatively. These suggest that 





Abnormal Turnover of Focals and Rivals During Event Windows 
 
Focals   Rivals  
Day ATURN p-Value Day ATURN p-Value 
-5 0.001 0.990  -5 0.112 0.114  
-4 -0.096 0.185  -4 -0.032 0.414  
-3 0.001 0.991  -3 0.125 0.026  ** 
-2 -0.205 0.003  *** -2 0.096 0.064  * 
-1 -0.127 0.062  * -1 0.119 0.035  ** 
0 -0.066 0.333  0 0.014 0.756  
1 0.005 0.968  1 0.079 0.238  
2 -0.037 0.734  2 0.055 0.347  
3 0.104 0.392  3 0.083 0.097  ** 
4 0.235 0.070  * 4 0.125 0.019  ** 
5 0.051 0.652  5 0.112 0.051  * 
This table reports the daily average abnormal stock turnover (ATURN), along with the p-values associated with the t-
tests on their significance (H0: ATURN = 0). *, **, *** significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
Table 2.10  
 
Cumulative Abnormal Turnover of Focals and Rivals 
 

















(-1,0) -0.20 -1.78 0.04**  (-1,0) 0.12 1.52 0.06 * 
(-1,1) -0.22 -1.26 0.10*  (-1,1) 0.16 1.57 0.06 * 
This table reports the Abnormal Stock Turnover (ATURN) along with the t-values and associated p values, with the 






Cumulative Abnormal Turnover of Rivals by BREACH_TYPE_Active 
 
Event Window (-1,0) - Rivals    
BREACH_TYPE_Active ATURN t-value p-value  
0 0.21 
2.17 0.02 ** 
1 -0.16 
This table reports the Abnormal Stock Turnover (ATURN) of Rivals along with the t-values and associated p values for 







Table 2.12 presents regression results for abnormal turnover. The use of the 
cumulative event window ATURN (-1, 0) for multivariate analysis is in line with previous 
research (Martin, Borah, and Palmatier 2017). Model (1) includes the control variables 
related to ATURN (-1, 0) and ln_PRC and Var are significant, which is consistent with the 
findings of Rosati et al. (2017). Models 4 through 7 show that when focal firms experience 
active data breaches (BREACH_TYPE_Active), markets for the rivals react negatively (β = -
0.94, p < 0.00). For the “stolen” breach type (BREACH_TYPE_Stolen), markets also react 
negatively, but the effect is not statistically significant. These results suggest that there is an 
information transfer to the market of rival firms when the news of focal firms’ data breach 
events arrives at markets. Although no effect of ITG is documented, the variable ITG_Active 
(the interaction term between ITG and BREACH_TYPE_Active) is significant and positive (β 
= 1.05, p<0.00). These findings suggest that when focal firms announce active data breach 
events, rivals with ITG = 1 did not experience negative abnormal turnover. This finding also 
highlights the importance of strong information technology governance in remediation of 
data breaches. The variable Similarity is not significant; thus, the hypothesis that rivals who 
are strategically similar to focal firms will experience similar (opposite) effects in the market 
is not supported. I suspect this is because of the rival selection procedure using the TNIC 
database, which identifies rivals based on product market similarity.  
Since the decision to have a technology committee, a CIO, a Chief Security Officer, a 
risk committee, or a compliance committee is not random, I use propensity score matching to 
address the endogeneity issue. When I matched the samples using Eq. 2.11, I found 58 
observations (29 ITG = 1, and 29 ITG = 0). I then performed two-way ANOVA, with the two 




Prior_Breach_Yes.  Figure 2.2 compares the unmatched sample and matched sample two-
way ANOVA results. It is evident from Figure 2.2 (a), produced from an unmatched sample, 
that ATURN (-1, 0) is less when BREACH_TYPE_Active = 1 and ITG = 0, than when 
BREACH_TYPE_Active = 0 and ITG =0. However, the presence of ITG = 1, pulls up ATURN 
(-1, 0), suggesting that strong information technology governance has a positive effect on 
ATURN (-1, 0). For the matched sample (Figure 2.2 (b)), the same effect is also evident. In 
Figure 2.2 (c) and Figure 2.2 (e), the effect of ITG is not evident; however, it is clear from 
Figure 2.2 (d) and Figure 2.2 (f) that ITG has a positive effect on abnormal turnover (ATURN 
(-1, 0)). Overall, these findings suggest that strong information technology governance of 
rival firms has some shielding effects when focal firms experience data breaches. Table 2.13 
is the regression analysis for the propensity score matched sample. The results suggest that 
when focal firms have a history of data breaches (Prior_Breach_Yes), the markets of rival 
firms react negatively (β = -1.56, p<0.06). The same is also true for “lost” 
(BREACH_TYPE_Lost) data breaches (β = -1.56, p<0.10). However, when there is strong 
ITG in rival firms, then markets react positively (β = 1.37, p<0.08). Together, these findings 
suggest that the characteristics of data breaches of focal firms have a negative effect on the 








Regression Analysis for ATURN (Unmatched Sample) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ATURN (-1,0) ATURN (-1,0) ATURN (-1,0) ATURN (-1,0) ATURN (-1,0) ATURN (-1,0) ATURN (-1,0) 
ln_PRC -0.25** -0.25* -0.26** -0.29** -0.28** -0.28** -0.28** 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Var 0.51**** 0.63**** 0.63**** 0.63**** 0.62**** 0.64**** 0.65**** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Spread 8.20 3.39 2.88 3.79 5.82 5.36 4.61 
 (0.23) (0.65) (0.70) (0.61) (0.49) (0.51) (0.54) 
In_mktCap  0.014 0.0023 0.012 -0.0084 -0.0068 -0.01227 
  (0.78) (0.96) (0.81) (0.87) (0.89) (0.82) 
BMRatio  0.17 0.090 0.10 -0.066 -0.086 -0.067 
  (0.55) (0.75) (0.71) (0.79) (0.72) (0.76) 
Leverage  0.60 0.52 0.52 0.75* 0.74* 0.78* 
  (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
FirmType  -0.024 -0.018 -0.021 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 
  (0.91) (0.93) (0.92) (0.55) (0.54) (0.64) 
ln_BrScale   0.0077 0.013 0.0056 0.0073 0.012 
   (0.73) (0.57) (0.80) (0.74) (0.61) 
Prior_Breach_Yes   0.30* 0.27 0.26 0.18 0.17 
   (0.09) (0.14) (0.16) (0.33) (0.37) 
BREACH_TYPE_Active    -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.93**** -0.94**** 
    (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen    -0.30 -0.15 -0.20 -0.23 
    (0.16) (0.51) (0.38) (0.29) 
BREACH_TYPE_Lost    0.084 -0.025 -0.047 0.017 
    (0.79) (0.94) (0.89) (0.96) 
ITG     0.23 -0.042 -0.020 
     (0.22) (0.85) (0.93) 
ITG_Active      1.05*** 1.004*** 
      (0.00) (0.00) 
Similarity       0.012 
       (0.96) 
Cons 0.39 -0.25 -0.18 -0.013 0.056 0.18 0.17 
 (0.19) (0.59) (0.72) (0.98) (0.92) (0.74) (0.74) 
N 543 453 453 453 475 475 466 
adj. R-sq 0.048 0.070 0.072 0.085 0.079 0.092 0.092 

















Regression Analysis for ATURN (Matched Sample) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 ATURN (-1,0) ATURN (-1,0) 
ln_PRC 0.36 0.34 
 (0.60) (0.63) 
Var 0.45 0.45 
 (0.21) (0.22) 
Spread -57.9** -57.4** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
In_mktCap 0.081 0.093 
 (0.69) (0.65) 
BMRatio 2.64* 2.72* 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Leverage 1.68 1.78 
 (0.20) (0.19) 
FirmType 0.33 0.44 
 (0.61) (0.53) 
ln_BrScale -0.048 -0.043 
 (0.59) (0.63) 
Prior_Breach_Yes -1.56* -1.55* 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
BREACH_TYPE_Active -0.98 -0.82 
 (0.21) (0.37) 
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen 0.16 0.17 
 (0.77) (0.76) 
BREACH_TYPE_Lost -1.56* -1.58* 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
ITG 1.37* 1.42* 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
ITG_Active  -0.31 
  (0.74) 
Cons -3.34** -3.54** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
N 58 58 
adj. R-sq 0.240 0.223 







Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread (ABAS)  
Table 2.14 is the Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread (ABAS) during event windows (-5, 5) for 
both focal firms and rivals. As with ATURN, the markets of both focal and rival firms react 
before the release of the data breach news. However, the markets for rivals react at – three to 
– 1 days. At – two day, the ABAS of both focals and rivals is significant, but the ABAS of 
focals is higher than that of rivals (0.0017 vs 0.0009), suggesting that data breaches result in 
more uncertainty in focal markets than in rival markets. Table 2.15 presents the cumulative 
ABAS. The results displayed in the table suggest that cumulative ABAS (-1, 0 and -1, 1) of 
rivals increased significantly. However, the cumulative ABAS (-1, 1) is significant for focal 
firms. Table 2.16 compares ABAS (-1, 0) of rival firms by Prior_Breach_Yes (the previous 
data breach history of focals). When focal firms have a previous data breach history, their 
rivals’ ABAS (-1, 0) increases compared to the rivals whose focal firms did not have a 
previous data breach history (t = -2.54, p<0.01). These suggest that uncertainty goes up in 
rival markets where focal firms have data breach histories. Table 2.17 compares the ABAS (-
1, 0) of rivals by BREACH_TYPE_Lost. When focal firms experience lost data breaches 
(BREACH_TYPE_Lost), the markets of rivals experience more uncertainty (t = -1.68, p 
<0.10) compared to when BREACH_TYPE_Lost= 0. These findings suggest that 










Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread of Focals and Rivals During Event Window 
 
Focals Rivals 
Day ABAS p-Value Day ABAS p-Value 
-5 0.0009029 0.1241 -5 0.0000594 0.4433 
-4 -0.0008305 0.8955 -4 0.0001601 0.3389 
-3 0.0007023 0.1596 -3 0.0008855 0.0176 ** 
-2 0.0016851 0.0321 ** -2 0.0008624 0.0316 ** 
-1 0.0000040 0.5021 -1 0.0013672 0.0023 *** 
0 0.0008645 0.1442 0 -0.0002472 0.7114 
1 0.0010711 0.0954 * 1 0.0004827 0.1273 
2 -0.0000549 0.5288 2 0.0007641 0.0493 ** 
3 0.0000801 0.4626 3 0.0004215 0.1605 
4 0.0002478 0.3776 4 0.0008265 0.0323 ** 
5 0.0010665 0.1205 5 0.001485 0.0003 *** 
This table reports the daily average abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), along with the p-values associated with the t-tests on their 





Cumulative Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread of Focals and Rivals 
 
















(-1,0) 0.001210 0.92 0.18  (-1,0) 0.001376 2.02 0.02 ** 
(-1,1) 0.002685 1.36 0.09 *  (-1,1) 0.002073 2.37 0.00 *** 
This table reports the average abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), along with the p-values associated with the t-tests on their significance 
(H0: ABAS > 0). *, **, *** significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
Table 2.16  
 
Cumulative Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread of Rivals by Prior_Breach_Yes 
 
Event Window (-1,0) – Rivals     
Prior_Breach_Yes ABAS t-value p-value  
0 0.0000361 
-2.54 0.01 *** 
1 0.0035988 
This table reports the Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread (ABAS) along with the t-values and associated p values for the variable 









Cumulative Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread of Rivals by BREACH_TYPE_Lost 
 
Event Window (-1,0) – Rivals     
BREACH_TYPE_Lost ABAS t-value p-value  
0 0.0010492 
-1.68 0.10 * 
1 0.0050991 
This table reports the Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread (ABAS) along with the t-values and associated p values for the variable 
BREACH_TYPE_Lost, with the Ha: Diff (ABAS) != 0. *, **, *** significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels, significantly.  
 
 
Table 2.18 presents the multivariate regression result of ABAS (-1, 0). The results 
confirm the above findings that focal firms’ previous data breach histories 
(Prior_Breach_Yes) results in more uncertainty in rivals’ market (β = 0.0035, p<0.044). 
Further, characteristics of the breach type (BREACH_TYPE_Lost) also result in market 
uncertainty in rivals’ markets (β = 0.0066, p<0.08). Additionally, though ITG mitigates the 
market uncertainty arising from of focal firms’ data breaches (- sign), it is not significant. As 
is the case with ATURN (-1, 0), Similarity is not significant. As was the case earlier, I suspect 
that this is because of the rival selection procedure using the TNIC database, which identifies 
rivals based on product market similarity. To address the endogeneity issue of ITG, I have 
used propensity scores to match samples. Figure 2.3 compares the matched and unmatched 
samples based on a two-way ANOVA. Figure 2.3 (a), (c), and (e) suggest that 
BREACH_TYPE_Active, BREACH_TYPE_Lost and Prior_Breach_Yes result in more 
uncertainty in rivals’ markets as their ABAS (-1, 0) is greater as compared to lesser. However, 
Figure 2.3 (b) and (d) suggest that ITG helps to mitigate the market uncertainty that arises 
from data breaches of focal firms because when ITG = 1 and BREACH_TYPE_Active = 1, 
rivals’ ABAS (-1, 0) is lesser rather than greater. The same is also true for 




ITG = 1. These findings might suggest that the repeated history of data breaches for focal 
firms can result in uncertainty in rivals’ market.  
Table 2.19 presents the regression results of the propensity score matched sample. 
The results further confirm that data breach characteristics (BREACH_TYPE_Lost) have 
significant effects (β = 0.019, p < 0.03) on ABAS (- 1, 0). Further, although ITG is not 
significant, the interaction term ITG_Lost is significant, suggesting that when focal firms 
experience data breaches (BREACH_TYPE_Lost), strong information technology governance 
(ITG = 1) in rival firms helps to mitigate market uncertainty (β = - 0.025, p < 0.04). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that focal firms’ histories of data breaches and the 
characteristics of their data breaches result in uncertainty in rivals’ markets, but that strong 







Regression Analysis for ABAS (Unmatched Sample) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  ABAS (-1,0) ABAS (-1,0) ABAS (-1,0) ABAS (-1,0) ABAS (-1,0) ABAS (-1,0) ABAS (-1,0) 
ln_PRC  0.0013 -0.000063 -0.000073 -0.00013 -0.00015 -0.00015 -0.00019 
  (0.15) (0.96) (0.95) (0.91) (0.92) (0.92) (0.87) 
Var  0.00011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 
  (0.90) (0.32) (0.30) (0.28) (0.36) (0.36) (0.28) 
Turnover  0.00023** 0.00016 0.00016 0.00015 0.00014 0.00014 0.00014 
  (0.01) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.30) (0.31) (0.16) 
In_mktCap   0.00042 0.00031 0.00032 0.00032 0.00033 0.00033 
   (0.38) (0.52) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.52) 
BMRatio   -0.00085 -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0013 
   (0.67) (0.51) (0.37) (0.48) (0.49) (0.51) 
Leverage   0.0084** 0.0068* 0.0058 0.0061* 0.0062* 0.0063* 
   (0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) 
FirmType   0.0012 0.0012 0.00073 0.00089 0.00083 0.0005 
   (0.55) (0.54) (0.71) (0.64) (0.67) (0.80) 
ln_BrScale    -0.00019 -0.00032 -0.00029 -0.00029 -0.0003 
    (0.36) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) 
Prior_Breach_Yes    0.0026 0.0033* 0.0034* 0.0035* 0.0035* 
    (0.12) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.044) 
BREACH_TYPE_Active     0.0011 0.00093 0.00093 0.0012 
     (0.56) (0.61) (0.61) (0.51) 
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen     -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0016 
     (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.43) 
BREACH_TYPE_Lost     0.0070** 0.0075** 0.0066* 0.0066* 
     (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.08) 
ITG      -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0013 
      (0.49) (0.43) (0.47) 
ITG_Lost       0.0021 0.0011 
       (0.67) (0.84) 
Similarity        0.00101 
        (0.64) 
Cons  -0.0048* -0.0092** -0.0062 -0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0051 
  (0.08) (0.03) (0.18) (0.33) (0.40) (0.40) (0.30) 
N  542 468 468 468 474 474 465 
adj. R-sq  0.013 0.028 0.032 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.034 


















Regression Analysis for ABAS (Matched Sample) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 ABAS (-1,0) ABAS (-1,0) 
ln_PRC 0.0079** 0.0058* 
 (0.02) (0.05) 
Var -0.0020 -0.0021 
 (0.44) (0.41) 
Turnover  0.00037 0.00053 
 (0.53) (0.35) 
In_mktCap 0.00041 0.0013 
 (0.68) (0.17) 
BMRatio -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.20) (0.22) 
Leverage -0.0045 -0.0019 
 (0.63) (0.84) 
FirmType 0.0045 0.0053 
 (0.52) (0.44) 
ln_BrScale -0.00049 -0.00069 
 (0.29) (0.14) 
Prior_Breach_Yes -0.0038 -0.0023 
 (0.37) (0.58) 
BREACH_TYPE_Active 0.0013 0.0021 
 (0.81) (0.69) 
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen 0.00017 0.00051 
 (0.97) (0.91) 
BREACH_TYPE_Lost 0.013 0.019** 
 (0.17) (0.03) 
ITG 0.0018 0.0023 
 (0.58) (0.47) 
ITG_Lost  -0.025** 
  (0.02) 
Cons -0.023* -0.025** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
N 58 58 
adj. R-sq 0.290 0.322 
p-values in parentheses: * p<.10               **p<.05 *** p<.01  **** p<.001 
 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)  
 
Table 2.20 is the Abnormal Return (AR) during event windows (-5, 5) for both 




the event date, though at day 1, the abnormal return is negative. These findings are 
inconsistent with those of Higgs et al. (2016) and Jeong, Lee, and Lim (2018). However, 
the markets of rivals react significantly at day – 1. Table 2.21 presents the Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) of focals and rivals and it also suggests that the markets of 
rivals react positively at several days (-1, 1). Together, these findings suggest that the 
data breaches of focal firms have consequences for the markets of rival firms. However, 
Table 2.22 and Table 2.23 suggest the characteristics of breach types 
(BREACH_TYPE_Active and BREACH_TYPE_Lost) have significant negative market 
reactions for rival firms. In contrast, Table 2.24 suggests that BREACH_TYPE_Stolen has 
a positive effect on rivals’ markets. Unexpectedly, Table 2.25 suggests that CAR between 
firms ITG = 1 and ITG = 0 does not differ significantly. The multivariate analysis 
presented in Table 2.26 further confirms that the characteristics of breach types of focals 
(BREACH_TYPE_Active and BREACH_TYPE_Lost) have implication for rivals. Further, 
it is suggested that the extent of the breach scale (ln_BrScale) also affects the market of 
rivals negatively (β = -0.00087, p<0.06). Though insignificant, the history of focals’ data 
breaches (Prior_Breach_Yes) also has implications for rivals. It was not expected, but 
information technology governance (ITG) has a negative insignificant relationship with 
CAR. As in ATURN and ABAS, I do not find strategic similarity (Similarity) significant in 








Abnormal Return (AR) of Focals and Rivals During Event Windows 
 
Focals  Rivals 
Day AR p-Value Day AR p-Value 
-5 0.0021 0.16 -5 -0.0007 0.49 
-4 -0.0007 0.55 -4 0.0010 0.21 
-3 0.0005 0.74 -3 -0.0021 0.00 *** 
-2 -0.0001 0.93 -2 0.00022 0.82 
-1 0.0013 0.29 -1 0.00238 0.02 ** 
0 0.0009 0.48 0 -0.0008 0.41 
1 -0.0011 0.48 1 0.00123 0.37 
2 0.0002 0.86 2 0.00034 0.82 
3 -0.0013 0.51 3 -0.0006 0.45 
4 -0.0016 0.21 4 -0.0001 0.91 
5 0.0012 0.43 5 -0.0004 0.68 
This table reports the daily Abnormal Return (AR), along with the p-values associated with the t-tests on their 





Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Focals and Rivals 
 
Focals  Rivals  
Event 






Window CAR  t-value  p-value 
(-1,0) 0.0021 1.23 0.89  (-1,0) 0.00154 1.06 0.14 
(-1,1) 0.0011 0.49 0.69  (-1,1) 0.00278 1.41   0.08 * 
This table reports the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) along with the t-values and associated p values, with the 






Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Rivals by BREACH_TYPE_Active 
 
Event Window (-1,1) – Rivals     
BREACH_TYPE_Active CAR t-value p-value  
0 0.0059 
3.39 0.00 *** 
1 -0.0061 
This table reports the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) along with the t-values and associated p values for the 








Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Rivals by BREACH_TYPE_Lost 
 
Event Window (-1,1) – Rivals    
BREACH_TYPE_Lost CAR t-value p-value 
0 0.0042 
3.04 0.00 *** 
1 -0.0134 
This table reports the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) along with the t-values and associated p values for the 






Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Rivals by BREACH_TYPE_Stolen 
 
Event Window (-1,1) – Rivals    
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen CAR t-value p-value  
0 0.0007 
-2.16 0.03 ** 
1 0.0099 
This table reports the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) along with the t-values and associated p values for the 






Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Rivals by ITG 
 
Event Window (-1,1) – Rivals    




This table reports the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) along with the t-values and associated p values for the 























Regression Analysis for CAR (Unmatched Sample) 
 
 
 Cumulative Abnormal Return  
 CAR (-1, 0)  CAR (0, 1)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FirmType 0.0022 0.0029 0.0029 0.0014 0.0018 0.0023 





0.000100 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0011 







0.00088* 0.00017 0.00016 0.00010 








0.0085** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
BREACH_TYPE_Stole
n 0.0044 0.0044 0.0042 -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.0073 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.33) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 







 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior_Breach_Yes -0.0035 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0053 -0.0049 -0.0044 
 (0.33) (0.44) (0.44) (0.21) (0.25) (0.29) 
ITG  -0.0036 -0.0036  -0.0020 -0.0017 
  (0.31) (0.32)  (0.63) (0.67) 
Similarity   0.00095   0.0050 
   (0.84)   (0.34) 
Cons 0.014* 0.013* 0.013 0.019** 0.019** 0.016* 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) 
N 475 475 472 475 475 472 
adj. R-sq 0.030 0.031 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.024 







Figure 2.4 confirms the findings discussed above for unmatched samples. 
However, for matched sample, it is clear that rival firms with ITG = 1 experience 
negative CAR for both BREACH_TYPE_Active and BREACH_TYPE_Lost. When focal 
firms experience BREACH_TYPE_Stolen and rivals firms have ITG = 1, the CAR of 
rivals reacts positively. Table 2.27 documents that markets of rival firms react positively 
only when they have ITG = 1 and focal firms experience stolen data breaches 
(BREACH_TYPE_Stolen). It further confirms that the scale of data breaches of focal 
firms has implications for rivals. To sum up, the findings suggest that though overall the 
markets of rivals react positively given the data breaches events of focal firms, the breach 
scale and the characteristics of the data breaches of focals have damaging market reaction 
for rival firms. Moreover, in some cases, strong corporate governance (ITG = 1) plays 















Regression Analysis for CAR (Matched Sample) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CAR (-1, 1)  CAR (-1, 1)  CAR (-1, 1)  CAR (-1, 1)  
FirmType 0.014 0.014 0.022 0.014 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.27) (0.50) 
ln_mktCap 0.0015 0.0015 0.0020 0.0017 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.31) (0.41) 
ln_BrScale -0.0020* -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0021* 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.23) (0.09) 
BREACH_TYPE_Active 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.016 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.35) (0.22) 
BREACH_TYPE_Stolen 0.017* 0.017* -0.0019 0.017* 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.88) (0.08) 
BREACH_TYPE_Lost 0.017 0.017 0.0088 0.023 
 (0.31) (0.33) (0.61) (0.26) 
Prior_Breach_Yes -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0053 -0.0014 
 (0.87) (0.88) (0.55) (0.88) 
ITG  -0.0017 -0.021* -0.00054 
  (0.82) (0.07) (0.95) 
ITG_Stolen    0.034**  
   (0.03)  
ITG_Lost     -0.020 
    (0.55) 
Cons -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0038 -0.0093 
  (0.75) (0.75) (0.87) (0.71) 
N 58 58 58 58 
adj. R-sq 0.022 0.003 0.080 -0.010 
p-values in parentheses   *p<.10    **p<.05    ***p<.01    ****p<.001 
 
 
Additional Analysis (Robustness Test) 
 
Exclusion of Rivals That  
Were Also Focals   
 
Some of the rival firms in the study are also focal firms – they experienced data 
breaches, as well. To ensure that the results of the study are not unduly affected by these 




that the conclusions remain the same. Thus, the results of the study are not affected by 
inclusion in the analysis of rival firms that were also breached focal groups, as well.  
Alternative Specification of  
Dependent Variables 
 
To measure abnormal trading volume, many accounting researchers use median 
adjusted trading volume (Chen and Sami 2013, 2008). Median adjusted abnormal trading 
volume is the percentage of outstanding shares traded daily in the event period, less the 
median percentage of outstanding shares traded daily during the non-event period. 
Median adjusted trading volume is a better measure than mean adjusted trading volume 
because mean adjusted trading volume is not stable and is more easily affected by sharp 
increases in non-event period trading for reasons other than liquidity (Bamber 1987). 
When I re-run the analysis using median adjusted trading volume; the results 
(untabulated) are similar.  
For a robustness check, I measure bid-ask spread as the absolute difference 
between closing bid and closing ask prices, deflated by the mid-point of the bid and ask 
prices. This is in line with Chen et al. (2015). The results (untabulated) also remain 
similar.    
For CAR, I also re-run the model using a market-adjusted model. This is in line 
with Jeong, Lee, and Lim (2018). The market-adjusted model is very similar to the 
market model, except that it assumes the beta = 1. The market model might represent 






Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Data breaches have become commonplace and very costly. Not only do the 
breached firms bear the costs of breaches, related firms are also likely to be affected by the 
breaches of focal firms. This research studies the reaction of the markets of rivals firms to 
data breaches of focal firms. The research studies trading volume, bid-ask spread, and 
abnormal returns of rival firms in response to the announcement of data breaches by focal 
firms.  
The theory of competitive dynamics suggests that rival firms are likely to be 
affected by the data breaches of focal firms. This information transfer about such 
breaches between the firms occurs through two different yet significant mechanisms – the 
contagion effect (a negative reaction) or the competitive effect (causing a positive 
reaction). Under competitive dynamics, when information such as data breaches is 
revealed in markets, this revelation not only affects the companies concerned but can also 
negatively influence competitors in the industry, as well. This outcome is described as a 
contagion effect. Contagion effects are not limited to the effects of data breach but are 
also shown to have influence in many other situations. Another school of thought related 
to competitive dynamics suggests that there is a theoretical possibility that competitor 
firms may benefit from a rival’s data breach. This school of thought is called the 
competitive effect. Prior literature related to other types of negative news releases about 
organizations also found support for this effect. The competitive effect holds that when a 
firm is in distress, rivals in the industry configure their resources accordingly and that this 
configuration is perceived by investors in a positive light. This market perception is 




So, when one firm experiences a data breach, it is natural to assume that investors will 
bid up competitors’ stocks, thus resulting in gains.  Furthermore, Signaling Theory 
specifies that the announcement of an event about one party will provide another party 
with information, thus helping the other party to infer outcomes from the announcements. 
Signaling theory is widely used in economics, finance, and accounting literature. The 
announcement of a data breach by focal firms relays information to rivals in this manner. 
Rivals might perceive that they need to take initiative to avoid such events in the future. 
Alternatively, they (rivals) might know the susceptibility of focal firms, and this might be 
perceived as a competitive benefit.  
Using data from privacyrights.org, COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and BOARDEX, I find 
evidence that markets of rival firms react when focal firms experience data breach. 
However, the overall effects of the data breaches to rival firms are opposite to those of 
focal firms, and in many cases rival firms’ markets also react negatively. Specifically, I 
find that the characteristics of data breach types and previous data breach histories of 
focal firms have implications for rivals. However, the existence of strong information 
technology governance among rivals plays a shielding role in mitigating those negative 
effects. Further, though I hypothesized that strategic similarity of focals with rivals also 
has implications, the study did not find such effect. However, the affirmative findings of 
the results of the study are robust to alternative specification of models and sample. 
The study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the study confirms 
that in the event of data breaches, not only are focal firms affected, but rivals are also 
affected. Second, the study is the first to measure market reactions to such breaches using 




demonstrates that data breaches of focal firms result in information asymmetry in the 
markets of rival firms. Finally, the findings provide some practical guidance for rival 
firms when their competitive counterpart experiences data breaches.  
The study has some limitations. Privacyrights.org does not cover the entire 
population of data breaches. Therefore, the sample size is small, and this limits 
generality. Additionally, since disclosure of data breaches is not required by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, there is wider latitude on the part of management 







BIG DATA ANALYTICS CHALLENGES AND INTERNAL 
AUDIT FUNCTION (IAF)’S RELIANCE 





“The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data”  
(The Economist 2017) 
 
“… the development of data analytics skill is a must for accountants”  
(Huerta and Jensen 2017, 104) 
 
“Today, data analytics offers accountants opportunities to generate value” 
(Schneider et al. 2015, 721) 
 
Given the availability of vast amount of data, companies in numerous industries 
exploit such data for competitive advantage, aiming to either increase revenues or 
decrease costs. Data Driven Decisions (DDD) are making significant differences in 
productivity, on Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE),  asset utilization, and 
on market value (Provost and Fawcett 2013). Firms using big data analytics in their 
operations can outperform their competitors by 5% in productivity and 6% in profitability 
(Barton and Court 2012). In 2017, 53% companies have adopted big data, as compared to 
only 17% in 2015 (Columbus 2017). Additionally, regulators are increasingly calling for 
organizations to use analytics (Protiviti 2017). This emphasizes the significance of big 
data analytics in organizations. Alles  (2015) suggested that these market forces may be 
factors influencing auditors/accountants to embrace big data/data analytics.  
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Big data analytics is important for accounting profession because data gathering and  
analytics technologies have the potential to fundamentally change accounting and auditing 
task processes (Schneider et al. 2015). Scholars note that the emergence of big data analytics 
will significantly change the infer/predict/assure (e.g., insight/foresight/oversight) tasks 
performed by accountants and auditors. Big data and analytics have increasingly important 
implications for accounting and will provide the means to improve managerial accounting, 
financial accounting, and financial reporting practices (Warren, Moffitt, and Byrnes 2015). It 
is further suggested that big data offers an unprecedented potential for diverse, voluminous 
datasets and sophisticated analyses. Alles (2015)  indicates that big data has great potential to 
produce better forecast estimates, going concern calculations, fraud, and other variables that 
are of concern to both internal and external auditors. Moreover, auditors might reduce audit 
costs and enhance profitability and effectiveness by means of big data or data analytics. 
Sixty-six percent of internal audit departments currently utilize some form of data analytics 
as part of the audit process (Protiviti 2017). Earley (2015) suggests that while there is 
significant promise for improving audit quality through the use of data analytics, significant 
hurdles still need to be overcome. 
Research suggests that the accounting profession has been historically slow to 
embrace revolutionary technologies (Dai and Vasarhelyi 2016; M. G. Alles 2015). However, 
practitioners, particularly external auditors, are playing leading roles in adopting big data 
analytics (Deloitte 2016a; EY 2015; Fullerton 2016) and they have been documenting the 
barriers to the adoption of data analytics (EY 2014; KPMG 2015). Notwithstanding, there is 
little research about the internal auditors’ adoption of big data and usage (H. Li et al. 2018; 
Tang, Norman, and Vendrzyk 2017) despite the fact that the Internal Audit Function (IAF) is 
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better positioned to leverage big data than are external auditors. The IAF has embraced 
analytics in the in audit process, but numerous challenges remain (Verver 2015; Protiviti 
2017).  In addition, research indicates that the use of audit analytics by IAF is below 
expectation (Li et al. 2018), but IAF still puts a high priority on data analytics and intends to 
increase its use in future (Tang, Norman, and Vendrzyk 2017). Although data analytics 
promises benefits for both external and internal auditors, it provides promising platforms for 
internal auditors,  providing deep insights (infer), realistic foresight (predict), and continuous 
oversight (assure) (Schneider et al. 2015; Verver 2015). Verver (2015, 20) noted that 
“because internal audit has access to processes and data from across the organization, data 
analysis often enables auditors to provide insights into risk, control, and performance issues 
that no other function can provide.”  
Li et al. (2018) identified three factors that create unique opportunities for IAF to 
employ data analytics. First, the scope of tasks of IAF is much broader than that of external 
auditors; therefore, internal auditors should have more demand for the use of data analytics to 
accomplish their tasks efficiently and effectively. Second, IAFs can easily access internal 
organizational data, so they can easily employ data analytics to detect anomalies and fraud. 
Finally, the work of IAFs is not as regulated as that of external auditors; therefore, IAFs have 
more flexibility in exploring various data analytics tools. These three factors are also 
highlighted by Alles and Gray (2016) for future research opportunities.  
The importance of emerging technologies such as big data analytics in IAF is 
demonstrated by the Institute of Internal Auditors code (2016) in its revision of the section 
entitled “Proficiency and Due Care” (Tang, Norman, and Vendrzyk 2017). Internal audit 
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departments with dedicated analytics functions experience the highest level of value from 
analytics, as do those departments with designated analytics champions (Protiviti 2017).  
To that end, the purpose of the study is to explore the challenges to big data analytics 
adoption by accountants/auditors. Particularly, the study will empirically test the effect of 
these challenges (sometimes called barriers) on the adoption of data analytics by the IAF. 
Protiviti (2017, 5) noted that “demand for data analytics services from the internal audit 
group has increased substantially across all organizations in the last year, especially among 
those with IAF that have analytics champions and a dedicated analytics function. It is likely 
that as internal audit shops embrace analytics and achieve more progress in how they use 
data, this demand will continue to increase.” Since data analytics has the potential to improve 
different aspects of auditors’ work (specifically the processes of infer/predict/assure), I will 
explore the employment of data analytics by auditors in population tests, business process 
improvement, tests of regulatory compliance, identification of possible fraud, and risk or 
control monitoring.   
The study of internal auditor reliance on big data analytics and challenges to data 
analytics adoption is important because big data analytics dominates the priority lists for 
internal auditors in the continual focus of such auditors on improving the use of data 
analytics to enhance technology-enabled auditing capabilities such as continuous auditing 
and continuous monitoring. Moreover, overcoming these constraints and challenges to the 
use of  analytics requires a longer-term strategy and an implementation roadmap, carefully 
chosen and well-crafted pilot programs, and clear direction from CAEs and organizational 
leaders who can establish that data analytics represents a valuable facet of internal audit’s 
services and long-term value (Protiviti 2017). Several studies (Anderson et al. 2012; 
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Malaescu and Sutton 2015) suggest that the investment in IT audit techniques and technology 
is one of the factors affecting the reliance of external auditors on IAF in keeping with 
requirements (PCAOB, 2007). Appelbaum (2016, 32) noted that “perhaps the genesis of a 
solution that addresses the challenges of external Big Data audit evidence could occur 
initially within the internal auditing profession.” Additionally, practitioners suggest that the 
more mature analytics capabilities are, the greater value that analytics are perceived to 
deliver. To that end, our research answers the call for research by Alles and Gray (2016), 
Huerta and Jensen (2017), and Li et al. (2018) to investigate factors such as technical skills, 
business acumen, and cognitive skills related to data analytics.  
The results of our study suggest that the most critical factor for big data analytics 
adoption is data-specific IT knowledge of accountants, rather than general IT competencies. 
Accountants’ business knowledge and critical thinking skills are also significant. 
Additionally, when IAFs are tasked with fraud risk management or when IAFs work in an 
industry where regulation requires the use of data analytics, they are more likely to adopt big 
data analytics. Further analysis suggests that Chief Audit Executives (CAE) with CPA 
certifications are more likely to adopt big data analytics than CAEs without CPA 
certifications when the size of the organization is small, or when the size of the IAF is small, 
or when there is a lack of data-specific IT knowledge or business skills. Another important 
finding is that when two groups of IAFs have similar size and data-specific IT knowledge, 
IAFs with fraud detection responsibility (e.g., management challenges) are more likely to 
adopt big data analytics, thus highlighting the circumstances of the underutilization of the 
data analytics in many cases. Finally, IAFs in Anglo culture countries are more likely to 
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adopt big data analytics than IAFs in non-Anglo culture countries given that both types of 
IAFs have the same size and data-specific IT knowledge.   
The study contributes to both theory and practice. From theoretical standpoint, first, 
the study empirically confirms that challenges to big data analytics have implications. 
Second, the findings highlight the most significant barriers that IAFs should overcome to 
improve the usage of big data analytics. Third, the study also documents why data analytics 
is sometimes underutilized even though organizations have the necessary skills to employ it. 
From a practical viewpoint, this study suggests how small organization or small audit 
departments can reap the benefits of big data analytics by employing CAEs. Second, our 
findings have implications for external auditors since the research suggests that the use of 
technology by IAFs affects external auditors’ decisions regarding reliance on internal 
auditors. 
 
Big Data, Data Analytics, and Audit Analytics5 
 
Big Data  
 
The meaning of big data varies across different disciplines and there is substantive 
confusion between the slightly differing characterizations of “big data,” “business 
intelligence,” and “data analytics” (Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle 2015). Cao, Chychyla, and 
Stewart (2015, 423) indicate that “big data includes data sets that are too large and complex 
to manipulate or interrogate with standard methods or tools.” Though many people consider 
big data in terms of quantities, it is also related to large-scale analysis of large amounts of 
data to generate insights and knowledge (Verver 2015).  Big data is characterized by four Vs: 
                                                 
5 In most cases, Big Data, Data Analytics, and Audit Analytics are used interchangeably.  
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Volume; Velocity; Variety; and Veracity. Volume refers to the size of the dataset, velocity to 
the speed of data generation, variety to the multiplicity of data sources, and veracity to the 
elimination of noise and obtaining truthful information from big data. Sometimes big data are 
characterized by six Vs: Volume, Velocity, Variety, Veracity, Variability, and Value;  or, 
even  seven Vs: Volume, Velocity, Variety, Veracity, Variability, Value, and Visualization 
(Sivarajah et al. 2017).  
Data Analytics  
 
Data analytics is defined by the AICPA (2015, 105) as “the art and science of 
discovering and analyzing patterns, identifying anomalies, and extracting other useful 
information in data underlying or related to the subject matter of an audit through analysis, 
modeling, and visualization for the purpose of planning or performing the audit.” Cao et al. 
(2015, 423) define big data analytics as the process of inspecting, cleaning, transforming, and 
modeling big data to discover and communicate useful information and patterns, suggest 
conclusions, and to provide support for decision-making.  
Audit Analytics6  
 
Audit analytics involves the application of data analytics in the audit. Specifically, 
AICPA (2017) defines audit data analytics as “the science and art of discovering and 
analyzing patterns, identifying anomalies and extracting other useful information in data 
underlying or related to the subject matter of an audit through analysis, modeling and 
visualization for the purpose of planning or performing the audit.” In other words, audit data 
analytics are techniques that can be used to perform a number of audit procedures such as 
risk assessment, tests of details, and substantive analytical procedure to gather audit 
                                                 
6 This does not indicate the “Audit Analytics” database. 
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evidence. The benefits of using audit data analytics include improved understanding of an 
entity’s operations and associated risk including the risk of fraud, increased potential for 
detecting material misstatements, and improved communications with those charged with 




The focus of this study is on the likelihood of the adoption of big data analytics in 
accounting/auditing, given the challenges that exist as to its adoption. As discussed by Alles 
(2015), for big data usage by auditors, two scenarios can be used to predict future adoption: 
one is historical evidence of the adoption of technology by auditors/accountants and the other 
is the enthusiastic embrace of big data analytics by the clients of auditors.  Therefore, a 
survey of the literature on the uses of big data analytics in different areas of accounting will 
highlight the areas in which IAFs can contribute. Additionally, a description of auditor 
technology adoption factors will contribute to the understanding of the context of big data 
analytics use. 
Information Technology Acceptance  
and Use by Auditors  
 
Historically, the accounting profession is not very advanced in the adoption of 
emerging technologies (Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle 2015; M. G. Alles 2015). Janvrin, 
Bierstaker, and Lowe (2008) found that external auditors use a variety of audit applications 
and that the use of IT in auditing and the perceived importance of IT in auditing varies by 
firm size. Additionally, Janvrin, Bierstaker, and Lowe (2009) suggest that Computer Assisted 
Audit Tools (CAAT) are more frequently used by auditors when they obtain an 
understanding of client internal control systems and business processes, and computer test 
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controls. Moreover, their results indicate that Big Four audit firms are more likely to employ 
computer related audit procedures and IT specialists than are smaller audit firms.  
A study by Braun and Davis (2003) suggests that while auditors perceive the benefits 
associated with CAAT, they lack confidence in their abilities to use it. Ahmi and Kent (2012) 
found that the use of Generalized Audit Software (GAS) was very low in the UK because of 
perceived limited benefits of GAS for small clients, because of high implementation costs, a 
significant learning curve, and lack of ease of use. Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Lowe (2014), 
using data from the Big 4, national, regional, and local audit firms, found that outcome 
expectations, organizational pressure, and technical infrastructure support influence the 
likelihood of adoption of CAAT by auditors. Gonzalez, Sharma, and Galletta (2012) found 
that the use of Continuous Auditing (CA) among internal auditors varies by size and is a 
function of effort and social influence.  
Kim, Mannino, and Nieschwietz (2009), using the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM), suggest that the adoption of audit software by internal auditors is significantly 
influenced by Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) and Perceived Usefulness (PU). Mahzan and 
Lymer (2014), using the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), 
suggested that performance expectancy and facilitating conditions influence internal auditors 
to use GAS; however, effects for social influence and effort expectancy were not significant. 
Curtis and Payne (2008), using experiments, indicated that given a longer-term budget and 
evaluation period and management favoring implementations, auditors are highly likely to 
adopt new technology. Pennington, Kelton, and DeVries (2006) suggest that the relationship 
between perceived ease of use and intention to use audit software such as Audit Command 
Language (ACL) is mediated by qualitative overload. Moreover, there is a positive 
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relationship between perception of difficulty in using ACL and perceived qualitative 
overload, which negatively affects the intention to employ ACL. The study by Debreceny, 
Lee, Neo, and Shuling Toh (2005) suggests that internal auditors treated GAS as a tool for 
special investigation rather than a tool for their regular work.  On the other hand, external 
auditors did not use GAS since it was not suited for testing financial statement assertions.  
Overall, this survey of the literature suggests that the adoption of technology by 
accountants/auditors is a function of many factors and the results of studies on the matter are 
mixed. Therefore, the topic of big data analytics adoption by IAFs warrants further 
investigation. 
Prior Data Analytics/Big Data Research 
in Financial Accounting  
 
Warren et al.(2015, 397) note that “in financial accounting, big data will improve the 
quality and relevance of accounting information, thereby enhancing transparency and 
stakeholder decision-making. In reporting, big data can assist with the creation and 
refinement of accounting standards, helping to ensure that the accounting profession will 
continue to provide useful information as the dynamic, real-time, global economy evolves.” 
In particular, they suggest that big data could significantly impact the future of financial 
accounting and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Big data can also help to 
supplement financial statement disclosures by accumulating, processing, and analyzing 
information about a given intangible of interest. Furthermore, big data or data analytics can 
help in narrowing the differences between accounting standards such US GAAP and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and facilitate different measurement 
processes such as Fair Value Accounting (FVA) by analyzing different kinds of unstructured 
data (Warren, Moffitt, and Byrnes 2015).  
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Crawley and Wahlen  (2014) noted that data analytics allows researchers to explore a 
large amount of qualitative information disclosed by organizations, and examines the 
consequences of such disclosures. Moreover, data analytics now provides the opportunity to 
judge the informational content of qualitative financial information. For example, Davis, 
Piger, and Sedor (2012) found that the extent of optimism expressed in firms’ earnings 
announcements is positively associated with Return on Assets (ROA) and stock reactions. By 
the same token, Li (2010c) suggested that the tone of forward-looking statements is 
positively associated with future earnings performance. In addition, Feldman, Govindaraj, 
Livnat, and Segal (2010) found that changes in disclosure tone is indicative of future changes 
in earnings. Interestingly, research shows that even information on social media such as 
Twitter can predict stock market responses (Bollen, Mao, and Zeng 2011). 
Data analytics helps to relate textual data to earnings quality. For example, firms 
having more complicated and less transparent financial statement disclosures are more likely 
to have poor quality earnings, less persistent positive earnings and more persistent negative 
earnings (Li 2008). Li, Lundholm, and Minnis (2013) confirmed that firms discussing their 
competition frequently have ROAs that mean returns more severely than the firms discussing 
the competition infrequently.    
With the help of textual data analytics, researchers recently documented the role that 
qualitative disclosures have in forming the information environment of organizations; such 
information environments include factors such as the number of analyst following a firm, 
characteristics of its investors, its trading activities, and the litigation it is involved with. Less 
readable 10-Ks are associated with greater number of analysts following the firm and a 
greater amount of effort needed to generate report about it (Lehavy, Li, and Merkley 2011). 
75 
 
They also find that less readable 10-Ks are associated with greater dispersion, lower 
accuracy, and greater uncertainty in analyst’s earnings forecasts about a given firm. Firms 
having complex and less readable financial reports are also less likely to have smaller 
investors (Loughran and McDonald 2010; Miller 2010). Moreover, data analytics also 
informs investment analysis about the effects of “tone” on various risk factors such as cost of 
capital, volatility of stock returns, and analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion (Kothari, Li, and 
Short 2009). Additionally, textual analytics of corporate disclosures confirms that firms are 
very cautious in delivering messages while facing greater litigation risks and that they reduce 
the levels of disclosures after litigation (Nelson and Pritchard 2007; Rogers and Van Buskirk 
2009).  
Like experimental studies, data analytics allows archival researchers in financial 
accounting to test the effect of behavioral biases of corporate executives on corporate 
financial policies (Li 2010b). Research documents that managers having self-serving 
attribution biases tend to be overconfident (Li 2010a), and the self-serving attribution bias of 
managers leads them to make less optimal investment decisions, to have higher leverage, to 
repurchase stocks, and to be unwilling to issue dividends.  
Prior Data Analytics/Big Data Research  
in Management Accounting  
 
Warren et al. (2015, 397) noted that “in managerial accounting, big data will 
contribute to the development and evolution of effective management control systems and 
budgeting processes.” In particular, they elaborate on how big data or data analytics can play 
a role in management control systems by discovering behaviors that have correlation with 
specific goal outcomes. Essentially, big data analytics can locate new kinds of behaviors that 
might impact goal outcomes by simplifying the identification of important motivational 
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measurement tools linked to organizational goals. Moreover, by analyzing non-structured 
data, big data analytics can help discern employee morale, productivity, and customer 
satisfaction. Data analytics can also be used to improve “beyond budgeting practices” since 
traditional budgeting sometimes creates barriers to creativity and flexibility (Warren, Moffitt, 
and Byrnes 2015). 
Richins, Stapleton, Stratopoulos, and Wong  (2017) suggest that big data analytics 
could improve customer service quality. They suggest that most of the time organizations use 
structured data that are in their records to evaluate customer service quality; however, this 
approach does not take into account the customer perspective. Big data analytics allow 
organizations to evaluate this customer perspective by using unstructured data from social 
media or e-commerce sites, thus permitting organizations to have a holistic view of customer 
service quality.  
Managers recognize that financial measures, alone, are insufficient to forecast future 
financial success or to use for performance management. Big data analytics provides 
opportunities to incorporate non-financial measures by incorporating unstructured data 
(Richins et al. 2017). Using big data analytics (particularly the analysis of  unstructured data) 
accountants can identify the causes of underlying problems, understand ramifications, and 
develop plans to mitigate adverse impacts (Richins et al. 2017). Data analytics can also 
provide accountants with additional tools to monitor operations and product quality, discover 
opportunities to reduce costs, and contribute to decision-making (Dai and Vasarhelyi 2016).  
However, research has also cautioned about the dark side of data analytics (Holt, 
Lang, and Sutton 2017; Warren, Moffitt, and Byrnes 2015). When used to monitor corporate 
performance, excessive monitoring or tracking could hinder employee creativity, motivation, 
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morale, and productivity. Employees may fear to demonstrate their originality and initiative. 
The existence of active monitoring also negatively impacts employee perceptions of 
organizational ethics and reduces their likelihood of being satisfied with a position in the 
organization (Holt, Lang, and Sutton 2017).  
Prior Data Analytics/Big Data  
Research in Auditing   
 
Big data analytics has the potential to improve the effectiveness of auditing by 
providing new forms of audit evidence. Data analytics can be used in both auditing planning 
and in audit procedures, helping auditors to identify and assess risk by analyzing large 
volumes of data. Even organizations that have very immature capabilities indicate that a 
strong level of value is derived from including analytics in the audit process (Protiviti 2017).  
Big data is being seen by practitioners as an essential part of assurance services (Alles 
and Gray 2016), but its application in auditing is not as straightforward as it is in marketing 
and medical research. Appelbaum (2016) and Cao et al. (2015) identified several areas that 
are likely to benefit from the use of big data analytics. Some of the areas are:  
a) At the engagement phase – supplementing auditors’ industry and client knowledge 
b) At the planning phase – supplementing auditors’ risk assessment process 
c) At the substantive test phase – verifying the management assertions 
d) At the review phase – advanced data analytical tools as analytical procedures 
e) At the continuous auditing phase – enhancing knowledge about the clients 
Yoon, Hoogduin, and Zhang (2015) suggest that big data create great opportunities 
through providing audit evidence. They focused on the “sufficiency” and “appropriate” 
criteria and noted that though there are some issues about the propriety of big data due to 
different kinds of “noise,” big data can be used as complementary audit evidence. 
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Additionally, they discussed how big data can be integrated with traditional audit evidence in 
order to add value in the process. Big data or data analytics can also help auditors to test the 
existence of assertions (e.g. fixed assets) using non-conventional data such as video 
recording (Warren, Moffitt, and Byrnes 2015). In the world of big data, potential types and 
sources of audit evidence have changed (Appelbaum 2016). For this reason, Krahel and 
Titera (2015) suggest that big data might change the focus of auditors, shifting emphasis 
from management to the verification of data. 
Data quality and reliability or verifiability have become important issues in auditors’ 
evaluations of audit evidence. In this way, big data can be used as part of analytical 
procedures, which are required at the planning and review phase, but which are optional at 
the substantive procedure phase. However, many issues remain unresolved about how to use 
big data since analytical procedures and auditing standards are not very specific about the 
selection of analytical audit procedures; the choice depends on the professional judgment of 
auditors (Appelbaum, Kogan, and Vasarhelyi 2017). For this reason, auditors need to 
exercise increased professional skepticism in the big data era because in many cases sources 
of big data lack provenance and, subsequently,  veracity, and sometimes auditors 
(particularly internal auditors) have little or no involvement in data quality evaluation of such 
sources (Appelbaum 2016). Considering the prediction that analytics will spell the demise of 
auditing, Richins et al. (2017) suggest that auditors in the big data era are still essential 
because they know “the language of business.” Particularly, they suggest that big data 
analytics cannot replace the professional judgment used by auditors, suggesting that analytics 
will instead complement auditors’ professional judgment.  
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Alles and Gray (2016) identify four potential advantages of incorporating big data 
into audit practices: strong predictive power to set expectations for financial statement audits, 
great opportunities to identify potential fraudulent activities, increased probabilities of 
discovering red flags, and the possibility of developing more predictive models for going 
concern assumptions. To that end, internal audit groups with dedicated analytics functions 
and organizations that have attained a managed or optimized to the state of analytics maturity 
are far more likely to conduct continuous auditing (Protiviti 2017). Though big data creates 
many opportunities for improving auditing, it also suffers from different shortcomings that 
hinder its application in Continuous Auditing (CA). For example, Zhang, Yang, and 
Appelbaum (2015) suggest big data characteristics such as volume, velocity, variety, and 
veracity creates problems in its application in CA through different gaps such as data 
consistency, data integrity, data identification, data aggregation, and data confidentiality.   
Rose, Rose, Sanderson, and Thibodeau (2017) found that the timing of the 
introduction of data analytics tools into the audit process affects the evaluation of evidence 
and professional judgment. Barr-Pulliam, Brown-Liburd, and Sanderson (2017) found that 
jurors consider auditors more negligent when they use traditional auditing technique rather 
than audit data analytics techniques. Additionally, they confirmed that audit data analytics 
tools increase the perceptions of audit quality. Schneider et al. (2015) suggest that data 
analytics can be used by auditors to evaluate the internal control effectiveness and policy 
compliance. They further suggest that by analyzing unusual data flows, unexpected large 
volumes of data, high frequency transactions, or duplicate vendor payments, auditors can 





Challenges to the Adoption of Data Analytics 
in Accounting/Auditing 
 
The theoretical background of this research stems from the frameworks of Sivarajah  
et al. (2017) and Schneider et al. (2015). Sivarajah  et al. (2017) identify the challenges of 
data analytics in terms of the data life cycle, which is depicted in Figure 3.1.  They classified 
such issues as data challenges, process challenges, and management challenges. Schneider et 
al. (2015) developed a framework for data analytics organizing principles, which is depicted 
in Figure 3.2. In regard to the Schneider et al. framework, this study focuses on their 
organizing principle 3, which is called “contingency factors.” I argue that both frameworks 
(Sivaraj and Schneider) identify data analytics challenges in the same way, but rather use 
different terms to describe them. I assume data challenges, process challenges, and 
management challenges in Sivarajah  et al. (2017) are equivalent to technological factors, 
cognitive factors, and organization factors respectively in Schneider et al. (2015). Therefore, 
I develop hypotheses around these challenges. Research has identified other relevant 
challenges related to big data such as security, ethics, and the legal liability of auditors 
(Appelbaum 2016; Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart 2015; Holt, Lang, and Sutton 2017; 
Schneider et al. 2015; Zhang, Yang, and Appelbaum 2015), which I did not focus on for the 









Figure 3.2 Challenges to the Adoption of Data Analytics - Schneider et al. (2015) 
 
 
Data (Skills) Challenges  
 
Data skills challenges involve technical competencies related to the employment of 
big data analytics in organization. Big data analytics capability is important for organizations 
because it is associated with firms’ financial and market performance. Of the specific big 
data analytics capabilities, employee data analytics skills are one of the most important 
(Wamba et al. 2017).    
The professional standards of internal auditors require them to have technology skills, 
which can largely be construed in terms of big data analytics competencies. IIA (2016, 6) 
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require that “Internal auditors must have sufficient knowledge of key information technology 
risks and controls and available technology-based audit techniques to perform their assigned 
work.” External auditors are not required to have such data analytics skills (Wang and 
Cuthbertson 2015). However, since PCAOB (2007) requires external auditors to rely on 
internal auditors, they also need to have data analytics skills to evaluate internal auditing 
work before relying on the IAF. These circumstances emphasize the significance of data 
analytics competencies in the IAF.  
For the accounting practice, research has noted that most companies have developed 
the skills for dealing with traditional data but have not done the same for big data (Brown-
Liburd, Issa, and Lombardi 2015). Implementing big data analytics is not an easy task; it 
requires personnel with expertise in data analytics (Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart 2015; Wang 
and Cuthbertson 2015). For that reason, Protiviti (2017, 6)  noted that “organizations 
indicating that their analytics capabilities are at a higher state of maturity derive notably 
higher value from integrating analytics into their audit processes compared to organizations 
whose internal audit functions demonstrate less mature analytics capabilities. This may be 
because they have people with the right skillsets, unlike other internal audit organizations 
that are more limited in terms of analytics skills. Another possibility is that mature 
organizations use analytics more pervasively throughout their audit plans and processes, 
enabling them to glean more value from these activities.”   
Emphasizing obstacles to big data adoption, Huerta and Jensen (2017, 105) 
commented on “…the difficulty of finding staff who can analyze businesses, identify the data 
needed, and determine what they tell them about the business. The creativity to ask insightful 
questions, paired with the analytical skills to answer them, will allow accountants to grow as 
83 
 
strategic business partners.” Dealing with unstructured data such as text, pictures, and videos 
requires a new set of analytical and technical skills and technological knowledge (Huerta and 
Jensen 2017). PwC (2015) calls for a restructuring of accounting education, emphasizing 
courses related to programming, databases, multivariate and inferential statistics, and data 
visualization.  
Alles (2015) suggested that lack of trained personnel is the greatest obstacle for the 
use of big data or data analytics in accounting. He also noted that auditors may find it 
difficult to compete for big data talent since competitors are also seeking talent for profit 
making rather than compliance purposes. Since big data is a disruptive technology, its 
adoption requires significant changes in many areas of auditing including increases in 
technical skills ,and the lack of these skills is one of the potential inhibitors in incorporating 
big data in auditing (M. Alles and Gray 2016). Deloitte (2016b) suggests that analytics might 
become the core capabilities for internal auditors, and it appears that CAEs are beginning to 
expect that all of the internal auditors in their department have a minimum level of expertise 
in data analytics (Tang, Norman, and Vendrzyk 2017). The average number of staff members 
dedicated to the data analytics function in a firm is five and the average number of data 
analytics function hours dedicated to audits that include analytics is 40 (Protiviti 2017).  
Earley (2015) identified training and expertise of auditors as one of the three 
challenges affecting the use of data analytics. Regulators fear that the lack of data analytics 
skills among auditors might hamper the quality of auditing by focusing the shift from 
auditing to advisory services since the scarcity of skills might lead practitioners to hire data 
scientists, who have a different mindset on compliance matters than traditional auditors (Katz 
2014). Li et al. (2018) also suggest that technological competence influences application-
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level usage of audit analytics. Richins et al. (2017) suggests that if accountants do not extend 
their competencies to include data analytics skills, then they risk being replaced by data 
scientists. Surveys indicate that IAFs tend to lack big data analytics general technical 
knowledge and audit specific data analytics skills (Protiviti 2017). Figure 3.3 indicates that 
IAFs feel that, for general technical knowledge, their data analytics level of competency is 
lower, and that they have a higher need to improve it (circle 5, which is marked yellow). 
Similarly, for audit process knowledge, IAFs level of competency is lower and they perceive 
pressing needs to improve in data analytics skills and knowledge (circle one and 7, which is 




Figure 3.3 Internal Audit Competencies - Protiviti (2017) 
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From a survey of internal audit practitioners, Protiviti (2017) recommends that CAEs 
use champions to lead the analytics efforts because champions in analytics help bridge the 
gap between the analytics function and operations auditing. Additionally, the presence of 
champions also encourages more analytics use, including basic usage by the whole team. As 
compared to other organizations, those with analytics champions and dedicated analytics 
functions in place deliver more value, experience higher demand for their analytics services 
and obtain better access to higher-quality data (Protiviti 2017).  
 Zhang et al. (2015, 470)  noted that “auditors with competence in data analytics will 
have better opportunities to widen the range and increase the scale of auditing on a more 
frequent basis via Continuous Data Monitoring (CDM), Continuous Control Monitoring 
(CCM), and Continuous Risk Monitoring and Assessment (CRMA).” Of the many 
challenges identified by Brown-Liburd et al. (2015), the lack of adequate analytics training 
and the absence of required analytics skills is a decisive challenge. They suggest that 
adequate training and skills play a critical role in adopting analytical tools. Big data creates 
challenges for auditors because of the associated information overload, rigors of pattern 
recognition, related ambiguity, and relevance, but these challenges can be overcome through 
data competence skills and IT savviness (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015). Additionally, Rose et al. 
(2017)  noted that auditors’ deficiencies in pattern recognition can be overcome by enhancing 
their knowledge. Tang et al. (2017) reported that in IAFs, a good percentage of employees 
hold IT related certifications. Their research implies that the demand for data analytics skills 
in the IAF will continue unabated and that the IAF will need more employees with data 
analytics skills and abilities. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
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H1a: CAEs with IT certifications are more likely to employ data analytics in 
inference /prediction/assurance.  
H1b: IT savvy IAFs are more likely to employ data analytics in inference 
/prediction/assurance.  
Alles (2015)  suggested that since there is a lack of skilled personnel in the market 
and since there is severe competition for among businesses for data savvy people, training 
could be a better alternative to facilitate the adoption of big data. Training ensures 
organizational privacy, as well (Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart 2015). Richins et al.(2017) 
emphasized the value of training for accountants on unstructured data such as text mining, 
and statistical software which will help auditors to achieve high levels of efficiency and 
create value. Tang et al. (2017) also report that CAEs consider various data analytics tools 
and training to support data analytics in their respective organizations. They indicate that for 
improving skills in data analytics, IAFs employ different kinds of training, which can be a 
function of the size of the organizations and the focus of analytics. Such training is important 
for IAFs, because IAFs investing in training will not only be able to keep the best employees 
but they will also be able to attract more of the talented employees they will need in the near 
future (Erhardt 2016). Additionally, Braun and Davis (2003) found that additional technical 
training is needed and desired by auditors to increase their confidence in the use of CAATs. 
It seems clear that training promotes the adoption of technology by easing qualitative 
overload, which mediates the relationship between technology adoption intention and 
perceived ease of use (Pennington, Kelton, and DeVries 2006). The average number of days 




As such, I hypothesize:  
H1c: IAFs employing greater training hours in analytics are more likely to employ 
data analytics in inference /prediction/assurance 
Process (Cognitions) Challenges  
 
Emphasizing the value of creative thinking in the big data era, Huerta and Jensen 
(2017, 102) noted that “… how the analysis of big data requires accountants to develop a 
creative mindset to identify the insights that can be gained from the data. Panelists 
emphasized that extracting meaningful knowledge from big data requires not only a deep 
understanding of the data, but also a creative way of thinking about data. The challenge with 
big data is identifying the right questions to ask.” They identify four cognitive biases that 
might impact decision-making on whether big data analytics are used. These cognitive biases 
include anchoring, availability, in-attentional blindness, and confirmation bias. Anchoring 
involves providing responses that tend to be related to initial values. As an example of 
anchoring, Huerta and Jensen (2017) cited the example of the estimate of warranty expenses 
which are calculated using data from social media postings. Availability involves assigning 
greater relevance to information recently acquired than to information known earlier. In-
attentional blindness involves disregarding information that is not in the specific focus of 
interest. Confirmation bias involves disregarding information that does not support 
hypothesized ideas. Lack of data interpretation skills is also identified as one of the inhibitors 
in incorporating big data in auditing (M. Alles and Gray 2016).  
Brown-Liburd et al. (2015) suggest that although big data analytics has the potential 
to improve auditor judgment and decision-making, auditors need to overcome challenges 
related to information processing weaknesses and cognitive limitations. They identify three 
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ways by which big data poses challenges to auditors: extraction of large volume of 
nonfinancial data for which auditors are not accustomed, confusion between correlation and 
causation, and the unstructured nature of big data.  
Though auditors lacking data analytics skill might outsource the analytics process or 
create tools that automate as much of the process as possible, the data analytics environment 
will result in auditor judgment playing a much more significant role than in sample-based 
auditing because of the potential for large numbers of anomalies requiring evaluation (Earley 
2015). Brown-Liburd et al. (2015) and Krahel and Titera (2015) suggest that big data – a 
significant amount of which is unstructured and non-financial – might overwhelm the 
information processing capabilities of auditors. Research suggests that auditors’ professional 
judgment is likely to be compromised by information overload (Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and 
Tuttle 2015). Moreover, big data will require auditors to have a higher tolerance for 
ambiguity and it is also likely that the use of big data will exacerbate some problems such as 
the tremendous number of likely exceptions – a large portion of which is likely to be false 
positives (Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle 2015). However, research suggests that big data 
analytics provides the opportunity to reduce the number of false positives dramatically by 
identifying true anomalies and exceptions along with better systems of prioritization (Cao, 
Chychyla, and Stewart 2015).   
Since skills such as pattern recognition and the related understanding of how to 
evaluate anomalies usually have not been the main focus of accounting education and the 
basis of training in public accounting firms, new auditors are not typically trained to consider 
whether a transaction itself makes sense or to develop expectations in order to recognize 
anomalies (Earley 2015). However, experience helps to compensate for the gaps (Earley 
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2015). Critical thinking skills deserve special attention because the possibility that the 
employment of big data analytics in auditing could give the mistaken impression to financial 
statement users that auditors are now able to provide absolute assurance rather than the 
customary reasonable assurance in their work (Krahel and Titera 2015). While big data 
analytics provides tremendous opportunities, because of information overload auditors 
cannot adequately capitalize on all of them; hence, they are unable to provide “absolute 
assurance”  (Krahel and Titera 2015). Rose et al. (2017, 85) suggested that “some of the 
benefits of big data in audit will come from the capacity of the data to create conflict, activate 
skepticism, and produce judgments that combine intuition and deliberate reasoning”. 
Therefore, I hypothesize the following:  
H2: IAFs having critical thinking skills are more likely to employ data analytics in 
inference /prediction/assurance. 
Management (Organizational) Challenges  
 
Alles (2015) noted that many auditors’ clients have already accepted big data; 
therefore, to add value for the clients and to better discharge their responsibility, auditors also 
face challenges in embracing big data. For internal auditors, their nature of work 
responsibilities will influence the extent of the usage of data analytics.    
Since businesses are integrating big data with business analytics approaches to make 
insightful decisions, auditors have some urgency to utilize advanced data analytics tools and 
techniques (Appelbaum, Kogan, and Vasarhelyi 2017). To leverage the benefits of big data, 
both technical and business knowledge are required. In response to critics, who charge that in 
the accounting profession faces likely extinction in the rise of analytics, Richins et al. (2017) 
argues that this is not true; accountants add important value to the firm in the big data era. 
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They contend that to get out of the most from big data, domain-specific knowledge is also 
required, and accountants are highly proficient at domain-specific knowledge. In addition, 
accountants excel in structured data analysis. Therefore, domain-specific knowledge and 
skills in structured data make accountants well positioned to contribute to analyses provided 
by data scientists. It is further suggested that blindly following data without understanding 
business fundamentals can be dangerous. Rose et al. (2017) suggest that auditors who 
understand the client’s financial issues are able to form an initial framework within which 
they can exercise professional skepticism and judgment, which helps to make sense of the 
patterns identified in big data analytics.  Protiviti (2017) indicates that the most oft-cited 
challenge to accessing data in the organization is identifying where the data reside, and I 
argue that the specific business knowledge of IAFs is likely to mitigate this problem. 
Moreover, keen business knowledge helps identify new data sources, both internal and 
external, which can then enhance the internal auditor’s view of risk across organizations 
(Protiviti 2017). As such, I hypothesize:  
H3a: Business savvy IAFs are more likely to employ data analytics in inference 
/prediction/assurance. 
Data analytics provides accountants with the opportunity to extend their roles – 
moving from watchdogs to business partners (Amato 2013). Accounting’s role in strategy 
formulation and implementation is not new. Research suggests that historically accountants 
have played a significant role in strategy development and execution (Simmonds 1982). 
Richins et al. (2017) notes that accounting tools such as Balanced Scorecard (BSC) provide 
framework for examining organizations from multiple perspectives and that big data 
analytics can play a significant role by providing non-financial measures for performance. 
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Verver (2015, 20) reported that “many internal audit departments fail to make progress in 
implementing audit analytics because they do not treat it as a strategic initiative…” He also 
suggests that active involvement in data analytics increases the IAF’s strategic importance in 
the firm and helps to deliver sustainable benefits.   
Research suggests that external auditors can help their clients make better strategic 
decisions through the employment of data analytics tools (Earley 2015). Alles (2015)  
suggests that outside of auditing, big data is regarded as a tool to figure out unexpected 
correlations in different strategic variables which can then be exploited to increase profits 
(e.g. developing new marketing strategies). Moreover, he suggests that if big data truly 
becomes a strategic necessity for businesses, then it becomes equally necessary for auditors 
to be “auditing through big data.” These scenarios suggest that clients have a great deal of 
impact on the usage of big data by auditors. These factors are called “exogenous drivers” by 
Alles (2015), and Richins et al. (2017) suggest that even though sometimes large datasets 
might find spurious correlations, accountants’ abilities to understand the language of business 
coupled with data scientists’ abilities to conduct exploratory analyses that identify 
correlations and patterns will turn data into implementable strategies.  
However, many organizations might not employ IAFs in management positions 
because they may fear that it would impair the objectivity and independence of internal audit. 
Studies document that when IAFs act as management training ground, their objectivity (not 
competence) is impaired, thus affecting the financial reporting quality (Christ, Masli, et al. 
2015; Rose, Rose, and Norman 2013). Therefore, even if IAFs are aligned with the strategy 
of an organization, their roles might be limited by different governance mechanisms such as 
an independent audit committee. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
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H3b: IAFs that are aligned with an organization’s strategy are more likely to employ 
data analytics in inference/ prediction (business performance).  
Data analytics in accounting is mostly used in assurance, particularly for fraud 
detection and compliance and in this manner data analytics helps auditors evaluate internal 
control effectiveness. Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart (2015) noted that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) uses big data analytics to monitor market events, to figure out 
financial statement fraud, and to identify audit failures. They further suggest that similar 
analytics could also be used by auditors to identify fraudulent or high-risk activities on the 
part of auditees. Additionally, in many organizations the IAF uses big data analytics to 
identify fraudulent insurance claims (Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart 2015).  
Internal auditing uses continuous monitoring of data to identify risk in internal control 
systems (Murphy and Tysiac 2015). Warren et al. (2015) suggest that big data will help 
internal auditors detect fraud more efficiently and effectively through social media text 
mining. Tang et al. (2017) suggest that using data analytics IAF can determine the areas for 
risk management in which the highest consideration should be given.  Therefore, I 
hypothesize the following:  
H3c: IAFs with fraud detection risk responsibility are more likely to employ data 






The data for the study was collected from the Common Body of Knowledge database 
(CBOK 2015) developed by The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation 
(IIARF)7. For the study, only the responses from Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) were used 
since these individuals are more knowledgeable and more experienced than other staff in the 
internal audit department. Furthermore, the dataset represents responses from internal audit 
departments located in different regions of the world. The distribution of the data is given in 




Distribution of Samples (Number of Observation) 
 
Total Respondent 14,518 
Less: Director or Senior Manager 1,630 
Less: Manager  2,098 
Less: Staff 5,644 
Less: Missing Value for Respondents’ Position 182 
Less: Academic Staff or Retired 1,620 
Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) 3,344 
Less: Missing Values for Dependent & Independent Variables 2,356 




                                                 
7 This is a proprietary database. The Appendix contains the “Agreement” between me and the IIARF, 





Distribution of Sample (Type of Organizations) 
 
Type_Org Freq. Percent 
   
Privately Held 340 34.4% 
Publicly Traded 363 36.7% 
Public Sector 209 21.1% 
Not for Profit 53 5.3% 
Other 23 2.3% 





Distribution of Sample (Region Represented) 
 
Region_Org Freq. Percent 
   
Africa 101 10.2% 
Asia  191 19.3% 
Europe 279 28.2% 
Latin America 119 12.0% 
North America 273 27.6% 
Oceania 25 2.5% 





Distribution of Sample (Country Represented) 
 
Country Freq. Percent 
Not an IIA Member 19 1.9% 
Albania 2 0.2% 
Argentina 14 1.4% 
Armenia 3 0.3% 
Australia 22 2.2% 
Austria 7 0.7% 
Bahamas 1 0.1% 
Bangladesh 1 0.1% 
Barbados 2 0.2% 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
   
Belgium 6 0.6% 
Bolivia 2 0.2% 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1 0.1% 
Botswana 1 0.1% 
Brazil 12 1.2% 
Bulgaria 1 0.1% 
Canada 34 3.4% 
Cayman Islands 1 0.1% 
Chile 25 2.5% 
China 11 1.1% 
Taiwan 13 1.3% 
Colombia 13 1.3% 
Costa Rica 6 0.6% 
Croatia 1 0.1% 
Cyprus 2 0.2% 
Czech Republic 1 0.1% 
Denmark 10 1.0% 
Dominican Republic 4 0.4% 
Ecuador 8 0.8% 
Egypt 1 0.1% 
El Salvador 8 0.8% 
Estonia 8 0.8% 
Ethiopia 2 0.2% 
Fiji 2 0.2% 
Finland 2 0.2% 
Macedonia 3 0.3% 
France  39 3.9% 
Germany 13 1.3% 
Greece  7 0.7% 
Haiti 2 0.2% 
Honduras 2 0.2% 
Hong Kong 1 0.1% 
Hungary 1 0.1% 
Iceland 1 0.1% 
96 
 
Table 3.4 (Continued) 
   
India 26 2.6% 
Indonesia 12 1.2% 
Israel 12 1.2% 
Italy 16 1.6% 
Japan 7 0.7% 
Kenya 2 0.2% 
South Korea 2 0.2% 
Latvia 3 0.3% 
Lebanon 3 0.3% 
Lithuania 3 0.3% 
Luxembourg 2 0.2% 
Malawi 1 0.1% 
Malaysia 33 3.3% 
Mauritius 7 0.7% 
Mexico 8 0.8% 
Montenegro 1 0.1% 
Netherlands  7 0.7% 
New Zealand 5 0.5% 
Nicaragua 4 0.4% 
Nigeria 2 0.2% 
Norway 4 0.4% 
North America 9 0.9% 
Oman 5 0.5% 
Panama 5 0.5% 
Paraguay 1 0.1% 
Peru 8 0.8% 
Philippines  8 0.8% 
Poland  2 0.2% 
Puerto Rico 1 0.1% 
Qatar 3 0.3% 
Romania 1 0.1% 
Russia 5 0.5% 
Saudi Arabia 9 0.9% 
Serbia 5 0.5% 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
   
Singapore  7 0.7% 
Slovenia 5 0.5% 
South Africa  36 3.6% 
Spain  27 2.7% 
Sri lanka  3 0.3% 
Swaziland  1 0.1% 
Sweden 6 0.6% 
Switzerland  45 4.5% 
Tanzania  19 1.9% 
Thailand  1 0.1% 
Tunisia  2 0.2% 
Turkey 11 1.1% 
Uganda 10 1.0% 
United Arab Emirates  21 2.1% 
United Kingdom & Ireland  13 1.3% 
United States  217 22.0% 
Uruguay 5 0.5% 
Zimbabwe 14 1.4% 
Member at large - Not Affiliated 5 0.5% 





Research indicates that IAFs employ data analytics in different kinds of functions 
such as audit execution, audit planning, fraud investigation, continuous monitoring, risk 
assessment, continuous auditing, reporting, testing of entire population, trend analysis, 
sample selection, testing of individual controls, audit scoping  and so forth (Protiviti 2017) . 
However, this study focuses on the five areas in which IAFs are most likely to employ big 
data analytics: testing of entire populations rather than sampling, tests for regulatory 
compliance, identification of possible instances of fraud, issues discovered through risk or 
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control monitoring, and business improvement opportunities. Protiviti (2017)  noted that 77% 
of organizations use big data analytics in the testing of entire populations and 66% use it for 
sample selection;  11% use big data analytics for departmental governance and 47% use it for 
continuous monitoring. In addition, 54% of IAFs use data analytics in fraud investigation and 
46% use it for risk assessment. Therefore, this study covers a well-represented sample of 
areas in which IAFs employ big data analytics. Since the dependent variable used here is a 
categorical variable, logistic regression is employed for analysis. Table 3.5 represents the 




Measurement of Variables 
 
Variables CBOK (2015)  
Questions 
Definition 




Q96 1 if IAF uses data mining or data analytics for 
tests of entire populations rather than 




Q96 1 if IAF uses data mining or data analytics for 





Q96 1 if IAF uses data mining or data analytics for 




Q96 1 if IAF uses data mining or data analytics for 





Q96 1 if IAF uses data mining or data analytics for 






Q13 1 if CAE has IS certification such as CISA, 
QiCA, CRISC; zero otherwise 
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4, 95-5, 95-6) 




Q14 Natural log of the number of hours of formal 
training related to the internal audit profession 
Critical_Thinking  
 








Q57 1 if IAF is fully aligned with the strategic plan 
of organization; zero otherwise.  
Fraud_DetRes  
 
Q55 1 if IAF has all or most of the responsibility to 
detect fraud in the organization; zero 
otherwise.  
Control Variables   
Size_Org  
 
Q19 Natural log of the number of Full Time 
Employees (FTE) in organizations 
LogAC_Meetings  
 
Q78a Log of the number of Audit Committee or 
equivalent Meetings held last year. 
 
For H1a, CAEs’ certifications in information technology are measured using a 
dummy variable, with one representing CAEs having Information Systems (IS) certifications. 
For H1b, factor analysis was conducted since the variable is a latent construct. Table 3.6 
contains the items indicating the constructs. When factor analysis was performed, two 
eigenvalues greater than one were found; therefore, two latent constructs were formed, with 
one being labelled general-IT savviness (IT_Savvy_GEN) and the other data-specific IT 
savviness (IT_Savvy_Data). General IT savviness (IT_Savvy_GEN) refers to the typical IT 
                                                 
8 When I run exploratory factor analysis on Q95, I got two factors with Eigenvalue greater than 1. 
Therefore, I created two constructs; IT_Savvy_GEN for the first factor and IT_Savvy_Data for the second factor. 
The items for each construct are in the parentheses of the second column.  
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competencies of IAFs whereas specific IT savviness (IT_Savvy_Data) refers to the data-
oriented competencies of IAFs. The items of the constructs are self-explanatory.  The factor 
loadings of both constructs (IT_Savvy_GEN  & IT_Savvy_Data )  are documented in Table 















Estimate your proficiency for each competency using the following 
scale; 1-Novice = can perform routine tasks with direct supervision; 2-
Trained = can perform routine tasks with limited supervision; 3-
Competent = can perform routine tasks independently; 4- Advanced = 
can perform advanced tasks independently; 5- Expert = can perform 
complex advanced tasks independently. 
1. Understanding the organization’s internal control risks (BS1) 
2.  Understanding the organization’s strategic risks (BS2) 
3. Understanding the organization’s governance risks (BS3) 
4. Understanding the organization’s industry and economic factors 
affecting it (BS4) 






What is the extent of activity for your internal audit department related 
to the use of the following IT tools and techniques? 1 = None; 2 = 
Minimal; 3= Moderate; 4= Extensive 
1. A Software or a tool for internal audit risk assessment (ITSG1) 
2. An automated tool for internal audit planning and scheduling 
(ITSG2) 
3. Electronic Workpapers (ITSG3) 
4. Flowchart or Process Mapping Software (ITSG4)  
5. Internal Quality Assessments using an automated tool (ITSG5) 
6. An automated tool to monitor and track audit remediation and 
follow up (ITSG6) 













What is the extent of activity for your internal audit department related 
to the use of the following IT tools and techniques? 1 = None; 2 = 
Minimal; 3= Moderate; 4= Extensive 
1. A software or tool for data mining (ITSD1) 
2. An automated tool for data analytics (ITSD2) 
3. Computer Assisted Audit Technique (ITSD3) 






Estimate your proficiency for each competency using the following 
scale; 1-Novice = can perform routine tasks with direct supervision; 2-
Trained = can perform routine tasks with limited supervision; 3-
Competent = can perform routine tasks independently; 4- Advanced = 
can perform advanced tasks independently; 5- Expert = can perform 
complex advanced tasks independently. 
1.Use appropriate data collection tools to create audit efficiency (CT1) 
2.Use data analysis to reach meaningful conclusions (CT2) 
3.Apply problem solving techniques to address issues (CT3) 
4. Apply understanding of the organization’s business objectives and 
strategy (CT4)  
 
 
To calculate the factor scores, the Bartlett method was used. For H1c, training 
(LogTraining_hours) was measured using the log of the number of training hours IAFs 
usually receive in a given year. The critical thinking skills (Critical_Thinking) of IAFs were 
measured using factor analysis and the Bartlett method was used. Table 3.6 includes the 
items for this latent construct and Table 3.7 includes factor loadings of the items. All of the 
loadings of the construct of critical thinking skills (Critical_Thinking) are above the 
recommended threshold as suggested by Hair et al. (1998), but the measure CT4 is cross 
loaded with other construct; therefore, measure CT4 is excluded while calculating factor 
scores since it violates discriminant validity of the construct. For H3a, business savviness of 
IAFs (Business_Savvy) is measured using the items listed in Table 3.6 and the factor loadings 
are listed in Table 3.7. As was the case with the previous constructs, this construct’s factor 
loadings are also above the recommended threshold. As stated, item CT4 is not counted 
towards business savviness in order to avoid violations of discriminant validity. For H3b, 
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strategic alignment of IAFs (Strategic_alignment) is measured using a dummy variable, with 
one being the IAFs fully aligned with strategic plan of the organization or zero otherwise. 
Similarly, for H3c, fraud detection responsibility (Fraud_DetRes) is measured by using a 
dummy variable and one represents the IAFs responsible for all or most of the fraud in the 




Factor Loadings (Principal Component Factor with Varimax Rotation) 
 
Items Business_Savvy IT_Savvy_GEN IT_Savvy_Data Critical_Thinking 
     
ITSG1 0.1385 0.6350 0.3914 0.0343 
ITSG2 0.1153 0.6754 0.4544 0.0056 
ITSG3 0.143 0.7174 -0.0044 0.0267 
ITSG4 -0.0041 0.5988 0.1377 0.1955 
ITSG5 -0.0061 0.6783 0.386 0.111 
ITSG6 0.1363 0.7128 0.3135 -0.0425 
ITSG7 0.0731 0.7589 0.359 0.0312 
ITSD1 0.1465 0.1937 0.8149 0.0574 
ITSD2 0.0899 0.2456 0.8335 0.0858 
ITSD3 0.0056 0.2974 0.7660 0.0834 
ITSD4 -0.0539 0.3797 0.6322 0.2194 
BS1 0.8391 0.0183 0.0564 0.1628 
BS2 0.8665 0.0657 0.053 0.224 
BS3 0.8504 0.0458 0.0814 0.2142 
BS4 0.8205 0.1202 0.0793 0.1777 
BS5 0.8516 0.0909 0.0372 0.223 
CT1 0.3025 0.0376 0.1149 0.8511 
CT2 0.3396 0.0115 0.1197 0.8554 
CT3 0.4892 0.0828 0.031 0.6886 
CT4 0.6744 0.0684 -0.0141 0.5311 
 
 
Control Variables  
The literature suggests a range of potential control variables that influence information 
technology adoption, and these have been included in the models. They are discussed below.  
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Size_Org: The use of IT in auditing and the perceived importance of IT is largely a 
function of organization size (Janvrin, Bierstaker, and Lowe 2008). Tang et al. (2017) also 
indicate that firm size affects the decision to provide training related to different kinds of 
efficiencies to auditors. Large organizations are well positioned to adopt disrupting 
technologies such as big data analytics because they have better resources for acquisition and 
implementation. Therefore, it is expected that large organizations are more likely to employ 
big data analytics in different aspects of operation, including the internal audit function. The 
variable that assesses this capability is called Size_Org and is measured using the log of the 
number of a firm’s full-time employees. Using full-time employee for measurement is ideal 
for the purposes of this study because it avoids exchange rate problems - the data for this 
study originating in different geographical locations of the world.   
LogAC_Meetings/LogAC_IAF_Meetings: Internal auditors play a critical role in the 
governance of organizations; they play a key role in helping audit committees discharge their 
responsibilities. Since big data analytics provides greater opportunities in organizational 
governance through risk control monitoring, fraud identification, and regulatory compliance, 
it is very likely that audit committees might be favorably inclined toward the adoption of 
analytics technology to optimize the effectiveness of the audit committee’s oversight. 
Research confirms that audit committees are influential in the implementation of various 
emerging technologies and processes such as Extensible Business Reporting Language 
(XBRL) and cybersecurity audit (Abdolmohammadi et al. 2017; Islam, Farah, and Stafford 
2018). Corporate governance guidelines emphasize frequent audit committee meetings in 
order to facilitate better communication between audit committees and internal auditors 
(PCAOB 2012; Blue Ribbon Committee 1999); it is also the case that auditor meetings with 
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their audit committees reduce the probability of fraud and restatement of financial statements 
(Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2004; Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson 1999).  
Therefore, it is argued that because of the beneficial possibilities arising from 
implementation of big data analytics in corporate governance, audit committees might lead 
IAFs to choose to employ big data analytics.  Two variables were used to measure this role of 
board oversight: LogAC_Meetings represents the log of the number of audit committee 
meetings (or equivalent) and LogAC_IAF_Meetings represents the log of the number of audit 
committee meetings in which the Chief Audit Executive (CAEs) is invited to attend.  
Industry_Org:Of the companies adopting big data, telecommunication and financial 
service are in the lead (Columbus 2017). Many financial services organizations have a 
requirement that all audits use data analytics, or that the auditors validate that they reviewed 
their scope and approach for data analytics use and can justify why analytics cannot be used 
(Protiviti 2017). Therefore, the dummy variable Industry_Org is included, with one referring 
to the organizations belonging to financial or insurance industry or zero otherwise.  
Cert_CPA/Cert_CIA: Tang et al. (2017) confirm that CPA and CIA certification are 
the most common credentials held by members of the IAF. Even so, internal audit 
professionals who desire to elevate their data analytics capabilities are uncertain about how 
to accomplish this task (Protiviti 2017), and it is well established that certification represents 
the specialization related to knowledge. Therefore, two variables are included to represent the 
specialization of CAEs - Cert_CPA (1 for the CAEs with CPA certification or zero 
otherwise) and Cert_CIA (1 representing the CAEs with CIA certification).  
LogExp_CAE:As discussed by Earley (2015), experience might compensate for the 
gap between education and training in big data, so CAE experience might serve as an analog 
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to education or certifications in regard to the use of big data analytics in internal auditing. 
Given the issues related to the use of big data such as information overload and ambiguity, 
Brown-Liburd et al. (2015) suggest that less experienced auditors face problems in exercising 
professional judgment in its use. They call for future research on the influence of experience 
in its effect on big data usage. Rose et al. (2017) also found that auditing experience has an 
effect on the understanding of data patterns in big data analytics. However, CAE experience 
might also have an inconclusive effect on big data adoption because research does indicate 
that CAEs with more experience in place might prefer either traditional alternative or 
emerging technologies (Abdolmohammadi and Boss 2010). The variable representing the 
CAE experience is called LogExp_CAE, which is the log of the number of years of 
experience as CAE.  
LogAge_IAF:  Research indicates that the average number of years that a dedicated 
analytics function might be in place is four years (Protiviti 2017). This suggests that mature 
IAFs are more likely to be involved with emerging areas such as XBRL implementation or 
security auditing (Héroux and Fortin 2013; Abdolmohammadi et al. 2017; Islam, Farah, and 
Stafford 2018). For that reason, it is expected that the more mature IAFs are, the greater the 
likelihood of adopting big data analytics. The variable used to measure the maturity of the 
IAF is LogAge_IAF, which is the log of the number of years that IAFs have been in the 
organization. 
LogSize_IAF:Research indicates that IAF size might also have a considerable effect 
on its ability to contribute to big data analytics adoption (Tang, Norman, and Vendrzyk 
2017). The literature  indicates that Big four audit firms are more likely to employ computer-
related audit procedures and IT specialists than are smaller audit firms (Janvrin, Bierstaker, 
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and Lowe 2009). Larger internal audit functions with more advanced analytics capabilities 
utilize data analytics in a majority of the audits they perform; larger internal audits can build 
repeatable or self-service tools that businesses can use without internal audit being closely 
involved (Protiviti 2017). Since size of internal audit seems to be a determining factor, the 
variable called LogSize_IAF is specified to investigate the effect, and it is characterized by 
the log of the number of Full Time Employees (FTE) in the IAF.  
Budget: The research by Protiviti (2017) and Tang et al. (2017) indicates that many 
IAFs consider their budget to be a barrier to the adoption of big data analytics. Long term 
budgets can influence the adoption process for audit software by auditors (Curtis and Payne 
2008). It appears that less than 67% of internal audit functions are associated with  20% of 
the total budget dedicated to data analytics (Protiviti 2017). For that reason, the variable 
Budget is specified using a dummy variable, with one representing completely sufficient 
budget or zero otherwise. 
ACCountries: Cultural change represents a major obstacle to successful 
implementation of analytics (Protiviti 2017). Practitioners suggest that scarcity of skills 
related to data analytics is more acute in developing economies than it is in developed 
economies. The oversight of boards might not be as rigorous in developing countries as in the 
developed ones, as well - thus potentially overlooking the potential of big data analytics in 
risk control monitoring, risk assessment, fraud detection, and regulatory compliance in lesser 
developed nation contexts. Therefore, it is expected that the adoption of big data analytics 
might differ in different national settings. The variable ACCountries is a categorical variable, 
with one representing respondents belonging to Anglo-culture countries such as UK/Ireland; 
USA; Canada; Australia; New Zealand; or South Africa, zero otherwise. 
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Empirical Models  
 
In this study, the use of big data analytics was tested in five areas:  data mining/data 
analytics for tests of entire populations rather than sampling, analytics for business 
improvement opportunities, analytics for tests of regulatory compliance, analytics for the 
identification of fraud, and analytics for risk or control monitoring. For this reason, five 
separate logistic regression models were used. The models are given below; some of the 
explanatory variables of the models differ because of the change of the nature of the 
relationship with dependent variables. 
 
Prob (DA_IP_Pop = 1) = F [α0 + α1 Size_Org + α2 
LogAC_Meetings + α3 LogAC_IAF_Meetings + α4 Industry_Org 
+ α5 cert_CPA + α6 cert_CIA + α7 LogExp_CAE + α8 
LogAge_IAF + α9 LogSize_IAF + α10 Budget + α11 ACCountries 
+ α12 cert_IT + α13 IT_Savvy_GEN + α14 IT_Savvy_Data + α15 
LogTraining_hours + α16 Critical_Thinking + α17 Business_Savvy 




Prob (DA_IP_BusImp = 1) = F [β0 + β1 Size_Org + β 2 
LogAC_Meetings + β 3 LogAC_IAF_Meetings + β 4 Industry_Org 
+ β 5 cert_CPA + β 6 cert_CIA + β 7 LogExp_CAE +   β 8 
LogAge_IAF + β 9 LogSize_IAF + β 10 Budget + β 11 ACCountries 
+ β 12 cert_IT + β 13 IT_Savvy_GEN + β 14 IT_Savvy_Data + β 15 
LogTraining_hours +β16 Critical_Thinking + β 17 Business_Savvy 




Prob (DA_Assu_Reg= 1) = F [ᵞ0 + ᵞ1 Size_Org + ᵞ2 
LogAC_Meetings + ᵞ3 LogAC_IAF_Meetings +   ᵞ4 Industry_Org 
+ ᵞ5 cert_CPA + ᵞ6 cert_CIA + ᵞ7 LogExp_CAE + ᵞ8 LogAge_IAF 
+ ᵞ9 LogSize_IAF + ᵞ10 Budget + ᵞ11 ACCountries + ᵞ12 cert_IT + 
ᵞ13 IT_Savvy_GEN + ᵞ14 IT_Savvy_Data +   ᵞ15 LogTraining_hours 







Prob (DA_Assu_Fraud= 1) = F [ᵟ0 + ᵟ1 Size_Org + ᵟ2 
LogAC_Meetings + ᵟ3 LogAC_IAF_Meetings + ᵟ4 Industry_Org 
+ᵟ5 cert_CPA + ᵟ6 cert_CIA + ᵟ7 LogExp_CAE + ᵟ8 LogAge_IAF 
+ ᵟ9 LogSize_IAF + ᵟ10 Budget + ᵟ11 ACCountries + ᵟ12 cert_IT + 
ᵟ13 IT_Savvy_GEN + ᵟ14 IT_Savvy_Data + ᵟ15 LogTraining_hours 





Prob (DA_Assu_RCMoni = 1) = F [ᵠ0 + ᵠ1 Size_Org + ᵠ2 
LogAC_Meetings + ᵠ3 LogAC_IAF_Meetings+   ᵠ4 Industry_Org 
+ᵠ5 cert_CPA + ᵠ6 cert_CIA + ᵠ7 LogExp_CAE +   ᵠ8 LogAge_IAF 
+ ᵠ9 LogSize_IAF + ᵠ10 Budget + ᵠ11 ACCountries + ᵠ12 cert_IT + 
ᵠ13 IT_Savvy_GEN + ᵠ14 IT_Savvy_Data + ᵠ15 LogTraining_hours 






Descriptive Analysis of Variables  
 
Summary statistics in Table 3.8 shows that 59% of IAFs use big data analytics to test 
entire populations rather than sampling (DA_IP_Pop) and this use is statistically significant 
across type of organization (χ2 = 14.36; p < 0.01). 56% of IAFs use data analytics for fraud 
detection (DA_Assu_Fraud), with χ2 = 6.23 and p < 0.18, indicating that there is no 
difference across different types of organizations in the use of data analytics in this manner. 
39% of IAFs use big data analytics for tests of regulatory compliance (DA_Assu_Reg), with 
statistically significant differences across organization type (χ2 = 15.14; p < 0.00). Of all five 
of the modelled uses of data analytics, analytics for business improvement opportunities 
(DA_IP_BusImp) scores lowest (31%), with differences across organization not significant 
(χ2 = 3.46; p < 0.48). This implies that the application of data analytics in business 
improvement process by IAFs is limited.  This finding makes sense as the increased 
corporate governance practice around the world tries to mitigate the use of IAFs as 






















DA_IP_Pop 0.59  0.60  0.64  0.49  0.49  0.61  14.36  
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50) (0.01) 
DA_IP_BusImp 0.31  0.33  0.31  0.28  0.28  0.43  3.46  
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.51) (0.48) 
DA_Assu_Reg 0.39  0.46  0.35  0.33  0.49  0.48  15.14  
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.47) (0.51) (0.51) (0.00) 
DA_Assu_Fraud 0.56  0.55  0.60  0.49  0.55  0.61  6.23  
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.18) 
DA_Assu_RCMoni 0.46  0.44  0.47  0.44  0.45  0.52  1.42  
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.84) 
cert_IT 0.16  0.13  0.17  0.15  0.25  0.30  9.75  
 (0.36) (0.33) (0.37) (0.36) (0.43) (0.47) (0.05) 
IT_Savvy_GEN 0.00  0.14  0.02  -0.19 -0.27 -0.02 4.58  
 (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (1.02) (0.99) (0.00) 
IT_Savvy_Data 0.00  0.10  0.03  -0.19 -0.20 0.18  3.69  
 (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.01) (0.98) (0.90) (0.01) 
LogTraining_hours 3.70  3.71  3.65  3.79  3.78  3.64  2.20  
 (0.59) (0.67) (0.57) (0.48) (0.40) (0.63) (0.07) 
Critical_Thinking 0.00  (0.03) 0.01  -0.01 0.20  -0.10 0.64  
 (1.00) (0.99) (1.02) (1.02) (0.95) (0.89) (0.63) 
Business_Savvy 0.00  -0.06 0.03  -0.05 0.30  0.09  1.69  
 (1.00) (1.03) (0.99) (1.01) (0.84) (0.76) (0.15) 
Strategic_alignment 0.63  0.64  0.59  0.67  0.64  0.70  5.33  
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.26) 
Fraud_DetRes 0.20  0.17  0.22  0.16  0.28  0.26  6.82  
 (0.40) (0.38) (0.41) (0.37) (0.46) (0.45) (0.15) 
Size_Org 7.05  6.53  7.67  7.01  6.55  6.37  12.22  
 (2.35) (2.21) (2.48) (2.09) (2.35) (2.63) (0.00) 
LogAC_Meetings 1.72  1.69  1.78  1.68  1.65  1.71  2.17  
 (0.51) (0.55) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45) (0.65) (0.07) 
LogAC_IAF_Meetings 1.64  1.63  1.67  1.62  1.61  1.66  0.48  
 (0.50) (0.53) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.67) (0.75) 
Industry_Org 0.35  0.54  0.29  0.15  0.38  0.39  92.87  
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.45) (0.36) (0.49) (0.50) (0.00) 
cert_CPA 0.44  0.42  0.44  0.44  0.45  0.57  1.91  
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.75) 
cert_CIA 0.41  0.39  0.39  0.45  0.58  0.30  10.15  
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.04) 
LogExp_CAE 1.90  1.91  1.87  1.89  1.94  2.03  0.39  
 (0.72) (0.73) (0.69) (0.74) (0.73) (0.78) (0.82) 
LogAge_IAF 2.60  2.50  2.69  2.62  2.60  2.71  2.64  
 (0.80) (0.79) (0.78) (0.84) (0.78) (0.83) (0.03) 
LogSize_IAF 2.14  2.04  2.31  2.09  1.77  2.21  3.84  
 (1.22) (1.21) (1.19) (1.23) (1.26) (1.30) (0.00) 
Budget 0.35  0.35  0.37  0.30  0.34  0.48  5.08  
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.48) (0.51) (0.28) 
ACCountries 0.32  0.22  0.32  0.40  0.74  0.17  64.30  
  (0.47) (0.42) (0.47) (0.49) (0.45) (0.39) (0.00) 
N 988.00  340.00  363.00  209.00  53.00  23.00   
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Finally, it is clear that of all the types of organizations (except the “other” category), 
analytics find greater uses in tests of entire populations, for fraud detection, and in risk 
control monitoring for publicly traded organizations. For independent variables, it is found 
that only 16% of IAFs have CAEs with information technology/systems certifications 
(cert_IT), with the differences across type of organization statistically significant (χ2 = 9.75; 
p < 0.05). For general IT savviness (IT_Savvy_GEN) the mean value is zero with standard 
deviation 1. Since the Bartlett method standardizes the factor scores, it always produces a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. However, the mean value for general IT 
savviness is positive for privately held and publicly traded organization, suggesting that 
privately held and publicly traded organizations’ general IT savviness is greater than that of 
other types of organizations in the analysis (significant at F = 4.58; p < 0.00). The same is 
true for data-specific IT savviness (IT_Savvy_Data), with significant differences across 
organization type (F = 3.69; p < 0.01). For training hours, the mean of the log of training is 
3.70 and is statistically significant (F = 2.20; p < 0.07). For critical thinking 
(Critical_Thinking), the overall mean is zero (standard deviation 1), with the mean of 
publicly traded organizations and not-for-profit organizations being positive, indicating that 
they have greater critical thinking skills than other types of organizations; however, the 
differences for critical thinking skills (Critical_Thinking) are not statistically significant (F = 
0.64; p < 0.63). The differences in the mean of business savviness of IAFs (Business_Savvy) 
across organization type are not statistically significant (F = 1.69; p < 0.15). Furthermore, 
63% of IAFs are found to be fully aligned with the strategic plan of the organization 
(Strategic_alignment), with the IAFs in publicly traded organizations having the lowest 
relation with strategic alignment. The differences of strategic alignment of IAFs across 
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organization type are not statistically significant (χ2 = 5.33 p < 0.26). Twenty percent of IAFs 
are responsible for fraud detection in their organization (Fraud_DetRes), but differences 
across organizational type are not statistically significant (χ2 = 6.82; p < 0.15).     
For control variables, it is found that the average size of organizations (Size_Org) is 
7.05, which is significant across organizational type (F = 12.22; p < 0.00), and publicly 
traded companies are the largest in size (average size – 7.67). Furthermore, the number of 
audit committee meetings (LogAC_Meetings) is significantly different across organization 
type (F = 2.17; p < 0.07), with an average meeting number of 1.72. Even so, the average 
number of audit committee meetings in which CAEs are invited (LogAC_IAF_Meetings) are 
not statistically significant across organization type (F = 0.48; p < 0.75). Thirty-five percent 
of organizations in the sample belong to the financial or insurance industry, and it was found 
that the average percentage of CAEs having CPA certifications (cert_CPA) was 44%, even 
though that was not statistically significant across organization type (χ2 = 1.91; p < 0.75).  On 
the other hand, differences in CIA certification across different types of organizations 
(cert_CIA) are statistically significant (χ2 = 10.15; p < 0.04), with an average certification 
rate for percentage of CAEs of 41%. This finding related to CPA and CIA certification in 
organizations is consistent with prior research (Tang, Norman, and Vendrzyk 2017).  
No differences were found for experience of CAEs (LogExp_CAE) across types of 
organizations (F = 0.39; p < 0.82), but there is significant difference in the maturity of IAFs 
(LogAge_IAF) across organization type (F = 2.64; p < 0.03). Similarly, the size of IAFs 
(LogSize_IAF) across types of organizations is significant (F = 3.84; p < 0.00). Also, 35% of 
IAFs appear generally to have sufficient budgets (Budget), with the differences across 
different types of organizations not statistically significant (χ2 = 5.08; p < 0.28). Finally, 32% 
112 
 
of our sample is from Anglo-culture countries. These descriptive analyses suggest that there 
are sufficient variations in the various explanatory variables related to data analytics to 
accurately account for the usage of data analytics by the internal audit function.   
Univariate Tests of Hypotheses  
Table 3.9 tests the relationship of explanatory variables with the dependent variables 
specified for the study. The analysis from the variable of IT certification of CAEs (cert_IT) 
suggests that IT certification has a role in the use of big data analytics in tests of populations 
rather than samples (χ2 = 6.329; p < 0.012), but cert_IT is not significant in any other area of 
analytics usage of data analytics. Hence, there is marginal support for hypothesis H1a. 
Regarding H1b, IT competencies, both general and data-specific, are significant across all 
dependent variables, confirming that IT competencies of IAFs are highly likely to lead to the 
adoption of analytics in accounting and auditing practice. The same is true for IAFs 
providing greater training to their employees, which supports H1c.  
H2 tests for the effect of critical thinking skills in the IAF and subsequent adoption of 
analytics technology. Not surprisingly, when assessing the role of the presence of critical 
thinking in the IAF and subsequent intentions to use analytics for specific purposes related to 
business goals, differences are significant and in the expected direction for all dependent 
variables. It appears that the presence of critical thinking skills in the IAF has an important 
effect on the uses of big data analytics for solving key auditing and business problems.  
H3a speculates on the business savviness of IAFs and its relationship to the adoption 
and use of big data analytics and is significant across all dependent variables. IAF’s that have 
a good understanding of business processes are more likely to employ analytics in their 






Summary Statistics Across Dependent Variables 
 

















  579 59% 409 41%   308 31% 680 69%   389 39% 599 61%   551 56% 437 44%   450 46% 538 54%   
                           
cert_IT Yes 105 18% 50 12% χ2 = 
6.329 
(0.012) 
53 17% 102 15% χ2 = 
0.781 
(0.377) 
59 15% 96 16% χ2 = 
0.132 
(0.717) 
91 17% 64 15% χ2 = 
0.644 
(0.422) 
71 16% 84 16% χ2 = 
0.005 
(0.944) 
 No 474 82% 359 88% 255 83% 578 85% 330 85% 503 84% 460 83% 373 85% 379 84% 454 84% 
IT_Savvy_G
EN 
Mean  0.19  -0.27 t = -7.29 
(0.000) 
 0.2  -0.09 t = -4.34 
(0.000) 
 0.23  -0.15 t = -5.93 
(0.000) 
 0.19  -0.24 t = -6.92 
(0.000) 
 0.24  -0.2 t = -7.04 
(0.000) 
 SD  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.04 
IT_Savvy_D
ata 
Mean  0.36  -0.51 t = -14.77 
(0.000) 
 0.3  -0.14 t = -6.46 
(0.000) 
 0.32  -0.21 t = -8.32 
(0.000) 
 0.34  -0.43 t = -12.94 
(0.000) 
 0.3  -0.25 t = -8.88 
(0.000) 
 SD  0.036  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04 
LogTraining
_hours 
Mean  3.75  3.65 t = -2.44 
(0.007) 
 3.72  3.7 t = -0.62 
(0.268) 
 3.76  3.66 t = -2.64 
(0.004) 
 3.73  3.67 t = -1.60 
(0.055) 
 3.74  3.67 t = -1.75 
(0.041) 
 SD  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.02 
Critical_Thi
nking 
Mean  0.07  -0.09 t = -2.44 
(.0074) 
 0.17  -0.08 t = -3.53 
(.0000) 
 0.2  -0.13 t = -5.05 
(0.000) 
 0.1  -0.12 t = -3.43 
(0.000) 
 0.11  -0.09 t = -3.15 
(0.000) 
 SD  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.04 
Business_Sa
vvy 
Mean  0.12  -0.17 t = -4.47 
(0.000) 
 0.12  -0.05 t = -2.46 
(0.007) 
 0.14  -0.09 t = -3.47 
(0.000) 
 0.09  -0.11 t = -3.16 
(0.000) 
 0.12  -0.1 t = -3.41 
(0.000) 
 SD  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.04 
Strategic_ali
gnment 
Yes 380 66% 242 59% χ2 = 4.29 
(0.038) 
213 69% 409 60% χ2 = 7.38 
(0.007) 




358 65% 264 60% χ2 =2.17 
(0.140) 
302 67% 320 59% χ2 =6.12 
(0.013) 
 No 199 34% 167 41% 95 31% 271 40% 119 31% 247 41% 193 35% 173 40% 148 33% 218 41% 
Fraud_DetR
es 
Yes 109 19% 84 21% χ2 = .447 
(0.504) 
65 21% 128 19% χ2 = .701 
(0.402) 
91 23% 102 17% χ2 = 6.08 
(0.014) 
123 22% 70 16% χ2 =6.16 
(0.013) 
104 23% 89 17% χ2 =6.73 
(0.010) 
 No 470 81% 325 79% 243 79% 552 81% 298 77% 497 83% 428 78% 367 84% 346 77% 449 83% 
Size_Org Mean  7.33  6.65 t = -4.48 
(0.000) 
 7.2  6.98 t = -1.37 
(0.086) 
 6.83  7.19 t = 2.39 
(0.990) 
 7.31  6.71 t = -3.99 
(0.000) 
 7.22  6.9 t = -2.14 
(0.016)  SD  0.1  0.11  0.13  0.09  0.12  0.09  0.1  0.11  0.11  0.1 
LogAC_Me
etings 
Mean  1.72  1.71 t = -0.49 
(0.313) 
 1.72  1.71 t = -0.31 
(0.378) 
 1.77  1.68 t = -2.79 
(0.003) 
 1.73  1.71 t = -0.63 
(0.264) 
 1.72  1.71 t = -0.15 
(0.441) 
 SD  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
LogAC_IAF
_Meetings 
Mean  1.67  1.6 t = -1.942 
(0.026) 
 1.64  1.64 t = -0.13 
(0.449) 
 1.71  1.6 t = -3.19 
(0.000) 
 1.66  1.62 t = -1.37 
(0.086) 
 1.65  1.63 t = -0.49 
(0.313) 
 SD  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Industry_Or
g 
Yes 205 35% 143 35% χ2 = .021 
(0.886) 
95 31% 253 37% χ2 = 3.76 
(0.052) 




183 33% 165 38% χ2 =2.21 
(0.137) 
167 37% 181 34% χ2 =1.29 
(0.256) 
 No 374 65% 266 65% 213 69% 427 63% 212 55% 428 72% 368 68% 272 62% 283 63% 357 66% 
cert_CPA Yes 288 50% 147 36% χ2 = 
18.53 
(0.000) 
140 46% 295 43% 
χ2 = 0.37 
(0.54) 
175 45% 260 43% 
χ2 =0.24 
(0.625) 
247 45% 188 43% 
χ2 =0.32 
(0.570) 
195 43% 240 45% 
χ2 =0.16 
(0.687)  No 291 50% 262 64% 168 55% 385 57% 214 55% 339 57% 304 55% 249 57% 255 57% 298 55% 
cert_CIA Yes 249 43% 158 39% χ2 = 1.89 
(0.169) 
129 42% 278 41% χ2 =0.09 
(0.767) 
149 38% 258 43% χ2 =2.21 
(0.137) 
237 43% 170 39% χ2 =1.70 
(0.192) 
176 39% 231 43% χ2 =1.48 







Table 3.9 (Continued) 
 
                  
LogExp_CA
E 
Mean  1.94  1.84 t = -2.16 
(0.016) 
 1.84  1.92 t = 1.69 
(0.954) 
 1.95  1.86 t = -1.72 
(0.043) 
 1.91  1.88 t = -0.64 
(0.262) 
 1.89  1.91 t = 0.45 
(0.673) 
 SD  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
LogAge_IA
F 
Mean  2.69  2.48 t = -4.06 
(0.000) 
 2.55  2.63 t = 1.52 
(0.935) 
 2.68  2.55 t = -2.54 
(0.006) 
 2.65  2.55 t = -2.05 
(0.020) 
 2.67  2.55 t = -2.50 
(0.006) 
 SD  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03 
LogSize_IA
F 
Mean  2.32  1.88 t = -5.73 
(0.000) 
 2.14  2.14 t = 0.07 
(0.528) 
 2.32  2.03 t = -3.67 
(0.000) 
 2.29  1.95 t = -4.33 
(0.000) 
 2.34  1.97 t = -4.89 
(0.000) 
 SD  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.05 
Budget Yes 224 39% 120 29% χ2 = 9.23 
(0.002) 
123 40% 221 33% χ2 = 5.16 
(0.023) 
148 38% 196 33% χ2 =2.95 
(0.086) 
207 38% 137 31% χ2 =4.15 
(0.042) 
167 37% 177 33% χ2 =1.92 
(0.166)  No 355 61% 289 71% 185 60% 459 68% 241 62% 403 67% 344 62% 300 69% 283 63% 361 67% 
ACCountrie
s 
Yes 209 36% 110 27% χ2 = 9.28 
(0.002) 
99 32% 220 32% χ2 =0.00 
(0.948) 
109 28% 210 35% χ2 =5.34 
(0.021) 
183 33% 136 31% χ2 =0.49 
(0.485) 
153 34% 166 31% χ2 =1.11 
(0.292) 










With the exception of the identification of fraud (DA_Assu_Fraud, χ2 = 2.17; p < 
0.14), it is significant to the adoption of data analytics. Moreover, when IAFs are tasked 
with the fraud detection, they are also significantly more likely to adopt big data analytics 
for fraud detection, regulatory compliance, and risk control monitoring, thus supporting 
H3c. Overall, the several tests of variables spanning H1 (a,b,c), H2, and H3 (a,b,c) 
provide strong support for the hypothesized influences of IAF competencies and skills in 
leading to the adoption/usage of big data analytics in different areas of accounting and 
audit.  
For control variables, it is found that organization size (Size_Org) is significant 
across all dependent variable in explaining the usage of data analytics. The board 
governance variables (LogAC_Meetings; LogAC_IAF_Meetings) also provide marginal 
support for usage of big data analytics. Additionally, IAFs in financial or insurance 
industries are significantly likely to engage in adoption of big data analytics for business 
improvement processes and in assuring regulatory compliance. This finding is line with 
the practitioner surveys on the topic (Protiviti 2017). CAEs with CPA certification are 
highly likely to adopt big data analytics in testing of populations; however, CIA 
certification is not significant for any of the dependent variables. Additionally, CAE 
experience, the age of IAFs, and the size of IAFs also indicate support for the usage of 
big data analytics, as does the presence of an adequate IAF budget. Lastly, and in some 
cases, there are differences in the adoption of big data analytics between Anglo-culture 







Multivariate Analysis and Tests of Hypotheses  
The correlation matrix in Table 3.10 demonstrates that all correlations between 
explanatory variables are below 0.50, except for the correlation between 
LogAC_Meetings and LogAC_IAF_Meetings, which is 0.884. However, tests of Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) for these variables returns a result of less than 10, which 
overcomes speculation that there might be multi-collinearity problems with the model.  
Table 3.11 through 3.15 document the results of the multivariate logistic 
regression. Since in logistic regression analysis it is difficult to interpret the beta 
coefficients, the marginal effects of means in addition to the beta coefficients are also 
calculated (marginal effects at means are in brackets). In order to measure the goodness 
of fit, Percentage of Correctly Predicted (PCP), which measures the percentage of the 
respondent correctly predicted by the respective models is calculated. In calculating PCP, 
the cutoff point is 0.50.  
Table 3.11 (Equation 1) displays results for adoption of big data analytics for 
testing of populations rather than samples. The results demonstrated in the table suggest 
that data-specific IT competencies (IT_Savvy_Data) and business savviness 
(Business_Savvy) are significant in predicting the usage of big data analytics by IAFs for 
purposes of testing population rather than sample, and this supports hypotheses H1b and 
H3a. Additionally, it is found that organizational size (Size_Org), audit committee and 
IAF meetings (LogAC_IAF_Meetings), CPA certification (cert_CPA), and size of IAFs 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































es Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  DA_IP_Pop DA_IP_Pop DA_IP_Pop DA_IP_Pop 


















* 0.5351[0.127]* 0.5370[0.128]* 0.5099[0.122] 
  (0.0073) (0.0988) (0.0980) (0.1205) 
Industry_Org 
 -0.03257[-
0.0079] -0.1052[-0.025] -0.1046[-0.025] -0.1543[-0.036] 










  (0.0006) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0067) 
cert_CIA  0.1265[0.031] 0.1024[0.024] 0.1033[0.025] 0.09130[0.022] 








  (0.5588) (0.7360) (0.7293) (0.5465) 
LogAge_IAF  0.1137[0.028] 0.03363[0.008] 0.03456[0.008] 0.02846[0.007] 
  (0.2349) (0.7489) (0.7425) (0.7882) 
LogSize_IAF 
 0.2404[0.058]**
** 0.1270[0.030]* 0.1279[0.030]* 0.1356[0.032]* 
  (0.0006) (0.0793) (0.0779) (0.0645) 
Budget  0.3046[0.074]** 0.1930[0.046] 0.1923[0.046] 0.1537[0.037] 
  (0.0354) (0.2278) (0.2296) (0.3428) 
ACCountries  0.2255[0.054] 0.2656[0.063] 0.2662[0.063] 0.2017[0.047] 
  (0.1396) (0.1122) (0.1115) (0.2356) 
cert_IT H1a  0.2205[0.052] 0.2194[0.052] 0.2156[0.051] 
































   (0.7757) (0.7657) (0.5819) 
Critical_Thinking 
H2 
  0.01348[0.003] 
-0.2015[-
0.048]* 









   
0.3281[0.079]*
** 




   0.03965[0.009] 
     (0.8042) 
Fraud_DetRes H3c    -0.2202[-0.051] 
     (0.2415) 
_cons  -1.5384**** -0.4303 -0.4267 -0.1702 
  (0.0001) (0.4599) (0.4639) (0.7758) 
LR chi2  78.96 235.59 235.62 247.79 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N  988 988 988 988 






62.45% 72.37% 72.27% 71.05% 
p-values in 
parentheses; 
Marginal Effect at 
Means in brackets 
 
    
* p<.10   ** p<.05  *** p<.01  **** p<.001  
 
 
It is evident that the probability of adopting big data analytics in testing of 
populations is 10% greater for CAEs with CPA certification than the CAEs without CPA 
certification (marginal effects at means).  The model’s PCP is more than 70%, thus 
confirming that the model accurately classifies 70% of the data. To gain additional 
insights from the interaction of the significant variables, I tested the marginal change of 
the probability of adoption of big data analytics for testing of populations, which is 
explained in the additional analysis section of the paper. 
Table 3.12 (Equation 2) provides results for the analysis of the adoption of big 
data analytics for business improvement process. It is evident that data-specific IT 
competencies (IT_Savvy_Data) and critical thinking skills (Critical_Thinking) are 







Regression Results and Marginal Effect at Mean (Business Improvement Process) 
 
 Hypotheses (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  DA_IP_BusImp DA_IP_BusImp DA_IP_BusImp DA_IP_BusImp 
DA_IP_BusImp      
Size_Org  0.03417[0.007] 0.03002[0.006] 0.02864[0.006] 0.02830[0.006] 
  (0.2988) (0.3731) (0.3968) (0.4056) 
LogAC_Meetings  0.05666[0.012] 0.1952[0.041] 0.1777[0.037] 0.1999[0.042] 




0.03568[0.008] -0.1632[-0.034] -0.1475[-0.031] -0.1829[-0.038] 
  (0.9034) (0.5954) (0.6343) (0.5567) 
Industry_Org  -0.2713[-0.058]* -0.3331[-0.069]** -0.3283[-0.069]** -0.3405[-0.071] ** 
  (0.0861) (0.0406) (0.0442) (0.0376) 
cert_CPA  0.1008[0.022] 0.06516[0.014] 0.09768[0.020] 0.1165[0.024] 
  (0.4818) (0.6613) (0.5150) (0.4395) 
cert_CIA  0.03025[0.006] 0.02841[[0.006] 0.03786[0.008] 0.03345[0.007] 
  (0.8334) (0.8547) (0.8078) (0.8300) 
LogExp_CAE  -0.1466[-0.031] -0.2141[-0.045]** -0.2292[-0.048]** -0.2270[-0.049]** 
  (0.1474) (0.0396) (0.0285) (0.0311) 
LogAge_IAF  -0.1274[-0.027] -0.1872[-0.039]* -0.1753[-0.037]* -0.1740[-0.048] * 
  (0.1914) (0.0635) (0.0832) (0.0856) 
LogSize_IAF 
 -0.004549[-
0.0009] -0.1056[-0.022] -0.09979[-0.021] -0.1008[-0.021] 
  (0.9446) (0.1463) (0.1703) (0.1670) 
Budget  0.3761[0.080]*** 0.2648[0.056]* 0.2530[0.053]* 0.2253[0.047] 
  (0.0100) (0.0796) (0.0950) (0.1406) 
ACCountries  -0.03055[-0.007] 0.002683[0.0005] 0.006858[0.001] 0.02255[0.005] 
  (0.8449) (0.9867) (0.9661) (0.8897) 
cert_IT H1a  0.06156[0.013] 0.05120[0.011] 0.05919[0.012] 
   (0.7578) (0.7980) (0.7676) 
IT_Savvy_GEN H1b  0.05978[0.013] 0.05180[0.011] 0.03894[0.008] 










   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LogTraining_hours H1c  -0.03282[-0.007] -0.04915[-0.010] -0.06218[-0.013] 
   (0.8004) (0.7053) (0.6346) 
Critical_Thinking H2   0.1483[0.031]* 0.1267[0.027] 
    (0.0521) (0.2067) 
Business_Savvy H3a    0.01486[0.003] 
     (0.8835) 
Strategic_alignment H3b    0.2504[0.052] 
     (0.1135) 
_cons  -0.6661* 0.08523 0.1257 0.03141 
  (0.0853) (0.8813) (0.8259) (0.9570) 
LR chi2  16.60 65.49 69.30 71.95 
  (0.1230) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
N  988 988 988 988 
pseudo R-sq  0.0135 0.0534 0.0565 0.0587 
      
      




Table 3.12 (Continued) 





68.83% 69.13% 70.04% 70.34% 
p-values in 
parentheses; Marginal 
Effect at Means in 
brackets 
 
    
* p<.10   ** p<.05  *** p<.01  **** p<.001  
 
 
The marginal effect at means shows that IAFs with sufficient budgets are 5.30% 
more likely to adopt big data analytics in support of business improvement processes than 
are IAFs with insufficient budgets. Moreover, it is evident from the analysis that for 
organizations belonging to the finance industry, that have experienced CAEs, and have 
matured IAFs tend not to adopt big data analytics in support of business improvement 
processes. These findings reflect on the strong corporate governance requirement that the 
use of IAFs be minimized/avoided for management operation ground; however, IAFs 
with sufficient budgets do tend to use big data analytics for business process 
improvement. These results suggest that when there are enough resources, IAFs might 
extend their use of data analytics to management operation ground even though such uses 
are discouraged by governance guidelines. 
Table 3.13 (Equation 3) displays results for analysis of the adoption of data 
analytics in regulatory compliance. The analysis suggests that data-specific IT 
competencies (IT_Savvy_Data) and critical thinking skills (Critical_Thinking) are 
statistically significant in leading to the adoption of big data analytics in assuring 
regulatory compliance. Additionally, industry type is statistically significant, with IAFs 
in the finance or insurance industries having a 12.70% greater probability of adopting big 




data analytics in support of achieving regulatory compliance. The PCP of the model is 




Regression Results and Marginal Effect at Means (Regulatory Compliance)  
 
 Hypotheses Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  DA_Assu_Reg DA_Assu_Reg DA_Assu_Reg DA_Assu_Reg 










  (0.0073) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
LogAC_Meetings  -0.02561[-0.006] 0.08077[0.019] 0.05630[0.013] 0.05108[0.012] 




0.3013[0.072] 0.1236[0.029] 0.1522[0.036] 0.1648[0.039] 








  (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
cert_CPA  0.05988[0.014] -0.01032[-0.002] 0.04898[0.012] 0.05713[0.014] 
  (0.6665) (0.9429) (0.7374) (0.6961) 
cert_CIA  -0.09653[-0.023] -0.1109[-0.026] -0.09163[-0.022] -0.08661[-0.020] 
  (0.4909) (0.4612) (0.5457) (0.5686) 
LogExp_CAE  0.1457[0.035] 0.08225[0.019] 0.05994[0.014] 0.05822[0.014] 
  (0.1379) (0.4159) (0.5565) (0.5696) 
LogAge_IAF  0.04593[0.011] -0.01616[-0.004] 0.006266[0.0014] 0.002861[0.0007] 
  (0.6295) (0.8701) (0.9498) (0.9771) 
LogSize_IAF  0.2053[0.049]*** 0.1405[0.033]** 0.1555[0.037]** 0.1511[0.036]** 
  (0.0013) (0.0331) (0.0199) (0.0242) 
Budget  0.1463[0.035] 0.03682[0.009] 0.01385[0.003] 0.01221[0.003] 
  (0.3049) (0.8039) (0.9263) (0.9353) 
ACCountries  -0.3247[-0.077]** -0.3081[-0.073]* -0.3049[-0.072]* -0.2846[-0.067]* 
  (0.0342) (0.0509) (0.0551) (0.0757) 
cert_IT H1a  -0.1532[-0.036] -0.1717[-0.0405] -0.1627[-0.038] 
   (0.4402) (0.3895) (0.4157) 
IT_Savvy_GEN H1b  -0.04940[-0.012] -0.06364[-0.015] -0.06071[-0.014] 








   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LogTraining_hours H1c  0.1547[0.037] 0.1197[0.028] 0.1184[0.028] 






    (0.0004) (0.0115) 
Business_Savvy H3a    0.01439[0.003] 
     (0.8822) 
Fraud_DetRes H3c    0.2552[0.060] 
     (0.1449) 




Table 3.13 (Continued) 
    
  (0.0009) (0.0435) (0.0592) (0.0467) 
LR chi2  61.00 112.10 124.87 126.99 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
N  988 988 988 988 





64.98% 67.51% 68.02% 66.60% 
p-values in 
parentheses; 
Marginal Effect at 
Means in brackets 
 
    
* p<.10   ** p<.05  *** p<.01  **** p<.001  
 
 
Table 3.14 (Equation 4) demonstrates results for the adoption of big data analytics 
in the detection of fraud or fraud risk management. The results suggest that when IAFs 
are assigned with fraud and risk management responsibilities (Fraud_DetRes), the 
likelihood of adopting big data analytics increases by 8.5%. Data-specific IT 
competencies (IT_Savvy_Data) are significant in the prediction of analytics use as well. It 
also appears that larger organizations (Size_Org) have a greater likelihood of adopting 
big data analytics. The model correctly classifies more than 65% of cases.  
Table 3.15 (Equation 5) displays results for analysis of the adoption of big data 
analytics for risk control monitoring. The results for the adoption of big data analytics are 
similar to those of the adoption of data analytics in fraud risk management, with data-
specific IT competencies (IT_Savvy_Data) and fraud risk responsibility (Fraud_DetRes) 
both statistically significant. Additionally, the size of the IAF is also statistically 
significant in predicting analytics use. Lastly, IAFs in Anglo-culture countries 
(ACCountries) are 7.02% more likely to adopt big data analytics in risk control 
monitoring than are IAFs in non-Anglo culture countries. The model correctly classifies 






Regression Results and Marginal Effect at Means (Fraud Risk Management) 
 
 Hypotheses        (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  DA_Assu_Fraud DA_Assu_Fraud DA_Assu_Fraud DA_Assu_Fraud 
DA_Assu_Fraud      
Size_Org  0.06373[0.016]** 0.05889[0.014]* 0.05791[0.014]* 0.06065[0.015]* 
  (0.0397) (0.0759) (0.0812) (0.0709) 
LogAC_Meetings  -0.4095[-0.101] -0.2384[-0.059] -0.2445[-0.059] -0.2323[-0.057] 




0.5109[0.126]* 0.2480[0.061] 0.2552[0.063] 0.2662[0.065] 
  (0.0692) (0.4152) (0.4031) (0.3863) 
Industry_Org  -0.2261[-0.056] -0.3336[-0.082]** -0.3316[-0.081]** -0.3281[-0.080]** 
  (0.1205) (0.0339) (0.0351) (0.0381) 
cert_CPA  0.02653[0.007] -0.08693[-0.021] -0.07069[-0.017] -0.06364[-0.016] 
  (0.8442) (0.5538) (0.6327) (0.6676) 
cert_CIA  0.1515[0.037] 0.1892[0.046] 0.1931[0.047] 0.1980[0.049] 
  (0.2646) (0.2183) (0.2091) (0.1992) 
LogExp_CAE  -0.005496[-0.001] -0.1046[-0.026] -0.1102[-0.027] -0.1213[-0.029] 
  (0.9542) (0.3130) (0.2887) (0.2467) 
LogAge_IAF  0.02645[0.007] -0.07095[-0.017] -0.06590[-0.016] -0.07539[-0.019] 
  (0.7751) (0.4790) (0.5116) (0.4545) 
LogSize_IAF  0.1855[0.046]*** 0.07355[0.018] 0.07833[0.019] 0.07296[0.018] 
  (0.0045) (0.2795) (0.2507) (0.2862) 
Budget  0.2335[0.058]* 0.1036[0.025] 0.09846[0.024] 0.08365[0.021] 
  (0.0954) (0.4977) (0.5197) (0.5863) 
ACCountries  -0.004804[-0.001] 0.01624[0.004] 0.01960[0.005] 0.03216[0.008] 
  (0.9739) (0.9186) (0.9019) (0.8411) 
cert_IT H1a  -0.1122[-0.028] -0.1202[-0.029] -0.1124[-0.028] 
   (0.5806) (0.5544) (0.5818) 
IT_Savvy_GEN H1b  -0.1691[-0.042]* -0.1728[-0.042]* -0.1779[-0.044]* 










   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LogTraining_hours H1c  -0.03531[-0.009] -0.04380[-0.011] -0.05477[-0.013] 
   (0.7802) (0.7299) (0.6680) 
Critical_Thinking H2   0.06869[0.017] -0.008919[-0.002] 
    (0.3429) (0.9270) 
Business_Savvy H3a    0.1075[0.026] 
     (0.2734) 
Fraud_DetRes H3c    0.3466[0.085]* 
     (0.0587) 
_cons  -0.8725** 0.2780 0.2960 0.2618 
  (0.0180) (0.6217) (0.5995) (0.6470) 
LR chi2  35.42 172.58 173.48 178.08 
  (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
N  988 988 988 988 





59.21% 68.22% 67.51% 66.40% 
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p-values in 
parentheses; 
Marginal Effect at 
Means in brackets 
 
    





Regression Results and Marginal Effect at Means (Risk Control Monitoring) 
 










DA_Assu_RCMoni      
Size_Org  0.01576[0.004] 0.007096[0.002] 0.005951[0.001] 0.007986[0.002] 
  (0.6092) (0.8230) (0.8514) (0.8034) 
LogAC_Meetings  -0.2050[-0.051] -0.08870[-0.022] -0.09831[-0.024] -0.07751[-0.019] 




0.1324[0.033] -0.07767[-0.019] -0.06848[-0.017] -0.06481[-0.016] 
  (0.6387) (0.7923) (0.8171) (0.8278) 
Industry_Org  0.1096[0.027] 0.04539[0.011] 0.04893[0.012] 0.05242[0.013] 
  (0.4504) (0.7627) (0.7451) (0.7292) 
cert_CPA  -0.1242[-0.031] -0.1971[-0.049] -0.1763[-0.044] -0.1675[-0.042] 
  (0.3557) (0.1604) (0.2124) (0.2376) 
cert_CIA  -0.1690[-0.042] -0.1842[-0.046] -0.1782[-0.044] -0.1737[-0.043] 
  (0.2112) (0.2087) (0.2247) (0.2386) 
LogExp_CAE  -0.08872[-0.022] -0.1693[-0.042]* -0.1782[-0.044]* -0.1910[-0.047]* 






  (0.5812) (0.8590) (0.9238) (0.8479) 
LogSize_IAF 
 0.2470[0.061]***
* 0.1619[0.040]** 0.1677[0.042]** 0.1615[0.040]** 
  (0.0001) (0.0131) (0.0105) (0.0142) 
Budget  0.1055[0.026] -0.03447[-0.009] -0.04201[-0.010] -0.05940[-0.015] 
  (0.4458) (0.8120) (0.7724) (0.6844) 
ACCountries  0.2074[0.051] 0.2661[0.066]* 0.2697[0.067]* 0.2835[0.070]* 
  (0.1557) (0.0798) (0.0762) (0.0647) 
cert_IT H1a  -0.06768[-0.017] -0.07611[-0.019] -0.06584[-0.016] 
   (0.7250) (0.6928) (0.7336) 
IT_Savvy_GEN H1b  0.1015[0.025] 0.09663[0.024] 0.09116[0.023] 








   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LogTraining_hours H1c  0.1007[0.025] 0.08861[0.022] 0.07640[0.019] 
   (0.4092) (0.4690) (0.5353) 
Critical_Thinking H2   0.09629[0.024] 0.006549[0.0016] 
    (0.1714) (0.9443) 




Table 3.15 (Continued) 
    
Business_Savvy H3a    0.1266[0.031] 
     (0.1792) 
Fraud_DetRes H3c    0.3654[0.091]** 
     (0.0342) 
_cons  -0.6669* -0.2353 -0.2066 -0.2354 
  (0.0686) (0.6632) (0.7024) (0.6678) 
LR chi2  31.23 94.12 96.00 102.06 
  (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
N  988 988 988 988 





57.89% 63.06% 63.36% 64.47% 
p-values in 
parentheses; 
Marginal Effect at 
Means in brackets 
 
    
* p<.10   ** p<.05  *** p<.01  **** p<.001  
 
 
Overall, the results of multivariate analysis suggest that majority of hypotheses 
are supported, with the exception of training hours in IAFs and IAF alignment with 
organizational strategy. It might be case that training hours in IAFs are not specifically 
spent on data analytics, but perhaps are dedicated to more general auditing-related 
practices. Additionally, because of strong corporate governance practices, IAFs do not 
engage in activities that will jeopardize their objectivity and independence. Data-specific 
IT competencies (IT_Savvy_Data) are significant across all dependent variables, and it is 
confirmed that when IAFs face various management challenges, they are more likely to 
adopt big data analytics to cope with those challenges. Finally, IAFs in developed 







To document the interaction effects of significant variables, I calculated the 
marginal probabilities of adopting big data analytics. Figure 3.4 documents the 
interaction effects of the numerous significant variables predictive of the adoption of big 
data analytics for population testing rather than sampling. From Figure 3.4 (a), it is 
evident that, in small organizations, CAEs with a CPA certification are 8% more likely to 
adopt big data analytics than CAEs without CPA certification. Moreover, in large 
organizations, the conditional probability of adopting big data analytics by the IAF 
decreases in correspondence with the increase of the size of the organization, given that 
CAEs hold a CPA certification. This makes sense, since as the size of the organization 
increases, it is more likely to hire more personnel with data analytics competencies. In 
those cases, IT departments or data scientists might take provide support for data 
analytics. However, in small organizations it is evident that CAEs with CPA 
certifications play a critical role in the adoption of big data analytics for testing of 
populations rather than sampling. The same findings are true when the audit committee 
does not have a strong role [Figure 3.4 (b)] or when the size of the IAF is small [Figure 
3.4 (c)]. In both cases, CAEs with CPA certifications are far more likely to adopt big data 
analytics for the testing of populations rather than sampling.  
When data-specific IT competencies are low, CAEs with CPA certifications are 
more likely to adopt big data analytics, but with the increase of the data-specific IT 
competencies, the likelihood of CAEs with CPA certifications to adopt big data analytics 
decreases. This finding makes sense because IAFs might hire or train people with data 




competencies. The same finding is true for business savviness of IAFs [Figure 3.4 (d)]. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that in small organizations, or in the case of small 
IAFs, or when board oversight is not great, or when IAFs have low data-specific IT 
competencies, or when IAFs lack business knowledge, CAEs with CPA certifications are 
more likely to adopt big data analytics in the testing of populations rather than sampling.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Interaction Effects - Use of Data Analytics in Tests of Population  





Figure 3.5 highlights the interaction effects of sufficient budget and data-specific 
IT knowledge and critical thinking skills in the adoption of big data analytics in 
supporting business improvement processes. It is evident from Figure 3.5 (a) that when 
IAFs have sufficient budgets, they are about 3% more likely to adopt analytics given that 
their data-specific IT competencies remain the same. Moreover, when data-specific IT 
competencies increase, IAFs with sufficient budgets are 5.5% more likely to adopt big 
data analytics. Though overall adoption of data analytics in business process 
improvement is the lowest as I have seen in the descriptive statistics, it is evident that 
when IAFs have financial flexibility, they do tend to adopt big data analytics. The same 
scenario is true for IAFs with critical thinking skills [Figure 3.5 (b)]. IAFs with sufficient 
budgets are 4% more likely to adopt big data analytics in support of business 
improvement processes, given that both groups have similar critical thinking skills. It is 
evident that sufficient budgets allow IAFs either to hire data-knowledgeable personnel or 
to spend more on data-specific skills.  
 
 






It is evident from Figure 3.6 (a) that small IAFs in the finance industry are about 
10.5% more likely to adopt big data analytics in support of monitoring regulatory 
compliance than IAFs that are not in finance industry. This finding confirms that when 
IAFs face management challenges, they are more likely to adopt big data analytics. Since, 
as established above, many organizations in the finance industry are required to use data 
analytics, this is an expected result. Given that IAFs have similar data-specific IT 
competencies [Figure 3.6(b)], IAFs in the finance industry are 9% more likely to adopt 
big data analytics in support of achieving regulatory compliance. The same finding is true 
in regard to critical thinking skills [Figure 3.6(c)]. Overall, these results confirm that 
when faced with greater management challenges, IAFs are far more likely to adopt big 
data analytics in order to cope with those challenges. This suggests that there may be an 
underutilization of big data analytics by auditors because of the lack of opportunity even 
though they may possess sufficient technical competencies.   
When IAFs are challenged with fraud detection responsibilities, they are 7.4% 
more likely to adopt big data analytics for fraud risk management purposes, given that the 
organizations to which they belong are of the same size [Figure 3.7 (a)]. However, as the 
size of organization increases, this difference decreases; yet, IAFs with fraud detection 
responsibilities are still more likely to adopt big data analytics for fraud detection 
purposes. The reason for the decrease in probability with the increase in organizational 
size may be due to the ability of larger organizations to afford to employ data-savvy 
personnel which might serve to reduce the responsibility of IAFs in that regard. 
Similarly, IAFs with fraud detection responsibilities are more likely to adopt big data 














Although the increase of data-specific IT knowledge decreases this probability, 
IAFs with fraud detection responsibilities are still more likely (about 4%) to adopt big 




when IAFs face management challenges, they are more likely to adopt big data analytics 
to deal with those challenges. 
Figure 3.8 represents the analysis of big data analytics adoption for risk control 
monitoring in Anglo culture countries and when IAFs are tasked with fraud detection 
responsibilities. It is evident that, given similar IAF size, fraud detection responsibilities 
in Anglo culture country IAFs are more predictive of the likelihood of adopting big data 
analytics for risk control monitoring [Figure 3.8 (a)]. Even IAFs with fraud risk 
responsibilities in non-Anglo culture countries are more likely to adopt data analytics 
than IAFs with no fraud risk responsibilities in both Anglo and non-Anglo countries. 
These findings suggest that management challenges lead IAFs to adopt big data analytics, 
in general. The strong regulatory environment and effective implementation of corporate 
governance in Anglo countries might account for some of this. The same scenario holds 
when IAFs have same data-specific IT knowledge [Figure 3.8 (b)]. Taken together, the 
findings suggest that although data-specific IT knowledge is significant in the adoption of 
big data analytics, management challenges increase the probability of adopting big data 
analytics given that data-specific IT competencies are constant. The difference of the 
probability for adopting the data analytics remains the same even if data-specific IT 









Overall, the results from the analysis of interaction effects provide deeper insights 
about the adoption of big data analytics by IAFs. CAEs with CPA certifications are more 
likely to adopt big data analytics in small organizations, or in small internal audit 
departments, or when board involvement is low, or even when there are low IT and 
business skills. Further, an IAFs’ resources (such as sufficient budget) can also account 
for the adoption of big data analytics. Additionally, IAFs in highly-regulated 
environments such as the finance industry are more likely to adopt big data analytics. 
Finally, when IAFs are tasked with fraud risk management responsibilities, they are far 
more likely to adopt big data analytics in Anglo culture countries given that they have 
same data-specific IT knowledge, are part of similar-sized organizations, and are of 
similar departmental size. These findings, taken together, indicate that although data-
specific IT knowledge, or CPA certifications, or sufficient budgets have an impact on 
data analytics adoption, management challenges such as operation in highly regulated 
industries or fraud risk management responsibilities increase the probability of the 




Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Given the availability of the increasingly unprecedented amount of data in 
modern business, organizations in all industries have already begun capitalizing on the 
availability of data for achieving competitive advantages, thus improving ROA, asset 
utilization, and market value. This scenario of their clients also puts the burden on 
accountants/auditors to similarly embrace big data analytics. Data analytics have the 
potential to fundamentally change accounting and auditing processes such as infer 
(insight), predict (foresight), and assure (oversight) tasks performed by 
auditors/accountants (Schneider et al. 2015). However, there remain significant 
challenges to be overcome for accountants to reap the benefits of analytics technologies 
(Earley 2015). In particular, three kinds of challenges are documented in the literature – 
data (skill) challenges, process (cognition) challenges, and management (organization) 
challenges.  
Data challenges are related to data-specific technical knowledge. It is evident that 
there are shortages of data-savvy personnel in accounting/auditing. This shortage arises 
from two primary reasons– one is the lack of data scientists in the market (supply) and 
the other is the demand for such data scientists by all kinds of organizations (demand). 
Process (cognition) skills are related to the evaluation of vast amounts of data. Although 
big data analytics have significant potential to improve the judgment and decision-
making processes of accountants/auditors, it also brings with it the risk of introducing 
biases in the decision-making process. Big data might also overwhelm accountants since 
it requires a very high tolerance for ambiguity. Therefore, accountants/auditors are in 




challenges from their own organization or industry. It is suggested that having knowledge 
about data analytics alone will not create the benefits for accountants unless they have 
good knowledge about their businesses they serve (Richins et al. 2017). So, accountants 
need both data analytics skills and domain-specific business knowledge. Moreover, 
sometimes accountants’ responsibilities such as fraud detection and risk management or 
business process improvement might motivate accountants to adopt big data analytics 
because of its enormous potential to deal with those challenges. 
The purpose of this research is to study accountants’ adoption of big data 
analytics in their work processes, including procedures such as the testing of populations, 
business process improvements, assurance of regulatory compliance, risk control 
monitoring, and fraud risk management.  The results of the study indicate that data-
specific IT knowledge of IAFs is central in explaining the adoption of big data analytics 
to support the work processes of accountants. Even though many IAFs are have 
acceptable general IT knowledge, this general knowledge does not account for the 
adoption of data analytics. As such, accountants are encouraged to focus on improving 
data-specific IT knowledge in order to reap the benefits of big data analytics. 
Additionally, the critical thinking skills of IAFs (e.g., process knowledge) and business 
savviness are also significant predictors. Taken together, these findings support the 
influence of both technical competencies (hard knowledge) and process and business 
knowledge (soft knowledge) which are required for accountants to fully appreciate and 
effectively utilize big data analytics. When IAFs are in highly regulated industries or 
when IAFs are tasked with fraud risk management responsibilities, they are more likely 




sufficiency of budgets also play a role in the adoption of data analytics. However, it is 
found that the adoption of big data analytics by IAFs for business process improvement is 
limited, implying that accountants might be unwilling to use IAFs for management 
operation ground.  
The results of the research further our understanding of the adoption and 
subsequent usage of big data analytics when additional analysis (i.e., interaction effects) 
is performed on the significant variables. The presence of CAEs with CPA certifications 
in the firm is significant in explaining the adoption of data analytics. In particular, in the 
case of CAEs with CPA certifications in small organization, or in small IAFs, or when 
there is reduced board oversight, or when there is a lack of data-specific IT knowledge or 
business knowledge, adoption likelihood is increased as compared to situations with 
CAEs who have no CPA certifications. These findings suggest that small organization, or 
small internal audit departments, should consider employing CAEs with CPA 
certifications even if there is a lack of data-specific IT knowledge or business knowledge.  
It is also found that when IAFs have sufficient budget, they are more likely to 
adopt big data analytics in support of business improvement processes even if they lack 
data-specific IT knowledge or critical thinking skills. This suggests that IAFs will seek to 
use data analytics for management operations only when they have sufficient 
organizational slack. Further, IAFs in organizations operating in the finance industry are 
more likely to adopt data analytics than other IAFs even when both groups have the same 
size, enjoy similar data-specific IT competencies, and possess process knowledge - thus 
indicating that management challenges in many cases lead accountants to adopt big data 




responsibilities. These findings, taken together, support the conclusion that when two 
IAFs have the same technical and process knowledge, the IAFs with additional 
management challenges are more likely to adopt big data analytics. This conclusion 
stems from the fact that big data analytics provide the ability to deal with the challenges 
that accountants face in their normal work process. Finally, when comparing IAFs in 
Anglo culture countries to IAFs in non-Anglo culture countries, given the same size and 
technical competencies, it is found that IAFs with fraud risk responsibilities in Anglo 
culture countries have the higher probability of adopting big data analytics than other 
IAFs. In sum, these findings suggest that IAFs in developed countries are more likely to 
adopt big data analytics given that they are on the same footing with their non-Anglo 
counterparts.  
As with all empirical survey investigations, the study has some limitation. The 
items to measure latent constructs might not fully represent the constructs, there being no 
previously-validated scale for the items related to data analytics in the literature. 
Moreover, for dependent variables, a few but representative areas in which internal 
auditors can apply big data analytics have been represented; there are most surely others 
that can be assessed, as well.  There might also be other inhibitors associated with 
incorporating big data into accounting that the study could not incorporate.  
Even so, the findings of the study have both theoretical and practical implications. 
The findings contribute to the literature in several ways. First, the results of the study 
provide empirical support for the assertion that the challenges to big data analytics have 
implications for improving accounting practice. Second, the study highlights the 




knowledge is the most significant factor in supporting the adoption of data analytics. 
Therefore, accountants should focus on how they can improve their technical 
competencies for data analytics. Moreover, the results suggest that not only technical 
competencies but also process knowledge and business domain-specific knowledge leads 
accountants to adopt data analytics. It is evident that when two IAFs have same technical 
or process knowledge, IAFs with added management challenges such as increased 
regulation and fraud risk management responsibilities are more likely to adopt big data 
analytics than IAFs without such management challenges. From a practical standpoint, 
the findings of the study demonstrate how small organizations or small IAFs can improve 
the usage of big data analytics by employing CAEs with specialized knowledge such as 
CPA certifications. Secondly, the research will better inform the external auditing process 
in its evaluation of the decision to rely on the work product of internal auditors simply by 







OUTSOURCING OF BIG DATA ANALYTICS BY  





The omnipresent availability of vast amounts of data provides great opportunities 
for improving the bottom line of organizations. Regulators are also increasingly 
encouraging organizations to use data. However, the real value of data arises from the 
analytics applied to the data. Not only can organizations reap the benefits of big data 
analytics, data analytics have the potential to fundamentally change the auditing and 
accounting task processes (Schneider et al. 2015). Big data analytics have great potential 
to provide better forecasting estimates, support going concerns, detect instance of fraud, 
and other business factors are of interest to auditors (Alles 2015). Given these 
perspectives, accounting academics are focusing on different issues related to the 
adoption and use of big data analytics in the accounting/auditing profession.  
In this research, I focus on the outsourcing of big data analytics by the Internal 
Audit Function (IAF) of organizations. Of external and internal auditors, IAFs have a 
greater likelihood than external auditors to use big data analytics because the scope of 
work for IAFs is much broader than that of external auditors. IAFs also have easy access 
to organizational data, and the work of IAFs is not overly regulated as is the case with 
external auditors. Studying the outsourcing of big data analytics by auditors is important
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because the same individuals (IAFs) who provide data for outsourcing data analytics will 
also be directly affected by the outcome of those outsourcing decisions and must rely on 
the work performed by the service organizations9 , which are engaged in the outsourcing 
process. Thus, the motivations of accounting personnel who provide the financial inputs 
for organizational analytics are relevant and must be carefully considered when choosing 
the appropriate outsourcing solution  (Christ, Mintchik, et al. 2015).  
Blaskovich and Mintchik (2011, 13) suggest that “the complexity of the 
Information Technology Outsource (ITO) choice demands additional investigation of the 
sociologic, strategic, and economic factors that determine the decision. Although research 
on these drivers has been conducted for several decades, the dynamic nature of 
technology continues to raise interesting questions and offer fruitful avenues for 
research.” Christ et al. (2015) also noted that in the Outsourcing of Information Systems 
(OIS)10, big data analytics outsourcing and IT outsourcing are not identical business 
practices. Therefore, accounting scholars should exercise caution and evaluate the 
similarity of contextual factors when considering whether to extrapolate the wealth of 
general IT outsourcing findings in the literature to the particular context of big data 
analytics outsourcing. As a further context-specific complication, in considering general 
IT outsourcing wisdom in the context of specific analytics outsourcing objectives, 
outsourced accounting functions must be performed in specific compliance with 
regulatory requirements, are subject to external monitoring by regulatory authorities, and 
                                                 
9 Service organizations are those who will provide data analytics service; user organizations are 
those who will outsource data analytics. In this case, IAFs are user organization.  
10 For General outsourcing (Including IT outsourcing), accounting function primarily provides 
financial and performance data used to evaluate new or ongoing outsourcing relationships. Alternatively, 
when companies engage in OIS, the accounting function not only provides the input for the decision 
process, the accounting function itself is fundamentally changed as a result of OIS.   
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may also result in sanctions and significant penalties for non-compliance. Hence, the 
outsourcing of big data analytics by IAFs warrants careful investigation. A shared 
understanding of the business rationale for outsourcing alliances and the use of 
measurable objectives to monitor the performance of such alliances are crucial factors for 
long-term success; therefore, insights into user organization motivations for outsourcing 
big data analytics can help practitioners identify the appropriate control practices for OIS 
relationships in remediation of the associated risks (Christ, Mintchik, et al. 2015).  
Since there is little research on OIS in accounting contexts (Christ, Mintchik, et 
al. 2015), one must draw upon the literature from areas outside of accounting. The 
literature on outsourcing identifies three disciplines that explain the outsourcing decision-
making process. These disciplines include economics, strategy, and sociology. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Agency Theory (AT) from economics posit that 
companies are more likely to outsource services that are common, frequently performed, 
and rarely changed. The strategic perspective from management posits that outsourcing 
arises from a decision to focus on core competencies, from concerns about in-house 
capabilities, from opportunities for restructuring, and/or from a desire to access 
technology and expertise (Christ, Mintchik, et al. 2015). Researchers propose that 
strategic drivers will dominate cost considerations when outcomes are unpredictable or 
when there are significant organizational changes. The sociological perspective suggests 
that there exists a broad array of relationship-driven motivations to engage in OIS. For 
example, because Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) requires US executives to personally certify 
that internal controls are effective, and the financial statements are fairly stated, 
executives might prefer to outsource subjective processes, such as the preparation of 
142 
 
complex estimate in an attempt to distribute responsibility and to make the estimates 
more justifiable.  
The results of this study suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, economic 
factors as represented by the sufficiency of the budgets allocated to IAFs are not 
significant predictors of outsourcing of audit functions.  Rather, strategic and sociological 
factors are most indicative of the likelihood of outsourcing big data analytics. 
Specifically, IAFs outsource big data analytics when they lack data skills to perform the 
processes and when they are tasked with fraud risk management responsibilities. 
Additionally, the role Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) is also significant. There is also a 
cultural variation of the outsourcing decision; IAFs from developing nations are more 
likely to outsource than are IAFs from developed countries. Further analysis of the 
interaction effects of these significant variables suggests that as the data skills of IAFs 
increase, the conditional difference of the likelihood of outsourcing decreases, suggesting 
that IAFs recognize both the value of data analytics and their related lack of 
competencies. The three-way interactions of the variables support the same conclusion. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, since outsourcing 
involves risks, appropriate controls are required to mitigate risks and insights into user 
organizations’ motivations for outsourcing can help in identifying the appropriate control 
practices for outsourcing relationships (Christ, Mintchik, et al. 2015). Second, contrary to 
previous expectations that companies are more likely to outsource services that are 
common, and which are rarely changed, the study provides evidence that this 
conventional wisdom does not apply for all situations related to the outsourcing of 
auditing analytics. Third, the findings also provide guidance for external auditors when 
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they evaluate the objectivity and competence of IAFs before relying on their work. These 
findings add to our understanding about the role of accountants in outsourcing in 
response to calls in the literature for understanding the role of accountants and auditors in 
the IT outsourcing process.  
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
 
Accounting information systems practice is intertwined with Information 
Technology (IT) infrastructure; yet, there is little research by accounting academics on 
the outsourcing of IT functions by accountants or auditors (Christ, Mintchik, et al. 2015; 
Blaskovich and Mintchik 2011). Therefore, accounting researchers default to the 
reference disciplines to explore the determinants of outsourcing of accounting functions. 
The literature identifies three categories of determinants for IT outsourcing: economic, 
strategic, and sociologic. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) posits that organizations 
usually outsource in order to minimize costs. Specifically, organizations weigh both 
production costs and contracting costs before making outsourcing decisions. TCE 
postulates that organizations tend to outsource those activities that are common, 
frequently performed, rarely changed, and have easily measurable quality (Christ, 
Mintchik, et al. 2015). Firms with a lack of financial slack also tend to outsource (Smith, 
Mitra, and Narasimhan 1998; Hall 2005). 
Obtaining personnel trained in big data analytics is one of the greatest obstacles in 
accounting (Alles, 2015), exacerbating the possibility of building in-house capabilities. 
IAFs find it very difficult to compete for big data talent since most competitors are also 
vying for analytics personnel. Research indicates that many auditors consider financial 
resources a barrier to the adoption of data analytics (Protiviti 2017). Historically, long 
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term financial flexibility affects the adoption of audit software by auditors and surveys 
document that a very small amount of financial resources have been dedicated to data 
analytics by auditors (Protiviti 2017). Given this reasoning and circumstances, it is 
hypothesized that:  
H1: IAFs with sufficient financial resources are more likely to outsource big data 
analytics. 
Many researchers charge that the economic perspective of outsourcing is too 
narrow and subsequently depicts a short-term perspective. For that reason, some scholars 
draw upon strategic theories to account for outsourcing decisions. Strategic theory 
postulates that outsourcing arises from the decision to focus on core competencies, 
concerns about in-house capabilities, opportunities for restructuring, and a desire to 
access technology and expertise (Christ, Mintchik, et al. 2015). In this view, anything that 
did not contribute immediately to the characteristics that directly support the competitive 
bottom line would be outsourced in order to free up organizational slack for 
concentration on competitive objectives.  
Researchers postulate that when outcomes are unpredictable or when there are 
significant organizational changes underway, strategic theories prevail over cost 
considerations in organizational decision-making. Since big data analytics has the 
potential to fundamentally change the nature of the work of accountants in the firm, it 
may lead to competitive advantages and a related desire to develop in-house capabilities 
and skills for data analytics. Alternatively, if accountants cannot develop in-house 
capabilities, in view of the growing recognition of the importance of analytics in 
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accounting and auditing, they might tend to outsource the analytics process to gain access 
to necessary skills and technologies. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:  
H2: Data analytics skills of IAFs are negatively associated with the outsourcing.  
Some researchers contend that sociological motivations of different roles in 
organizations are also important for understanding the behavior of outsourcing aspects of 
the accounting function. Generally, this line of research focuses on the effects of 
relationships among companies and/or individuals on outsourcing decisions (Christ, 
Mintchik, et al. 2015). The nature of such relationships is affected by organizational 
politics, power, contracting, institutionalism, institutional isomorphism, and social norms. 
Blaskovich and Mintchik (2011) noted that sociological motivations for outsourcing arise 
from a political power struggle with chief IT personnel, pressure from IT vendors, and 
related factors.  
The jobs and responsibilities of accountants are defined by numerous regulations 
and corporate governance guidelines specific to particular industries. These 
circumstances might shape interplay of power and politics, thus affecting the decisions on 
outsourcing. For example, many financial organizations require that every audit use data 
analytics or that auditors validate that they reviewed their scope and approach for data 
analytics use and justifies why analytics were be used (Protiviti 2017). Further, because 
of the requirements of Sarbanes Oxley, accounting executives might prefer to outsource 
subjective processes in an attempt to distribute responsibility and to make potentially 
risky decisions appear more justifiable (Christ, Mintchik, et al. 2015).  
Research suggests that executives related to IT play leading roles in the 
consideration of outsourcing but that final decisions are often made by a small number of 
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business executives with little IT knowledge (Sobol and Apte 1995). In IAFs, Chief 
Audit Executives (CAEs) are the managers who makes strategic decisions (such as the 
adoption of big data analytics) and it is acknowledged that different kinds of 
certifications held by CAEs reflect on their specialized knowledge. Since big data 
analytics demands special knowledge, it is expected that CAEs with certifications might 
play a critical role in the data analytics outsourcing or usage decision. Tang et al. (2017) 
documented that the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) certification is the one most 
commonly found in IAFs. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:  
H3: Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) with CPA certifications tend to outsource big 
data analytics.    
Another important sociological aspect that might have an effect on outsourcing 
decisions in the auditing function is corporate governance practice. Specially, the role of 
the audit committee is important because IAFs report to them and since audit committee 
is charged with the overall financial responsibility of organizations. Since big data 
analytics has greater potential to streamline the operations of accountants, persons 
responsible for corporate governance such as the audit committee might play a critical 
role in gaining access to this emerging technology. Research also documents that audit 
committees play a critical role in the adoption of emerging technologies and process 
(Abdolmohammadi et al. 2017; Islam, Farah, and Stafford 2018). Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H4: Audit Committee oversight will be positively associated with the outsourcing 
decisions for big data analytics.    
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Of the many applications in which data analytics can be employed by 
accountants, fraud detection is increasingly important. Regulators such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) also use big data analytics to identify fraud in financial 
statements and to identify audit failures. Fraudulent insurance claims are also detected by 
auditors using big data analytics. In most of the organizations, IAFs are tasked with the 
responsibility for fraud detection; for these reasons it is hypothesized that:    
H5: IAFs with fraud detection responsibility is more likely to outsource big data 
analytics.     
The outsourcing literature suggests that country characteristics might affect the 
extent and the form of IT outsourcing (Apte et al. 1997). Members of the accounting 
practice suggest that culture represents a major barrier to the successful implementation 
of analytics (Protiviti 2017). The oversight of corporate governance personnel also might 
not be as rigorous in developing countries as in developed ones, which could lead to 
overlooking the potential of big data analytics in risk control monitoring, risk assessment, 
fraud detection, and regulatory compliance. Therefore, it is expected that the outsourcing 
of data analytics by IAFs will vary from culture to culture. Because of the shortage of 
personnel skilled in data analytics and owing to a distance barrier in acquisition of such 
personnel, IAFs in developing nations will tend to outsource data analytics. As such, it is 
hypothesized that:  
H6: IAFs from developing countries are more likely to adopt big data analytics 









The data for the study were collected from the Common Body of Knowledge 
database (CBOK 2015) developed by The Institute of Internal Auditors Research 
Foundation (IIARF). For the study, only the responses from Chief Audit Executives 
(CAEs) were used, on the rationale that they are more knowledgeable and experienced 
than the balance of personnel in the internal audit department.   The distribution of the 




Distribution of Sample (Number of Observations) 
 
Total Respondent 14518 
Less: Director or Senior Manager 1630 
Less: Manager  2098 
Less: Staff 5644 
Less: Missing Value for Respondents’ Position 182 
Less: Academic Staff or Retired 1620 
Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) 3344 
Less: Missing Values for Dependent & Independent Variables 2928 





Distribution of Sample (Types of Organizations) 
 
Type_Org Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
Privately Held 137 32.93 32.93 
Publicly Traded 160 38.46 71.39 
Public Sector 85 20.43 91.83 
Not for Profit 24 5.77 97.60 
Other 10 2.40 100 







Distribution of Sample (Regions Represented) 
 
Region_Org Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
Africa 44 10.58 10.58 
Asia  72 17.31 27.88 
Europe 123 29.57 57.45 
Latin America 51 12.26 69.71 
North America 115 27.64 97.36 
Oceania 11 2.64 100 
Total 416 100  
 
 
Variable Measurement and  
Empirical Model  
 
The dependent variable of the study is the percentage of data analytics activities 
that IAFs outsource. For hypothesis H1, the financial flexibility of IAFs is represented by 
the amount of budget they receive from the organization. Budget is a dummy variable 
(Budget), with one representing IAFs that have completely sufficient budgets or zero 
otherwise. For H2, data analytics skills of IAFs (IT_Savvy_Data) are measured by factor 
scores; to calculate factor scores, Bartlett method was used. Exploratory factor analysis 
using principal components produced one factor with the eigenvalues greater than 1, and 
this factor accounts for 67.84% of variance. The items and factor loadings are displayed 
in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 respectively. All factor loadings are above the threshold 
recommended by Hair et al. (1998). For H3, CAEs with CPA certifications is measured 
using a dummy variable (cert_CPA), with one representing CAEs who hold a CPA 
certificate, zero otherwise. For hypothesis H4, audit committee oversight was measured 
using the log of the number of audit committee or equivalent meetings in which CAEs 











What is the extent of activity for your internal audit department 
related to the use of the following IT tools and techniques? 1 = None; 
2 = Minimal; 3= Moderate; 4= Extensive 
5. A software or tool for data mining (ITSD1) 
6. An automated tool for data analytics (ITSD2) 
7. Computer Assisted Audit Technique (ITSD3) 














The auditing literature frequently uses the number of meetings held by the audit 
committees to measure the oversight of the audit committee in the organization. The 
fraud detection responsibility (H5) is measured using a dummy variable (Fraud_DetRes), 
with one representing IAFs who have all or most of the responsibility to detect fraud in 
the organization or zero otherwise. Studies that use the CBOK (2015) database usually 
consider Anglo-culture countries developed countries. In line with the literature and 
expectations, developing countries (H6) is measured by using a dummy variable 
(Non_ACCountries), with one representing the IAFs not belonging to UK/Ireland, USA, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa, zero otherwise. Additionally, several 
control variables were included, but when Full Model (FM), including the controls, is 
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run, all of the controls were insignificant.  Therefore, the Reduced Model (RM) was used 
for hypothesis testing. The empirical model of the study is:  
Prob (Ousource_DA) = F [α0 + α1 Budget + α2 IT_Savvy_Data + α3 
cert_CPA + α4 LogAC_IAF_Meetings + α5 Fraud_DetRes + α6 
Non_ACCountries] + ε 
 
Eq. (4.1) 
Since the response variable (Ousource_DA) is a fraction, including both zero and 
one, it is recommended that Fractional Regression (FR) rather than Ordinary Least 




Descriptive Analysis of Variables  
 
Summary statistics in Table 4.6 shows that, on average, 20% of data analytics 
activities are outsourced by IAFS, but the standard deviation (23%) is greater than the 
mean indicating that there is a lot variation in the outsourcing of data analytics. Of the 
outsourcing organizations, privately-held and not-for-profit outsource most (23%), 
followed by public sector firms. Publicly-traded organizations outsource the least (17%). 
There is no statistical difference between organizations in term of data analytics 
outsourcing (p < 0.21).  
A little more than 33% of IAFs, on average, have sufficient budgets to support 
analytics and the difference is not significant across organization types (p < 0.33). The 
average value of data analytics skills is 0, with the standard deviation being 1. This 
finding is in line with the Bartlett factor scores, since the Bartlett method standardizes the 
responses with a mean of one and a standard deviation of 1.  
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Positive factor scores indicate skills above the average and negative factor scores 
indicate skills below the average. Though there are both positive and negative factor 
scores for the variable IT_Savvy_Data, the difference across the type of organization is 
not statistically significant (p < 0.27). Further, on average, 46% CAEs have CPA 
certifications, with the difference across the organization type being statistically 
insignificant (p < 0.52). However, the difference in audit committees’ oversight is not 
significant (p < 0.45). Only 25% of IAFs are responsible for fraud detection, with the 
difference being insignificant (p < 0.65), while the outsourcing decision is significant 
across organizations in terms of culture (p < 0.00), suggesting that culture has a bearing 




Summary Statistics of Variables Across Different Types of Organizations 
 













Outsource_DA 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.18 1.48 
 (0.239) (0.253) (0.227) (0.216) (0.292) (0.268) (0.21) 
Budget 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.26 0.38 0.50 4.60 
 (0.476) (0.476) (0.486) (0.441) (0.495) (0.527) (0.33) 
IT_Savvy_Data 0.00 0.29 0.04 -0.20 -0.10 -0.10 1.30 
 (1.00) (0.983) (0.983) (1.015) (1.039) (0.978) (0.27) 
cert_CPA 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.58 0.60 3.23 
 (0.499) (0.496) (0.499) (0.503) (0.504) (0.516) (0.52) 
LogAC_IAF_Meetings 1.65 1.59 1.71 1.64 1.70 1.53 3.72 
 (0.527) (0.536) (0.511) (0.545) (0.545) (0.400) (0.45) 
Fraud_DetRes 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.40 2.45 
 (0.431) (0.410) (0.434) (0.447) (0.442) (0.516) (0.65) 
Non_ACCountries 0.67 0.80 0.64 0.62 0.21 0.80 34.91 
 (0.471) (0.405) (0.480) (0.487) (0.415) (0.422) (0.00) 
N 416 137 160 85 24 10  
 
 
Multivariate Analysis and Tests of Hypotheses  
 
The correlation matrix in Table 4.7 suggests all correlations are below 0.5 and the 
relationship between outsourcing, and fraud detection and culture are significant, thus 
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supporting H5 and H6. Several other relationships between explanatory variables are also 
significant. Table 4.8 contains the results of Factorial Regression (FG) analysis and 
suggests that data analytics skills of IAFs have significant negative relationships with 
outsourcing decisions, indicating that if the data analytics skills of IAFs increase, they 
tend not to outsource. This finding confirms the expectation that IAFs either prefer focus 
on core activities or that they are concerned about the lack of pertinent skills when they 
have low data analytics capabilities. CAEs with CPA certifications played an important 
role in outsourcing decisions, and IAFs with fraud detection responsibilities were also 
more likely to outsource (H5). Finally, IAFs from developing countries are more likely to 
outsource. However, no support is found for cost considerations or audit committee 
oversight. Since the coefficients of Fractional Regression (FR) are difficult to interpret, 
the marginal effects at means (which measure the change in the response variable for the 
change in an explanatory variable holding other variable values at means), are also 
included. For example, marginal effect at means for Fraud_DetRes indicates that IAFs 







 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Outsource_DA 1       
2.Budget -0.0678 1      
3.IT_Savvy_Data -0.0893 0.1370** 1     
4.cert_CPA 0.0512 0.0441 0.0940 1    
5.LogAC_IAF_Meeti
ngs 
-0.0058 0.00330 0.1670*** 0.0234 1   
6.Fraud_DetRes 0.0984* -0.0007 0.1060* -0.0654 -0.0689 1  






Regression Results and Marginal Effects at Means 
 
  Outsource_DA Marginal Effect at Means 
Outsource_DA    
Budget  -0.171 -0.0268 
  (-1.06) (-1.06) 
    
IT_Savvy_Data  -0.145* -0.0227* 
  (-1.81) (-1.79) 
    
cert_CPA  0.276* 0.0433* 
  (1.87) (1.86) 
    
LogAC_IAF_Me
etings 
 0.0641 0.0100 
  (0.48) (0.48) 
    
Fraud_DetRes  0.339** 0.0530** 
  (2.10) (2.11) 
    
Non_ACCountri
es 
 0.391** 0.0613** 
  (2.15) (2.19) 
    
_cons  -1.94****  
  (-6.73)  
N  416 416 





The interaction effects of significant variables are presented in Figure 4.1 and 4.2. 
Figure 4.1(a) shows that when IAFs data analytics skills are low, IAFs from the 
developing nations are 7% more likely to outsource big data analytics than IAFs from 
developed countries. As the skills increase, the difference decreases, indicating that IAFs 
consider big data analytics a core skill. Further, when IAFs have low data analytics skills 
but are assigned fraud detection responsibilities, they are 6% more likely to outsource big 
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data analytics (Figure 4.1(b)). The same scenario holds for the other variables. Taken 
together, the findings suggest that IAFs consider data analytics to be a critical skill and 
that they only outsource when they are low in data analytics skills, but the likelihood of 
outsourcing decreases as the skills increases. This tends to validate the strategic 
perspective of outsourcing in IAF decisions.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Two-Way Interaction Effects 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the three-way interactions of significant variables. Figure 4.2(a) 
suggests that IAFs with fraud detection responsibilities in developing nations are most 
likely to outsource when they are low in data analytics skills. Overall, Figure 4.2(a) 
indicates that IAFs in developing nations are more likely to outsource and this likelihood 
increases further when they are assigned fraud detection responsibilities. The same 
finding also holds for other interactions variables. Taken together, the results suggest that 
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when IAFs are led by CPAs, or when IAFs are in developing nations, or when IAFs have 
fraud responsibilities, they are more likely to outsource analytics than other IAFs. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Three-Way Interaction Effects 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study examines the determinants of outsourcing big data analytics by the 
Internal Audit Function (IAF). The importance of the study is reflected by the potential of 
data analytics to change the work processes of auditors. Though the information systems 
literature is rich in detail on the outsourcing topic, there is little outsourcing research in 
accounting. The study of the outsourcing of data analytics is important because the same 
individuals (IAFs) who provide data for outsourcing data analytics will also be directly 
affected by the outcome of those decisions and must rely on the work performed by the 
service organizations. Additionally, the complexity of this particular technology (i.e., 
data analytics) demands additional investigation of the sociologic, strategic, and 
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economic factors that determine the decision. Outsourced accounting functions must be 
performed in compliance with regulatory requirements, they are subject to external 
monitoring by regulatory authorities, and may they result in sanctions and significant 
penalties for non-compliance; thus, the outsourcing of big data analytics by IAFs 
warrants further investigation. 
Drawing upon the Information System (IS) literature, the study hypothesizes that 
economic, strategic, and sociological factors play role in the IAFs’ decision to outsource 
big data analytics. The results of the study suggest, contrary to conventional wisdom, that 
economic factors (as represented by the sufficiency of the budget allocated to IAFs) are 
not significant. Rather, strategic and sociological factors are significant in the outsourcing 
of big data analytics. Specifically, IAFs outsource big data analytics when they lack data 
skills and are tasked with fraud risk management. Additionally, the role of Chief Audit 
Executives (CAEs) is also significant. There is also a cultural variation in the outsourcing 
decision; IAFs from developing nations are more likely to outsource than are IAFs from 
developed countries. Further analysis of the interaction effects of these significant 
variables suggests that as the data skills of IAFs increase, the conditional difference of 
the likelihood of outsourcing decreases, suggesting that IAFs recognize both the value of 
data analytics and their lack of competencies. The three-way interactions of the variables 
support the same conclusion.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, since outsourcing 
involves risks and because appropriate controls are required to mitigate those risks, 
insights into organizational motivations for outsourcing of analytics can help in 
identifying the appropriate control practices for developing outsourcing relationships. 
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Second, contrary to previous expectations that companies are more likely to outsource 
services that are common and rarely changed, the study provides evidence that this 
conventional wisdom does not apply for all situations, particularly as regards the 
outsourcing of accounting functions such as audit analytics. Third, the findings also 
inform external auditors who may be considering the evaluation of the objectivity and 
competence of IAFs before relying on their work. Finally, the findings add to our 
understanding about the role of accountants in outsourcing, in answer to the calls for 
research into the role of accountants and auditors in IT outsourcing processes.  
There are limitations to the study. As in any survey research, data representing the 
responses of CAEs might not represent their real opinions, or may represent them 
unreliably, thus limiting the generality of results. Additionally, for data skills, there is no 
established scale and thus the construct might suffer from construct validity and 
reliability issues.  
The research does provide opportunities for future research. For example, 
researchers can seek to understand the implications of the lack of data analytics skills on 
the part of IAFs, assessing whether it is due to the lack of necessary resources or if it is 
because they do not consider data analytics skills integral to the auditing function. Future 
research can also focus on how IAFs deal with the risks that arise from the decision to 





CHAPTER 5  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the findings of three studies of the dissertation. 
Limitations of the studies are also described. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
directions for future research.  
Study 1: Reaction of the Investors of Rivals Firms to the  
Information Security Breaches of Focal Firms: Evidence  
from Market Activity and Information Asymmetry 
 
The study finds evidence that markets of rival firms react when focal firms 
experience data breaches. Particularly, the study documents that when focal firms 
announce data breaches, rival firms’ trading volume and information asymmetry 
increases. However, the overall effects of data breaches to rival firms are opposite to 
those of focal firms; in many cases, rival firms’ markets also react negatively. 
Specifically, I find that the characteristics of data breach types and previous data breach 
histories of focal firms have implications for rivals. However, strong information 
technology governance of rivals plays a shielding role in mitigating those negative 
effects. Further, though I hypothesized that strategic similarity of focals with rivals also 
has implications, the study did not document such effect. The results of the study are 




Study 2: Big Data Analytics Challenges and Internal Audit 
Function (IAF)’s Reliance on Big Data Analytics 
 
Though big data analytics has potential to create value for accountants/auditors, 
data analytics are underutilized in the audit practice. The study examines the adoption of 
big data analytics by the Internal Audit Function (IAF) in view of several key challenges 
to adoption. The results of the study suggest that data-specific IT knowledge rather than 
general IT knowledge is significant in explaining the adoption of big data analytics. 
Critical thinking skills and business knowledge also contribute to the adoption of big data 
analytics.  
If IAFs face challenges (management challenges) such as fraud risk detection, 
they are more likely to adopt big data analytics. Results from interaction effects analysis 
suggest that Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) with CPA certifications are more likely to 
adopt big data analytics than CAEs without CPA certifications, when the size of the 
organization is small, or when the size of the IAF is small, or when there is a lack of data-
specific IT knowledge or business skills. Another important finding is that, when two 
groups of IAFs have similar size and data-specific IT knowledge, IAFs with fraud 
detection responsibility (management challenges) are more likely to adopt big data 
analytics. Finally, IAFs in Anglo culture countries are more likely to adopt big data 
analytics than IAFs in non-Anglo culture countries given that both IAFs have the same 
size and have data-specific IT knowledge.  The study has both theoretical and practical 






Study 3: Outsourcing of Big Data Analytics  
by Internal Audit Function 
 
Big data analytics has the potential to fundamentally change the work process of 
auditors. The research studies the motivations of the Internal Audit Function (IAF) to 
outsource analytics. The results of the study suggest that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, economic factors (as represented by the sufficiency of the budget allocated to 
IAFs) are not significant. Rather, strategic and sociological factors are significant in 
determining the outsourcing of big data analytics. Specifically, IAFs outsource big data 
analytics when they lack data skills and are tasked with fraud risk management 
responsibilities. Additionally, the role Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) is also significant. 
There is also a cultural variation in outsourcing decisions; IAFs from developing nations 
are more likely to outsource than are IAFs from developed countries. Further analysis of 
the interaction effects of these significant variables suggests that as the data skills of IAFs 
increase, the conditional difference of the likelihood of outsourcing decreases, suggesting 
that IAFs recognize both the value of data analytics and their specific lack of 
competencies in making such decisions. The three-way interactions of the variables 
support the same conclusion. The findings have implications about the formation of 
effective internal controls that will remediate risks arising from the outsourcing decision 
process. Moreover, external auditors will find the results useful when they evaluate the 




The first study is subject to several limitations. Privacyrights.org does not cover 




Additionally, since the disclosure of data breaches is not required by the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), there is wider latitude on the part of management on 
whether to disclose breaches. 
As with all empirical survey investigations, the second study also bears 
limitations. The items used to measure latent constructs might not fully represent the 
construct because there are no established scales for the items related to data analytics in 
the literature. Moreover, for dependent variables, a few but highly representative areas, in 
which internal auditors can apply big data analytics were covered. There might be other 
inhibitors associated with incorporating big data into accounting that the study could not 
subsequently account for. 
The third study is also subject to limitations. As is the case with all survey 
research, the responses here of CAEs might not represent their actual opinions, or may 
represent them inexactly, thus limiting generalization of the results. As in other studies of 
this dissertation, constructs are assessed for which prior scales did not exist, and 
subsequent issues of construct validity and reliability should always be taken into 
consideration when evaluating results.  
 
Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 
The findings of the dissertation can provide fruitful avenues for future research. 
Future studies should look for the other characteristics of data breaches or investigate 
other sorts of data breached firms, in order to discern further implications of breaches for 
rival firms. Most of the previous research that focus on a particular industry to examine 
the spillover effect of information security breaches used CAR for market reaction; one 




reactions. Additionally, the effects of breaches on firms related to but not in competition 
with breached firms (e.g., suppliers or distributors in value chains) might well be studied 
in future research.  
For the adoption of big data analytics by the IAF, future studies might focus on 
other issues such as security risk management of data which might have implications for 
the adoption of analytics. The role of CAEs with IT certification might also be explored, 
since their role was not significant in influencing the adoption of big data analytics.  The 
third study of the dissertation also suggests future research opportunities. For example, 
researchers can seek to understand the reasons for the lack of data analytics skills on the 
part of IAFs – attempting to determine if it is because they lack necessary resources or 
because they do not consider data analytics skills as integral to the auditing function. 
Further, future research can focus on how IAFs deal with risks that arise from the 
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THIS CONFIDENTIALITY AND NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (“Agreement”) 
is entered into on this <04-14-2017> (“Effective Date”) by and between the Internal 
Audit Foundation (the Foundation), a not-for-profit incorporated in the Washington, 
D.C., (“the Foundation”) and < Md. Shariful Islam > (“Contractor”) (both hereinafter 
referred to as “Parties”) 
The Parties agree as follows:  
 
1. Disclosing Party. For the purposes herein, the Disclosing Party is the Foundation 
where said party provides information to the Contractor.  
2.  Receiving Party. For the purposes herein, the Receiving Party is the Contractor 
where said party receives information from the Foundation.  
3.  Purpose. See Attachment A: Data Access Request Form. (“Purpose”) 
4.  Confidential Information. For purposes herein, “Confidential Information” shall 
mean any and all information of a confidential nature that the Disclosing Party 
discloses to the Receiving Party, including, but not limited to  specifications, 
formulas, prototypes, computer programs and any and all records, data, ideas, 
methods, techniques, processes and projections, plans, business plans, marketing 
information, materials, financial statements, memoranda, analyses, notes, legal 
documents and other data and information, regardless of form, as well as 
improvements, patents (whether pending or duly registered) and any know-how 
related thereto, as well as any information learned by the Receiving Party from the 
Disclosing Party through inspection of the Disclosing Party’s property and/or its 
products and/or designs, and any third-party confidential information disclosed to 




Notwithstanding, Confidential Information shall not include information 
that: (i) is now or subsequently becomes generally available in the public domain 
through no fault or breach on the part of the Receiving Party; (ii) the Receiving 
Party can demonstrate in its records to have had rightfully in its possession prior to 
disclosure of the Confidential Information by the Disclosing Party; (iii) Receiving 
Party rightfully obtains from a third party who has the right to transfer or disclose 
it, without default or breach of confidentiality obligation; (iv) the Receiving Party 
can demonstrate in its records to have independently developed, without breach of 
this Agreement and/or any use or reference to the  Confidential 
Information; or (v) is disclosed pursuant to the order or requirement of a court, 
administrative agency, or other governmental body; provided, however, that the 
Receiving Party shall make the best effort to provide prompt notice of such court 
order or requirement to the Disclosing Party to enable the Disclosing Party to seek 
a protective order or otherwise prevent or restrict such disclosure.  
For the purpose of the foregoing exceptions, disclosures which are specific, 
such as design practices and techniques, products, software, operating parameters, 
etc. shall not be deemed to be within the foregoing exceptions merely because they 
are embraced by general disclosures which are in the public domain or in the 
possession of the Receiving Party. In addition, any combination of features shall 
not be deemed to be within the foregoing exceptions merely because individual 
features thereof are in the public domain or in the possession of the Receiving Party, 
but only if the combination itself and its principle of operation are in the public 




information may be generally known in the relevant industry, but the fact that the 
Disclosing Party uses it may not be so known, and therefore, such information shall 
be treated as Confidential Information.  
5. Non-disclosure and Non-use. The Receiving Party agrees to accept and use 
Confidential Information solely for the Purpose. The Receiving Party will not 
disclose, publish, or disseminate Confidential Information to a third party. The 
Receiving Party further agrees to take all reasonable precautions to prevent any 
unauthorized use, disclosure, publication, or dissemination of Confidential 
Information to any third party. The Receiving Party agrees not to use Confidential 
Information otherwise for its own or any third party’s benefit without the prior 
written approval of an authorized representative of the Disclosing Party in each 
instance. In performing its duties and obligations hereunder, the Receiving Party 
agrees to use at least the same degree of care as it does with respect to its own 
confidential information of like importance but, in any event, at least reasonable 
care. Further, the Receiving Party agrees that it shall not make any copies of the 
Confidential Information on any type of media, without the prior express written 
permission of the authorized representative of the Disclosing Party, other than for 
the fulfillment of the Purpose.  
6. Ownership. All Confidential Information, and any derivatives thereof is and shall 
remain the property of the Disclosing Party and no license or other rights to 
Confidential Information is granted or implied hereby to have been granted to the 




7. No Warranty. The Confidential Information and any other information is provided 
by the disclosing party “as is”, without any warranty, whether express or implied, 
as to its accuracy or completeness, operability, use, fitness for a particular purpose, 
or non-infringement.  
8. Return of Confidential Information. Nothing herein shall be construed as 
imposing an obligation on the Disclosing Party to disclose, now or in the future, 
Confidential Information to the Receiving Party. The Disclosing Party may, at any 
time, with or without cause, demand the return of the Confidential Information, or 
any part thereof, by giving written notice to the Receiving Party, with immediate 
effect. Upon the earlier of: (i) the Disclosing Party’s foregoing written notice or (ii) 
the termination, or expiration of this Agreement as set forth in paragraph eight 
below, the Receiving Party shall forthwith:   
(a) return to the Disclosing Party any information disclosed in any tangible 
form, and all copies thereof (on whatever physical, electronic or other media such 
information may be stored) containing any of the Confidential Information, unless 
such Confidential Information is stored in electronic form, in which case it is to be 
immediately deleted; and  
(b) provide a written certification that the Receiving Party has complied with 
all of the terms of this Agreement, that it has retained no copies of the Confidential 
Information on any media and that it has retained no notes, or other embodiments, 
of the Confidential Information.  
9. Equitable Relief. The Receiving Party hereby acknowledges that unauthorized 




significant injury to the Disclosing Party that may be difficult to ascertain. 
Accordingly, the Receiving Party agrees that the Disclosing Party, without 
prejudice to any other right or remedy that it may have available to it at law or in 
equity, will have the right to seek and obtain immediate injunctive relief to enforce 
obligations under this Agreement without the necessity of proving actual damages 
and without the necessity of posting bond or making any undertaking in connection 
therewith.  
10. Entire Agreement and Governing Law. The laws of the State of Florida govern 
all matters arising out of this Agreement. Any action to enforce any terms of this 
Agreement must be brought in Seminole County, Florida and both parties consent 
to a court of competent jurisdiction in that state.   
11. Term. This Agreement shall govern the communications relating to Confidential 
Information between the Parties hereto as of the Effective Date, and shall expire or 
terminate upon the earlier of the following to occur: (i) the period of two (2) years; 
or (ii) until such time as the present Agreement is expressly superseded by a 
subsequent agreement between the Parties hereto; or, (iii) upon termination of the 
Agreement by either Party hereto, at any time, with or without cause, subject to a 
seven (7) day prior written notice (hereinafter, all of the above “Term”). The 
obligations set forth in this Agreement shall bind the Parties for a period of three 
(3) years from the date of disclosure of the Confidential Information or any part 
thereof, and such obligations shall survive the termination or earlier expiration of 




12. Assignment. This Agreement shall not be assignable by either party without the 
prior written consent of the other party, and any purported assignment not permitted 
hereunder shall be construed null and void. However, it is hereby clarified that 
consent of the Receiving Party shall not be required for the terms and conditions of 
this agreement to apply towards the company formed by the Disclosing party upon 
its incorporation.  
The parties are signing this agreement on the Effective Date, which is stated in the 
introductory clause.   
  
 
  
  
 
